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ABSTRACT
The author presents a new framework for approaching command and
control in operations other than war (OOTW). Currently, no common doctrine
exists, between potential coalition partners to guide the command and control
process in this particular environment. As a consequence, coalitions are formed
ad-hoc,which has potential consequences for the adequacy of the resulting
command and control process and system, and commensurately, for the speed
and impact a coalition may have in a target environment. The author examines
current US perceptions concerning command and control, intelligence, and
communications, and the conceptual adjustments required for US forces
involved in the irregular environment. Challenges and lessons learned from
recent OOTW are then discussed in order to identify, to the degree possible, the
specific impediments to optimum coalition command and control. Conclusions
stress that a common and standardized approach is required to blend the
political agendas, capabilities, and limitations of a diverse coalition into an
efficient and effective entity. To accomplish this, the approach must include a
methodical and iterative process which logically, chronologically, and holistically
frames and links the problem at hand, the resources arrayed to address the
problem, and the functions that comprise the problem solving process, in a
manner appropriate to existing conditions at any particular time. The
Coordination, Cooperation, and Consensus (CO^) Loop presented in this
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. PURPOSE
The purpose of this thesis is to present a useful framework for approaching
command and control (C^) and its inextricable elements, intelligence and
communications, in operations other than war (OOTW).
Currently, no common doctrine exists between potential coalition partners
to guide the command and control process in this environment. As a
consequence, coalitions are formed ad-hoc, which has potential consequences
for the adequacy of the resulting command and control process and system, and
commensurately, for the speed and impact a coalition may have in a target
environment.
The framework presented is called the Coordination, Cooperation, and
Consensus (CO^) Loop, and is a standardized, concept oriented, decision and
capability based methodology that provides a more holistic approach to the
conceptual, environmental, and architectural aspects of C^ in OOTW.
B. METHODOLOGY
The author first provides a discussion of the nature and origins of US
perceptions concerning C^, intelligence, and communications. Then, the nature
of OOTW and how it impacts traditional US command and control perceptions is
examined. Subsequently, challenges and lessons learned from recent OOTW
are discussed in order to identify, more specifically, the impediments in
achieving optimal coalition command and control. Finally, the new framework is
introduced, which provides an initial attempt at addressing the identified
impediments and lessons learned.
A major issue the new framework, and the thesis, will address is the notion
of command and control as a problem solving process. Although individual
coalition members may have a distinct command and control process as a result
of their respective role in the coalition, the coalition must share a problem
solving methodology to ensure that individual C2 processes are synergistically
positioned in the environment. This requires a methodical, holistic, and iterative
process, as is developed in the framework presented in this thesis.
Many, but not all, of the challenges, examples, and lessons learned
presented in this thesis are drawn from three recent OOTW: OPERATION SEA
ANGEL (disaster relief to typhoon victims in Bangladesh 11 May-13 June, 1991),
OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT (Kurdish relief operations, Northern Iraq,
April- June 1991), and ongoing efforts in Somalia, including OPERATION
RESTORE HOPE and OPERATION CONTINUE HOPE, (December 1992-
present). These operations involve dramatically different circumstances and
threat levels, and hopefully offer a representative sample of what coalitions will
face in future OOTW. This thesis, however, is not a case study, per se. The
details of these operations are widely chronicled in other works. A brief synopsis
of the state of affairs surrounding each operation, however, is provided in
Appendix A.
The research for this thesis involved several sources. Personal interviews
with individuals involved in the aforementioned operations, including one of the
JTF commanders, were especially useful. Further interviews with principle staff
members from the staffs of US Commander in Chief Pacific, and Commander
Marine Forces Pacific provided the author with a great deal of information
concerning current initiatives geared towards improving C3I in the general
sense. Other supporting material was drawn from after action reports and
"lessons learned" submissions from respective operations, documentation from
appropriate training and doctrine commands, and other available books, reports,
and periodicals. The author's attendance at a conference at the Naval War
College concerning United Nations involvement in OOTWalso helped lend a
more internationally balanced perspective
C. SCOPE
This thesis is written for the JTF commander, about command and control,
intelligence, and communications in operations other than war, and from an
operational perspective. The emphasis in this thesis rests with identifying the
key factors that currently impact the ability of the US military and other coalition
forces in providing optimal command and control in the OOTW environment, and
developing conclusions germane to recommending an alternative and improved
approach.
Despite the operational focus, there is significant, albeit inadvertent,
overlap into institutional, strategic, and tactical territory. Additionally, many other
considerations involving such functional areas as logistics, operations, and
administration are vital to compiling an exhaustive list of factors involved in
OOTW. While considerable overlap between these additional areas and
command and control may exist in reality and in this thesis, they are not
specifically addressed.
Additionally, one should not automatically discount the relevance of this
study to missions outside the realm of OOTW. Although there are differences,
many operational concepts and practices appropriate for combined arms and
conventional types of roles remain relevant in OOTW. Accordingly, the
conceptual framework and functional decomposition may have utility in other
types of operations.
D. BACKGROUND
1. The Changing World
The boundaries that formerly provided focus for US defense planning no
longer exist. Predicating US military force structure, equipment, and training on
the Cold War and anticipated large scale, world wide confrontation with the
Soviet Union is no longer valid. The US no longer has a dependable, predictable
opponent against whom to focus strategy.
What is clear, however, is that external US security challenges have
changed and that the world is even more unpredictable and perilous than ever.
The regional "de-polarization" resultant from communism's collapse has
triggered a worldwide resurgence of ethnic, religious, and political upheaval.
Many countries do not share the same internal stability as the US The downfall
of communism has left many large countries in pieces. The commensurate
leadership vacuum has left the "pieces" unchecked in their quest for legitimacy,
resources, revenge, etc.. State impotence and flux within the disintegrating
states and associated "fragment nations" is certain to perpetuate conditions
under which neighboring countries or enclaves will clash (as is occurring in the
former Yugoslavia), and non-traditional types of conflict will flourish. Religious
fundamentalism may also play heavily into this equation.
Furthermore, third world instability is likely to continue for several
reasons. Former superpowers and other first world nations are likely to devote
less and less attention to third world problems, especially as resources needed
to rectify more pressing internal and external problems remain scarce. The
existing economic and social conditions that exist in many third world nations,
such as high debt load, scarce resources, over population, disease, lack of food,
poverty, and disparate of wealth will continue to foster a tumultuous
environment.
Additionally, most of these benefits of the technological revolution are
currently limited to first world nations. The disparity in standard of living will
widen if this trend is not reversed and the technological infrastructure of third
world nations improved. Compound these factors with a host of other disasters,
both natural and man-made, and the ominous consequences for the human
condition in many parts of the world are evident.
2. Why is it necessary to consider OOTW?
a) Continued US Involvement Likely
Operations short of war, peace operations, irregular operations,
operations other than war, or by whatever alternative alias the operations of
interest in this thesis are referred, are an increasingly important and prevalent
part of US foreign and defense policy.
The prevailing environment and a lack of resources to address these
problems suggest that the era of uncertainty, instability, and tumult is likely to
continue, with corresponding ramifications for the need for some form of
response. Accordingly, US military forces can anticipate continued involvement
in situations that fall outside the realm of "traditional" charters. Whether
engaging in peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations in Somalia, or
providing humanitarian relief to hurricane ravaged South Florida, the US military
will necessarily maintain its adopted, "chameleon like" character to accomplish
the myriad of assigned roles in these operations- operations other than war
(OOTW).
Many argue that US military participation in operations such as
peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or foreign humanitarian assistance is
inappropriate. Reasons for this position include fear of degrading conventional
capability as well as concern that the United States should expend its ever-
decreasing defense resources to pursue only those interests vital to its national
security. Although the exact implications of employing US forces in OOTW are,
at best unclear, the remainder of the argument requires serious scrutiny.
The concept of "national interest" is murky and does little to justify
(or not justify) employment of US military force. Nations, including the United
States, are increasingly aware that many problems and issues, such as the
environment, refugees, and commerce, are "trans-national" and do not recognize
sovereign boarders. The sheer number of nations and the corresponding
intertwining of interests renders conflict resolution and achieving agreement and
consensus between involved parties extremely difficult. Consequently,
interpretation of US interest and subsequent actions aimed at achieving those
interests are extremely situational and inconsistently applied. The lack of
boundaries, includes, but is not limited to defense oriented concerns. Concurrent
with the development of a New World Order are emerging concepts of state
sovereignty, legitimacy, and collective action that have significant implications
for the employment of military forces. [Ref. 1]
b) Precedent for Coalition Operations
OOTW will potentially remain a prominent role for US forces for the
foreseeable future, which causes concern for various reasons. Recent history
indicates a trend, as pertains to US military involvement in OOTW. The trend
implies that, not only will the US participate in future OOTW, but also that when
it participates, it will do so as part of a coalition.
Though not to imply that the US should (or does) seek "permission"
from the world community for every, or any, policy decisions resulting in military
deployment, recent operations have set a precedent has been set for obtaining
international consensus versus taking unilateral action. The increase in the
number of nation states has created a situation where specific "interests" are
likely to overlap between nations. Accordingly, to maintain an appearance of
legitimacy, many nations, including the US, more and more frequently seek
international consensus and support in many aspects of foreign policy,
especially those that involve the use of the military. [Ref. 2:p.51] Additionally,
many evolving nations are too weak to defend their interests alone. The
advantages of collective cooperative arrangements are obvious, resulting in a
corresponding increase in the amount of consensus, cooperation, and
coordination (CO^) between nations
c) The Role of Doctrine
At the very heart of war lies doctrine. It represents the central beliefs for
waging war in order to achieve victory. Doctrine is of the mind, a network
of faith and knowledge reinforced by experience which lays the pattern for
the utilization of men, equipment, and tactics. It is fundamental to sound
judgment. [Ref. 3:p. 1-1]
Currently, the doctrinal foundation from which OOTW are
approached is, in the author's opinion, less than adequate. There is, to the
author's knowledge, no common doctrine for OOTW. Current joint doctrine
touches on some of the complexities involved in both OOTW and coalition
warfare. Further, several "playbooks" and "help lists" were developed from the
lessons learned during past irregular operations. Unfortunately, the author feels
that these efforts are not adequate in addressing the differences between
OOTW and conventional operations.
The doctrinal void means that future OOTW will be approached with
doctrine developed largely for conventional operations. This approach is not all-
together wrong, in the author's opinion, as many of the fundamental concepts
that apply to conventional operations remain appropriate for OOTW. There are,
however differences between OOTW and conventional operations. Some are
subtle, some less so. These differences are enumerated in subsequent chapters
of this thesis.
Certainly, lacking common doctrine, coalition forces are not wholly
impotent. Through a combination of applying lessons learned in previous OOTW
and adapting accordingly and, in many cases, superhuman individual efforts,
American forces continue to play pivotal roles in OOTW. One may consider US
contribution to coalition accomplishments in the numerous OOTW subsequent to
Desert Storm to draw conclusions as to the effectiveness of this approach.
Unquestionably, forces of various compositions have achieved significant
degrees of success in OOTW, but have been somewhat handicapped by the
lack of common doctrine. They will continue to learn from their predecessors
mistakes and make significant contributions towards improving the human
condition in many clime and place.
Efforts at developing joint doctrine specifically oriented towards
OOTW are underway, and subsequent coalitions have benefited significantly
from the lessons learned in previous operations. However, until doctrine is
developed, shared, and digested by all likely coalition participants, the approach
taken in future OOTW will remain largely ad-hoc. This is, at best, a contentious
path.
The problem with ad hocracy, the only available method when a framework
is absent, is that the individual determinations may form a set of defacto
principles of operation, a new set of rules of the game that would not have
been adopted through a conscious, deliberative process. The crisis and
responses of the early post-cold war period suggest strongly this
possibility unless clarifying discussions and deliberations occur. [Ref. 4:p.
2]
Although the focus of this thesis is not to measure the impact of
doctrine in a particular type of operation, it is logical to assume that the
standardized framework found in doctrine may, in some degree, enhance force
effectiveness by alleviating the need to "reinvent the wheel" for every situation.
Commensurately, lessons learned during these operations suggests that there
exists considerable room for process improvement in many facets of these
operations, as well as a need to establish a codified, standard set of procedures
to guide forces in the conduct of these missions.
Doctrine is important for a number of reasons, but its true value in
OOTW is in conveying how a force will embark upon its mission. The procedures
and other "ground rules" established in common, shared doctrine, would reduce
the mystery in how various parties approach OOTW. Participants, therefore, can
think through potential problem areas before crisis develops. This enhances, not
only the efficiency and effectiveness of the force, but also the rapidity and
magnitude of the impact a given force may have in a particular situation.
Doctrine also provides participants with a guideline to which they
can organize, train and equip appropriate forces. Hopefully, by examining the
nature of OOTW and identifying potential and actual shortfalls, as pertains to
C^, a more appropriate approach will surface. It is towards this overarching
objective that this thesis is focused.
E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS
1. Chapter II. Command and Control Overview
Chapter II provides a broad examination of the origins, nature,
objectives, and principles pertaining to US perceptions of command and control.
Current military viewpoints, and the critical notion that C^ is a problem solving
process, which depends upon intelligence and communications, is presented.
2. Chapter III. Operations Other Than War
Chapter III illustrates the unique environment of operations other than
war and its relationship to traditional US command and control precepts. The
author discusses the adjustments required of the "US military mind" in order to
more appropriately "navigate" the irregular operating environment.
3. Chapter IV. Command and Control Lessons Learned
Chapter IV provides a detailed discussion of specific challenges and
impediments, including those experienced in recent OOTW, to effective coalition
command and control.
4. Chapter V. Intelligence Lessons Learned
Chapter V presents a detailed discussion of the relationship between
command and control and intelligence, as well as the institutional and doctrinal
challenges as experienced in recent OOTW.
5. Chapter VI. Communications Lessons Learned
Chapter VI examines the challenges coalitions face in ensuring that
critical and adequate communications are achieved between coalition entities.
Again, current doctrinal shortfalls and historical examples provide a basis for this
discussion.
6. Chapter VII. A New Framework
Based upon the identified challenges and impediments in coalition
command and control, as well as intelligence and communications, Chapter VII
presents a standardized methodology which structures a coalition's approach to
command and control in a manner that adequately addresses the identified
shortcomings.
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II. COMMAND AND CONTROL OVERVIEW
A. INTRODUCTION
A critical analysis of command and control requires an understanding of the
status quo. The purpose of this chapter is to establish a foundation for the
command and control concept and to expand understanding of the command
and control process in the context of military operations. Towards this end, the
author will present a representative baseline of current thought on how C2, as
well as intelligence and communications, are viewed with respect to US military
operations. Furthermore, various thoughts on the structure of command and
control and the respective activities involved are presented.
Command and control is the central issue in this thesis. Communications
and intelligence are included in this analysis because, in the author's opinion,
command and control can not exist without them. The C^ paradigm that currently
exists and the one that this thesis will establish require detailed discussion of
these terms in the context of OOTW.
This chapter will reflect, to the extent possible, a commonly accepted,
doctrinally codified perspective. The terms and concepts presented in this
discussion focus primarily on the conceptual level, vice detailed technical
implementation.
B. COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2)
1. Origins
The term "command and control" is among the most misused terms in
the military vocabulary. First used in the 1950s in connection with the
11
automation of the US strategic air defense system, C2 has been poorly
understood and subject to widely varying interpretations ever since. [Ref. 5:p. 3]
A full appreciation of the complexities involved with command and
control requires a further discussion of its origins. C. Kenneth Allard, in his book
Command, Control, and the Common Defense, suggests that one should view
command and control as:
...the apex of a pyramid whose connected layers include in ascending
order national values, operational environments, strategic paradigms,





Figure 1. C. Kenneth Allard's Key Determinants of
Command and Control
service organization, national command, and finally, the command and
control environment itself. [Ref. 6:p. 241]
Graphically represented in Figure 1, this pyramid capsulizes the
historical and evolutionary foundation upon which US command and control is
predicated. Each level in the pyramid involves issues and concerns that are well
documented in the existing body of literature, and are beyond the scope of this
thesis. Current perceptions and difficulties related to the command and control of
12
US forces have roots primarily in the US military and governmental institutions
which actually perform the commanding and controlling.
The pyramidal paradigm is useful in both developing a framework for
understanding current perceptions, as well as analyzing command and control
lessons learned in subsequent chapters.
Currently, the vocabulary associated with the study of command and
control (C^) is contentious. There are very few commonly agreed upon terms
and interpretations. The derivative nomenclature associated and used
synonomously with C^, such as C^, C^l, and C^, further confuses the issue.
Debate continues to this day concerning the appropriate "exponents" for the
Cm l n equation. Command and control as well as its derivative forms mean many
different things to many different people. The vast number of brevities and the
interchangeable but undifferentiated manner in which they are used is a major
problem for the C^ community.
One of the least controversial things that can be said about command and
control is that it's controversial, poorly understood, and subject to widely
different interpretations. The term can mean almost everything from
military computers to the art of generalship: whatever the user wishes it to
mean. [Ref. 7:p. 23]
This blurred concept has far reaching ramifications in that it appears to
have diverted much needed attention away from the fundamental C^ process
itself. The two most serious implications of this are a confusion within the C^
community about the C^ function and responsibility as well as a failure of the C^
community to focus adequate attention on developing a useful and commonly
understood command and control theory. [Ref. 5:p. 4]
2- Definition
A critical aspect of understanding the complexities of command and
control lie in establishing a clear and concise definition of C2 and its associated
terminology.
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JCS Pub 1-02 defines command and control as:
The exercise of authority and direction of a properly designated
commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of a mission.
Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of
personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures which
are employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and
controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.
[Ref. 8]
This definition, however, is far more simplistic than what actually
transpires in practice. Command and control is the art and science of causing
subordinates to employ combat capability in the optimum fashion to attain the
command's mission. [Ref. 9:p. 1] Command and control is not viewed as simply
an exercise in the dynamics of communications and electronics. Rather, it is a
non technical process that occasionally relies on technology to accomplish its
mission. Emphasis is on the human aspect of the process, not the technical.
Many go through great lengths to emphasize the distinction between
command and control. The simplest method of defining any term is to examine
each word separately. "Command" represents the legal authority vested in a
military commander over subordinates, by virtue of rank or assignment. "Control"
is typically associated with a commander's direction of forces. The JCS-
sanctioned definition of "command and control" obviously goes well beyond the
basic dictionary wordage. [Ref. 5:p. 4]
The JCS definition is also convenient in that it captures a number of
distinct, but equally important, concepts in one definition:
• "The exercise of authority and direction of a properly designated
commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of a mission...,"
incorporates the legal and authoritative context of command.
• The statement that C2 functions "...are performed through an
arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities and
14
procedures...," captures the essence of a command and control system
(around which the subsequent definition of communications is based.)
• Finally, "...employed by a commander in planning, directing,
coordinating, and controlling forces...," introduces the fundamental
notion that command and control is a process. A detailed discussion of
this thought follows shortly. [Ref. 10:p. 4]
The extent to which these definitions imbue the personal nature of
command is striking. Particularly important is that command is vested in an
individual who is both responsible for the direction, coordination, and control of
military forces, as well as legally and professionally accountable for what those
forces do and don't do. US doctrine emphasizes that commander is the center,
the essence of the C2 system. [Ref. 6:p. 16]
Two other factors that directly relate to the concept of the commander
as the center of the system and are critical in understanding current perceptions
on command and control involve the relationship between C2 and the principles
of war known as the principle of unity of command and the principle of simplicity.
Unity of command has two major aspects: unity of effort and the premise
that the optimum command and control structure resides in a single commander.
Unity of effort manifests itself in several tangible ways, but is best described by a
single word- cohesiveness. Increased cohesiveness logically results in an
increase in effectiveness and synergistic use of an organization's resources.
The concept of a single commander comprising the optimum C2
structure is explained in terms of the limitations of human cognition and
information processing. Although the word commander is singular, it is
understood that command in a military organization consists of a hierarchy of
commanders interrelated in a chain of command. The required "problem solving
capacity" is obtained by arranging people with limited cognition and information
processing capacity in a hierarchical structure. [Ref. 11:p. 169]
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The principle of simplicity espouses the use of clear, uncomplicated and
concise language to gain understanding. As pertains to command and control,
the structures and procedures of command and control should be clear,
uncomplicated, and concise.
3. The Process
Perhaps the most important philosophical hurdle, in the author's
opinion, required in understanding and evaluating command and control is
recognizing that it is a process . Whether cognizant of it or not, commanders
have used (and will continue to use) this process since the beginning of warfare
in order to exercises authority and direction over assigned forces in
accomplishing the mission.
The American Heritage Dictionary defines process as:
A series of actions, changes, or functions that bring about an end result.
[Ref. 12]
The command and control process, in simplest context, is a problem
solving process oriented towards effecting change in a target environment. The
direction in which this process is oriented is predicated upon three central
questions that form the basic logic used in developing any military campaign
plan. Those questions are:
• What conditions must be produced to achieve the overarching goal?
• What sequence of events will most likely result in the desired
conditions?
• How should resources be applied to produce that sequence of events.
[Ref. 13:p. I-7]
Furthermore, the command and control process is embedded in a C2
problem solving system. The system problem solving system consists of a set of
decision makers who are "interconnected" via a command and control structure
and associated processes. Procedures are the processes used in a problem
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solving system to arrive at a solution. The procedures of C2 are the formalized
heuristics and algorithms employed to execute the functions of the command
and control problem solving definition. Finally, the functions that comprise the
process are an equally important part of the problem solving system. [Ref. 1 1 :p.
168]
The functions of command and control, as enumerated in the JCS
definition, are the planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling of forces.
These functions belie those things the commander must do to forces to
accomplish assigned tasks and objectives, and will manifest themselves in
various ways depending upon the situation. The command and control loop or
control cycle is the traditional paradigm used to model the manner in how
military commanders decide how best to execute these functions.
Several individuals have wrestled with conceptual models of the
command and control process. Although each representation has its peculiar
and unique attributes, each is similar in that it depicts command and control as
an iterative cycle of functions culminating in action and change in a target
environment. The conceptual model offered by Joel S. Lawson, who retired from
the Naval Electronic Systems Command where he was known as "the guru of
Navy C3I," presents a complete, yet simple view of the C2 cycle, in the author's
opinion. Lawson's models, as shown in Figure 2 [Ref. 6:p. 150] offer a
sophisticated but easily digested blend of concepts that include the C2 cycle and
its relationship with the environment and does an excellent job depicting the




























Figure 2. Lawson's Models of Command and Control
There are five basic functions indicated. SENSE is the function with
which the commander gathers information on the battlefield via any data
gathering activity (radar sites, forward observers, photo reconnaissance
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systems, etc.). The primary focus is upon extracting signals from the
environment. An important (and frequently overlooked) portion of this function is
information management. Only relevant information must continue through the
cycle to prevent clogging the system. This function heavily hinges upon the
intelligence process discussed later in this chapter. PROCESS acts upon the
gathered data to extract meaning from them. This function may also act upon
data external to the environment, such as intelligence analysis indicating
patterns representative of a division headquarters in a specific region of the
operating area. COMPARE conveys the ability to interpret and analyze
information and based upon this analysis, and discerning the current state of the
environment as opposed to the desired state. As a result of the comparison, the
DECIDE function entails selecting a course of action from possible options with
the aim of moving the actual state to the desired state. Implied in this phase is
the planning, preparation, and issuing of orders and plans. The ACT function
executes the decision. [Ref. 7:p. 25]
When one's own forces are added to the environment, their results,
status, etc., become a part of the data chain. The basic four step SENSE-
COMPARE-DECIDE-ACT model as shown in Figure 2 is therefore a component
in a more detailed and involved representation of the process. Lawson refers to
this as his thermodynamic model of the C2 process in reference to its interaction
with and effect upon the surrounding environment. The final diagram in the
figure shows Lawson's loop nested three deep. The model represents a notional
naval task force to illustrate the functional differences applied to this process at
each level, as well as their conceptual similarity. [Ref. 6:p. 153]
This representation also fits in well with Lawson's larger view of
command and control, which treats C^ as a process in which different
components have different roles while operating as parts of a larger system.
Lawson feels that "to talk about a completely integrated C3I system is
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ridiculous." The multiple parts that comprise a system must exist primarily as serf
contained, as well as perform definable and separable functions so that we can
change one "module" of the system without affecting all the others. Logically, it
then follows that the purpose of the command and control process is to either
maintain or change the state of the environment in a manner or for a purpose
determined by higher authority. [Ref. 6:p. 152]
C. INTELLIGENCE
By "intelligence" we mean every sort of information about the enemy and
his country-the basis, in short, of our own plans and operations. [Ref. 3:p.
IV-1]
Tell me what you know... tell me what you don't know... tell me what you
think... always distinguish which is which. [Ref. 3:p. IV-9]
This thesis develops intelligence as an integral part of the command and
control process. It is, in the author's opinion, a most critical consideration in C2,
as well as every other aspect of military operations, a fact illustrated in the
discussion of Lawson's cybernetic C2 loop.
1. Definition
Intelligence encompasses everything a commander knows and does not
know about a given situation. Opinions concerning the nature and distinction
between intelligence and other classes of information (such as information,
combat information, data, etc.) vary widely. Current doctrine, however, clearly
distinguishes between intelligence and information in order to "...better
understand intelligence and its cycle." [Ref. 3:p. II-3] The definitions for
intelligence and information are provided below
intelligence : 1. The product resulting from the collection, processing,
integration, analysis, evaluation and interpretation of available information
concerning foreign countries or areas. 2. The meaning that a human
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assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their
representation. [Ref. 3:p. GL-10]
information : 1. In intelligence usage, unevaluated material of every
description that may be used in the production of intelligence. 2. The
meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions
used in their representation. [Ref. 8]
For purposes of this thesis, the definition of information is expanded to
include all general knowledge available to a user, gained from a variety of
sources, organic and non-organic. It can take many forms ranging from raw,
unevaluated and incomplete, to fully processed. Information may be old and
stale, or real time and instantaneous. Sources will vary from extremely reliable to
known incorrect. [Ref. 14:p. 178]
The critical distinction between intelligence and information is that
information is data that, although collected, have not gone through analysis,
interpretation, or correlation with other data and intelligence. Analysis transforms
information into intelligence. While both intelligence and information are
important, and may exist together in various forms, they are not the same and
have different connotations, applicability, and credibility. [Ref. 3:p. II-3]
Further distinctions are made concerning the types of intelligence. Joint
Pub 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations , enumerates three
primary types of intelligence which parallel the three levels of conflict- strategic,
operational, and tactical.
Strategic intelligence is required for the formulation of strategy, policy,
and military plans and operations at national and theater levels. Operational
intelligence pertains to that intelligence required for planning and conducting
campaigns and major operations to accomplish strategic objectives within
theaters or areas of operations. Finally, tactical intelligence is required for
planning and conducting tactical operations. [Ref. 3 p. 11-1]
The intelligence sources, which encompass the means or systems used
to observe, sense, record, or convey information pertaining to conditions,
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situations or events, also require mention. These sources include seven primary
types: imagery intelligence (IMINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), signals
intelligence (SIGINT), measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), open
source intelligence (OSCINT), technical intelligence (TECHINT), and
counterintelligence (CI). [Ref. 3:p. 11-2]
2. Purposes
Commanders constantly seek information concerning the operating
environment, which drives the entire command and control process. In military
operations, either conventional or other than war, it is logical to anticipate that
the force with the most relevant, accurate, and timely information has a distinct
advantage in dictating the course of events.
It matters little what the situation was at any particular point or moment: all
that matters is what the commander thought it was. [Ref. 10:p. 6]
Recognizing the purposes of intelligence may assist commanders in
employing it in the most efficient and effective manner. Intelligence should
directly support commanders with complete and objective views of situations to
facilitate relevant and timely decisions commensurate with their responsibilities,
missions, and to the situation as it is known. A primary goal of intelligence is to
advise and assist commanders in determining objectives that will attain or
contribute to national security policy objectives, and derived military objectives.
Intelligence should contribute, as determined by the commander, to developing,
planning, and executing operations. The intelligence system must be structured
and operated to reduce the possibility of deception or surprise. System flexibility
is essential to allow for recovery if surprise does occur. Additionally, intelligence
must provide the commander with an understanding of the adversary's
command, control, and intelligence systems in order to determine appropriate
deception and denial measures. Finally, the role of intelligence in assessing
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operational results and determining when objectives are attained is critical to
subsequent force reorientation and operational planning. [Ref. 3:p. 111-4]
3. The Intelligence Cycle
The intelligence cycle depicted in Figure 3 is the process by which
information is transformed into usable intelligence and provided to those who
need it. Intelligence also has its steps represented in a time honored fashion.
Although adequate for discussing the doctrinal intelligence structure, the cycle
represents an oversimplification of intelligence operations in terms of the
processes and mechanics involved. It is also important to note that intelligence
actions do not necessarily occur sequentially in the cycle. For example, a
request for imagery results in action in the planning and direction step, but may
not require any additional collection because a production facility may have the
image on file, thereby fulfilling the request. A detailed discussion of the functions
in the intelligence cycle follows. [Ref. 3:p. 11-3]
PLANNING AND DIRECTION entails establishing the command
relationship of all intelligence elements within the force; identifying, prioritizing
and validating intelligence and intelligence system requirements. Various types
of intelligence support assets, including organic, attached, and supporting, are
necessarily considered in this step. Planning and direction also includes
identifying intelligence personnel augmentation requirements to other key staff
areas, as well as the logistics loads and sequencing required to support
intelligence operations.
COLLECTION includes both the acquisition of information and the
provision of this information to appropriate processing and or production
elements. The force collection management must have the capability to task any
coalition force asset and obtain the aid of external resources if necessary. The
disparate nature of the participants in OOTW present significant difficulties
throughout the cycle, and are similarly prevalent in the collection step.
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Figure 3. The Intelligence Cycle
Centralization of tasking must not, however, diminish the collection
management element's responsiveness to the requirements of individual
elements of the coalition. The system must also posses some redundancy to
compensate for the loss or failure of any collection asset, and ensure that
intelligence requirements are provided to the operating force.
Finally, optimizing coalition intelligence effectiveness requires clear
peacetime delineation and practicing of appropriate organizational and agency
responsibilities and procedures prior to the onset of operations
PROCESSING entails converting collected information into formats that
are easily used by intelligence personnel in the analysis and production of
intelligence. Processing includes data forma and format conversions, graphics,
art work, photographic developing, and other forms of multi media production.
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PRODUCTION is the integration, evaluation, analysis, and
interpretation of information form any source or sources into finished intelligence
to support military and related national security consumer requirements.
Producers of intelligence must know what the user requires, and must produce
objective, unbiased, and integrated products that provide appropriate individuals
and organizations with the clearest possible picture of the situation.
Intelligence is useless unless it gets to those who need it.
DISSEMINATION is the method of conveying intelligence to users in a suitable
form, and occurs in a variety of forms via a variety of means (including hard
copy, radio messages, data bases, pictures, etc.). Caution is necessary to
ensure that users are provided with only the information they require.
Information overload may otherwise result. [Ref. 3:pp. II-3-II-10]
4. Basic Principles
Intelligence doctrine encompasses intelligence considerations for all
forms of military operations, both during war and at times other than war. There
are several general principles developed that the doctrine establishes for joint
operations that require consideration (and are indicated in italics). The doctrine
indicates that the Joint Force Commander (JFC) is responsible for intelligence
support to operations. This individual determines the strategic and operational
objectives for the theater of operations, and decides on the relative importance
of intelligence in accomplishing the mission. The J-2 (Joint Force Intelligence
Officer) determines the intelligence requirements and the direction of the
intelligence effort in support of the JFC's objectives. The intelligence effort is
critical to the mission, and its nature, orientation, and scope depend on the
commander's perspective concerning the role of intelligence.
Synchronization of all intelligence and counter-intelligence (CI) activities
and assets is required to optimally support operations plans. The integration of
intelligence and operations ensures totality and consistency of effort at the
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agreed upon points. Effective synchronization results in the maximum use of
every intelligence resource, where and when its contribution is greatest.
Military intelligence must use the same approach for support of
peacetime operations, operations other than war, and war. While organizational
size (particularly in Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs)) may shrink and expand
with the scope and demands of an operation, a single structure is required to
prevent difficult and time consuming transitions from occurring during critical
situations.
Intelligence should play a role in the decision planning process from the
moment operations are contemplated or directed. Although J-2, JFC relations
are not standardized, the chief intelligence person should collocate with the JFC
and function as a full staff member. This allows intelligence to provide the
commander with the best information available, as well as to best identify,
develop, and disseminate critical intelligence in support of operations. J-2 must
also appraise the commander on the intelligence supportability of all
contemplated campaigns, operations, tactics, and courses of action.
Unity of intelligence effort will facilitate overall unity of effort. Coalition
operations may well involve a large, diverse array of intelligence assets. It is
imperative that commanders recognize the need to, where possible and
appropriate, exercise their authority to ensure that all mission related collection
and analysis is coordinated in centralized fashion. This ensures complete,
accurate, and current intelligence which provides coalition forces with the best
possible understanding of the adversary and the situation, and will reduce
duplication of effort.
Key elements in developing unity of effort lie in ensuring that
appropriate forces and units have access to any mission related intelligence
capability and coordination of all intelligence efforts n and about the area of
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interest. Although cooperation of intelligence organizations is important, it does
not replace the requirement for a unified and coordinated effort.
Commanders must recognize counterintelligence CI as a source of
information. CI is separate and distinct from foreign intelligence, and is designed
to support military commanders, operational planners, and traditional
intelligence disciplines during planning and operations at all levels. Methods and
varieties of support vary between organizational levels within DOD. CI has
played an important role in recent OOTW, and develops information on threats
to plans, resources, strategies, operations and systems posed by foreign
intelligence services and intelligence collection by foreign groups. CI is
responsible for identifying, neutralizing, and or exploiting this threat, and plays a
significant role in both force protection and complementing intelligence functions
such as collection and analysis.
Commanders must prioritize component intelligence requirements.
Prioritization allows intelligence planners to focus finite resources on
requirements in priority order. Furthermore, information flow management is
critical in preventing the war fighter from receiving more information than he can
"digest." The lowest command level possible should answer critical, time
sensitive requests for information (RFIs).
5. The Intelligence Community
Joint forces may expect to receive support from a number of sources
that are controlled and managed by organizations within the Intelligence
community.
The Intelligence Community refers to those Executive Branch agencies
that conduct activities contributing to the US national intelligence effort.. The
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the
Offices within the DOD for the collection of specialized national foreign
intelligence through reconnaissance programs, the Bureau of Intelligence and
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Research of the Department of State, the intelligence elements of the services,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of the Treasury, the
Department of Energy, the Drug Enforcement Administration and the staff
elements of the Director of Central Intelligence comprise the intelligence
community.
Intelligence elements of the Department of Commerce, the Defense
Mapping Agency (DMA), the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC),
the Federal Research Division (FRD) of the Library of Congress, and the
intelligence components of the unified and specified commands are also
intelligence contributors. [Ref. 15:pp. 9-10]
One may group these intelligence elements into five principle
categories:
• National intelligence organizations
• Department of Defense intelligence organizations
• Military service intelligence organizations
• The intelligence components of the unified and specified commands and
• Civilian intelligence organizations. [Ref. 15:p. 10]
6. Principles for Multinational Operations
Current doctrine also acknowledges that US forces will often participate
in operations with allied and friendly nations, as well as a host of other
organizations which may require "user-provider" relationships outside normal
parameters. There is no single intelligence doctrine for multinational operations,
as each coalition or alliance develops its own. There are principles and concepts
currently developed with the purpose of providing a starting point to develop the
required "situational" doctrine.
There are many similarities between strictly joint intelligence doctrine
and multinational procedures that stem from a common requirement-the need to
provide support to the operational forces. Multinational doctrines, differences in
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culture and national perspectives are just some of the differences that must be
understood in order to either adapt current or develop new doctrine. [Ref. 3:p.
VIII-1]
Joint Pub 2-0 identifies the principles that accommodate creating a
seamless intelligence support architecture for a multinational force. Several key
elements warrant discussion (and, again are identified in italicized print), and
parallel other requirements posed by the unique environment in OOTW that is
developed in detail in subsequent chapters of this thesis.
The first identified requirement is to adjust national differences among
nations. This involves identifying a single Director of Intelligence and adjusting
those support differences that may affect the integrated employment of
intelligence resources as well as the sharing of intelligence and information.
Additionally, intelligence officers from each nation need to view the
threat from a national and a coalition perspective. A shared perspective
facilitates unity of effort against a common threat. Alliances and coalitions are
developed in response to a common threat. Consequently, a threat to one
member of the coalition is necessarily considered a threat to all.
Determining and planning intelligence is no easy task in a coalition
environment. The requirements of all participants, as well as methods of
production and dissemination all require agreement well in advance of
operations. For anticipated situations and operations, a primary objective should
be ensuring compatibility of intelligence operating doctrine and concepts.
Identification of individual participant systems, communications, language and
terms, and services and products is a further prerequisite to developing the
"seamless" intelligence system desired in a coalition environment.
Special arrangements that facilitate the full exchange of intelligence are
often required in ensuring that all participants have the required intelligence and
information to accomplish their respective missions. Incompatibilities resulting
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from culture, language and terminology, organizations and structures, equipment
deficiencies, etc. are a reality in a coalition environment. The coalition should
adjust and coordinate as necessary to ensure each member is adequately
provided for.
An additional complication involves the disclosure of sensitive
information to a coalition member. This is a contentious issue both in the
substance of certain intelligence products as well as the manner in which these
products are obtained. When sources and methods can not be shared among
coalition participants, the intelligence should be sanitized, effectively separating
the intelligence from the method in which it is obtained.
Establishing complementary intelligence operations requires
identification of the resources, and capabilities and limitations of aM coalition
participants. Combined with a full understanding of coalition requirements will
facilitate a synergistic intelligence collection and management effort. [Ref. 3:p.
VIII-3-VIII-8]
7. Information Management
Timely decision making, crisis or otherwise, requires information.
Providing this information requires time to collect and process. Better decisions
require better (and sometimes more) information. Today, improved technology in
mobility, weapons, sensors, and C4 systems continues to reduce the factors of
time and space, cause faster tempos of operations, and generate incredible
amounts of information. This information overload, if not managed, may
ultimately degrade the reactions of personnel and ultimately the war fighting
force. The more information collected, the longer the time required to process.
The longer the processing time, the slower the decision cycle. It is essential to
employ C4 systems that are designed to complement human capabilities and
limitations.
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The preceding description of information requirements in military
operations suggests a dichotomy between the amount of information and
intelligence desired in a situation and the potential effects that obtaining
adequate levels of information has on the rapidity of decision making.
Commanders should directly influence the flow of intelligence and information
into their decision making process via the intelligence cycle.
D. COMMUNICATIONS
As previously mentioned, this thesis uses communications as an all-
encompassing term that incorporates the "how it's physically accomplished"
aspects of command and control. This includes considerations such as
hardware, software, architecture, and procedures.
1. Definition
In simplest form, communications is defined as:
A method or means of conveying information of any kind from one
person or place to another. [Ref. 8]
Current doctrine makes a distinction between a C2 system and a C4
system as shown in the definitions of each.
command and control system. The facilities, equipment,
communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a commander for
planning, directing, and controlling operations of assigned forces pursuant
to the missions assigned.
command, control, communications, and computer systems.
Integrated systems of doctrine, procedures, organizational structures,
personnel, equipment, facilities, and communications designed to support
a commander's exercise of C2, through all phases of the operational
continuum. Also called C4 systems. [Ref. 8]
Both definitions allude to the resources required to implement the C2
process. C2 systems, however, generally support only the C2 process (e.g.,
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emergency action message (EAM) dissemination systems), while C4 systems
(e.g., the Defense Message System; i.e., AUTODIN) support not only the C2
process but also common user and certain special purpose (communications,
information, and management) systems and functions. In a practical sense,
automated C2 systems are included within the umbrella definition of C4 systems,
but not all C4 systems can be thought of as C2 systems. [Ref. 16: p. 1-4] To
eliminate confusion, however, this thesis will consider and refer to both C2 and
C4 systems as command and control (C2) systems.
2. Components
The pieces of a C^ system are an important aspect of understanding
potential system vulnerability. The "facilities, equipment, communications,
procedures, and personnel," comprise the tangible aspects of the C^ system.
The components are interdependent, and the overall system is only as effective
as its weakest link. [Ref. 10:p. 5]
FACILITIES may be as sophisticated as the National Military Command
Center in the Pentagon, or as simple as a shelter half nailed to a tree in the field.
Whatever the degree of sophistication, command facilities or fusion centers are
an important part of any C2 system. They provide a location for housing
personnel and equipment required to operate the system. EQUIPMENT includes
all physical items involved in sensing, processing, computing, and displaying
information. Examples range from the missile warning system used at the
Strategic Air Command to an acetate covered map in the field.
COMMUNICATIONS is the most dominant subsystem of the entire C2 system,
but is not necessarily the most important. Communication system provide the
connection between the commander, his forces, and his source of data. The
term "communication" applies more than voice radio traffic. It can represent
anything from satellite transmissions to the hand and arm signals a squad leader
uses. PROCEDURE includes all steps used in planning, directing, coordinating,
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and controlling assigned forces. The commander or pre-established standing
operating procedures promulgate procedures. This is perhaps where the military
leadership style of a commander is most prevalent. The commander has a great
deal of flexibility in how he employs available technology, what information he
receives, how often he receives it, and in what format he receives it. The
PERSONNEL subset of the C2 system is without question the most important. It
enjoys this distinction because the human element is the weakest and most
complex part of the C2 system. The commander and his assigned forces are
part, as well s users of the C2 system. No matter how good the system is, it
relies on human interface for data input. The individual's decision making
process directly affects all information input. The most essential element of the
decision making process is the commander, the decision maker. The essence of
the C2 process is decision making, which normally occurs under conditions of
extreme uncertainty, great stress, and critical time sensitivity. Individuals not
properly trained, confused by the fog of war, physically exhausted, or simply
disheartened can adversely affect even an otherwise perfect C2 system. [Ref.
10:p. 5]
3. Objectives
Military forces must have information to operate. Desired is information
that is relevant, essential, timely, and formatted so that humans can quickly
understand and act on it. C2 systems provide the medium to process and
communicate information to support command and control across the
operational continuum. Although C2 systems may be complex, their underlying
objectives are not.
C2 systems should promote the synergism of military forces and their
supporting elements, by simultaneously bringing the thoughts, views, and
impressions of multiple commanders, key personnel, and other experts to bear
on any given task. The system must help decision makers form perceptions,
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react, and make decisions. Simplicity, immediate responsiveness, and ease of
understanding are all required to facilitate human effectiveness, especially
during high stress situations.
Additionally, C2 systems must have the capability to rapidly respond to
requests for information and to place and maintain the information where it is
needed. Providing the information only where needed effectively reduces the
potential to clog the communications network, hence reducing critical delays.
The overarching goal of C2 systems is to fuse many pieces of information
together in order to produce a simultaneous and accurate picture that meets the
needs of all system users. Although no one information fusing will meet the
needs of all users of the information, by providing users with concise, accurate,
timely and relevant information, unity of effort is improved, uncertainty reduced,
and the capabilities of the force as a whole are improved.
4. Principles
The C^ system developed in support of coalition efforts in OOTW will
require much forethought and consideration, and, as with any other complex
system, must adhere to certain principles to ensure maximum utility to the
operating forces. Some important factors are relevant to aspects involved in life
cycle development, and are beyond the scope of the thesis. The earliest stages
of command and control architecture planning, however, are guided by several
overarching principles (annotated in all capital letters).
DISCIPLINE allows for the prioritization of information flow in a fashion
consistent with the projected intensity and scope of the operation. More directly,
the principle of discipline provides for the ability to control the flow of information
gathering, processing, directing, and reporting to the commander. Mechanisms
that facilitate system discipline include reporting structures, standardized
message text formats and reports, standardized data base configuration
(including structures, elements, and formats for bulk data uploads and updates,
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precedence capabilities, preemption capabilities, call sign assignments, routing
indicators, minimize procedures, and other physical and procedural measures.
This concept is at least partially incorporated in emerging joint systems concepts
such as C4I For the Warrior (C4IFTW) which emphasize the problem of
"information overload", and advocate transition to the "information pull" concept.
[Ref. 16:p. II-2]
ECONOMICAL SYSTEMS EMPLOYMENT, without sacrificing
capabilities or survivability, is essential. This is accomplished in a number of
ways such as s consolidating functionally similar facilities, integrating special
purpose and dedicated networks into the DCS switched systems (if improved
service is possible). Careful planning, design and procurement of facilities and
systems, proper systems management and operating practices, as well as
appropriate use of available commercial systems will further facilitate economy
of employment.
The JTF C2 system requires sufficient INTEROPERABILITY to ensure
success in OOTW. Interoperability is achieved between systems when
information or services are directly (and satisfactorily) exchanged between
providers and users. Equipment and systems are common when: 1) they are
compatible; 2) operations and maintenance is possible (without additional
specialized training) by personnel trained on other equipment; 3) repair parts are
interchangeable; and, 4) consumable items (batteries, paper, etc. ) are
interchangeable. Current trends see DOD systems migrating more towards
Commercial Of the Shelf (COTS) equipment. This may alleviate much of the
interoperability problems currently experienced by US forces in a coalition
environment. [Ref. 16:p. II-3]
COMPATIBILITY is the ability of two or more components to function in
the same system or environment without mutual interference.
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Systems architecture's require FLEXIBILITY to adapt, with minimal
disruption, to the ever changing operational environment in OOTW. System
flexibility allows planners to more readily "plug in" and un-plug" all levels of
systems in and out of the architecture as the situation warrants.
C4 system capacity limitations mandate that commanders PRIORITIZE
INFORMATION requirements to ensure that they system will accommodate the
designated priority requirements.
The role of personal LIAISON in the dissimilar environment present in
OOTW is critical. Liaison effects mutual understanding and unity of purpose and
action, not only between military forces, but also between all other coalition
participants. C4 systems liaison personnel are equally important in ensuring that
the system functions as required/intended, and can take corrective action if
required.
C4 systems must perform when required and as intended,
demonstrating adequate RELIABILITY. This is achieved via providing sufficient
alternate paths for information flow, standardizing equipment and procedures,
electronic counter-counter measures, and establishing effective logistic support
programs. [Ref. 16:p. II-3]
SECURITY is an integral portion of communications planning at the
earliest stages. The threat environment will largely determine the level of
Communications Security (COMSEC) provided for in the system architecture.
Considerations such as user requirements and the susceptibility of transmission
media to interception and exploitation are essential.
5. Defense Communications System
The Defense Communications System (DCS) is important to consider in
this discussion, as it is the primary point at which the operational force will
interface with required strategic relationships. The DCS is a composite of certain
DOD communications systems and networks under the management control and
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direction of DISA. It administers the C2 requirements of DOD and civil agencies
directly concerned with national security or other critical emergency
requirements. The objective is to organize the complex of DOD communications
networks, equipment, control centers, and resources to provide an effective,
responsive, survivable worldwide communications system. [Ref. 16:p. II-3]
E. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter provided a broad look at the origins, nature, objectives and
principles that pertain to both command and control, and its inseparable
components, intelligence and communications.
Command and control is based upon a pyramidal structure of
considerations, each tier of which has its roots in history and tradition. The
vernacular of C2 is historically contentious- a malady which joint doctrine is
intended to fix.
US military conceptions of command and control hinge heavily upon the
notion of unity of command, both as pertains to authority vested in a single
commander and the unity of effort that is a result of this single source of
authority.
Conceptualization of C2 as an iterative and interactive problem solving
process is a key element of the foundation for the remainder of the thesis. The
process is established in order to create a change in a target environment, and
structured in accordance with three overarching questions that identify the
change of state desired, the milestones to reaching that state, and the resources
available to effect the change. The process is represented in a number of ways
as an iterative cycle comprised of functions (such as is developed by Lawson).
Each function plays a specific role in the cybernetic progression that allows the
commander to assess the condition of the operating environment, compare that
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condition to the desired state, decide what action is necessary, and then execute
the action decided upon.
Intelligence is established as a prerequisite for command and control
decision making. The importance and characteristics of adequate intelligence to
an operational force is also outlined in this chapter. The intelligence process
feeds the command and control process, and is also represented as an iterative
cycle. Multi-national operations pose significant challenges for the intelligence
community and are identified in current doctrine. Considerable forethought is
required to ensure adequate and appropriate intelligence support is provided to
coalition members.
Planning sufficiently in advance to ensure the capacity to share sensitive
information and intelligence, as well as to coordinate the disparate types of
intelligence resources present in a multi-national environment are key
considerations. Equally important is the ability to correctly identify and provide
for the very different intelligence needs of the various participants in a coalition.
This is particularly challenging, in part, because of the information management
problem. Technological trends and the common perception that more is better
pose potential problems as pertain to a force collecting more information than is
necessary or desired.
The net effect of "over collection" is that it hinders the commander's ability
to make a timely decision with the best information available. Collected
information requires time to process into usable intelligence. Unfocused or
poorly aimed collection efforts clog the force's processing capability with
information of little or low priority utility to the force. Consequently, a commander
experiences either a lack or lag of the information needed to orchestrate a
force's efforts.
Finally, to achieve its intended goal, a command and control process must
be supported by a command and control system. A command and control system
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facilitates the exercise of authority by providing information to the commander
and by conveying the commander's decision to the field. The sole function of the
command and control system then becomes one enabling a commander to
sense, compare, decide, and to act. It is a set of interconnected systems
comprised of input, decisions, and output, developed in concert with certain
overarching principles and objectives, and linked together by communications
and electronics systems.
An effective C2 system is the net result of successful interaction of a
complex architecture comprised of physical, human and procedural elements.
Developing multinational architecture's poses several predictable challenges as
pertain to common doctrine, procedures and equipment. Ideally, the architecture
will be transparent to the users; both commanders and forces being
commanded. As long as data is conveyed to the decision makers and orders are
passed to appropriate units, however, users easily forget about the complexity of
the process. What is critical is remembering that a C2 system is not just a series
of components. Rather, "command and control system' is an all encompassing
term that includes all processes, interrelationships, and interdependencies of
each component and subsystem. [Ref. 10:p. 5]
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OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR
A. INTRODUCTION
1. Purpose of the Chapter
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a general overview of the
irregular environment, identify appropriate distinctions between OOTW and
conventional operations, and draw conclusions regarding the implications of
these distinctions with respect to US perspectives concerning command and
control.
This chapter provides the reader with an analytical framework for
understanding the nature of OOTW. It identifies the critical dimensions and
guiding principles required to successfully navigate through the OOTW
environment.
2. Significance
The OOTW environment is different from conventional military
operations in many ways that fundamentally alter and complicate the nature of
the C2 process as developed in Chapter II. The determination of desired
changes in the target environment developing the plan to effect those changes,
and the implementation of that plan are significantly impacted by the
peculiarities of OOTW. Accurate understanding of the environment is required to
identify potential problem areas and to facilitate the development of appropriate
decision making processes.
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3. Types of OOTW
Military operations other than war encompass a wide range of activities
where the military instrument of national power is used for purposes other than
the large-scale combat operations usually associated with war. Although these
operations are often conducted outside the United States, they also include
military support to US civil authorities. Military operations other than war usually
involve a combination of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces as
well as the efforts of governmental agencies and non governmental
organizations, in a complementary fashion. [Ref. 17:p. V-1] The types of OOTW
run the gambit from support to US, state, and local governments, humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief, nation assistance and drug interdiction, to
peacekeeping, support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, non
combatant evacuation, and peace enforcement. [Ref. 18:p. 13-0] Although the
focus of this thesis is not to specifically differentiate between the various types of
OOTW, definitions are contained in Appendix B.
4. General Overview
Military operations are dynamic. Commanders are accustomed to
contemplating change in the direction and depth of battle and adjusting battle
plans to achieve specific, easily defined, military objectives in a dynamic
situation. As with any military employment, conventional operations are typically
driven by political objectives, and require a C2 capability that supports the
application military means for political ends.
Operations other than war are also dynamic, but considerations of less
importance in conventional operations attain much greater significance in
OOTW. The political dynamics inherent in the OOTW environment are at the
core of this observation. [Ref. 19]
The objectives established for UNISOM II clearly illustrate the potential
political nature of stated objectives in OOTW. OPERATION CONTINUE HOPE,
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UNISOM ll's official name, was authorized by UN resolution 814 on 26 March
1993. The resolution called for a nation-building effort in Somalia intended to
restore some semblance of government, internal security, the administration of
justice, and economic stability. Towards these objectives, specific goals included
keep the peace, achieve disarmament, facilitate economic rehabilitation and
help to rebuild the institutions of civil society with a broad representation from
the Somali people. [Ref. 20:pp. 6-7]
Based upon this overview, there appear to be, in the author's view,
several primary conceptual transitions pertinent to command and control that a
US commander must make in order to fully understand the OOTW environment
and its implications for military operations. Considerations including the nature
of OOTW, the role of the US military in OOTW, the complex and varied nature of
other participants, and the interaction between the US and other participants are
among the critical areas on which this chapter will focus.
B. THE NATURE OF THE OPERATION
1. General
OOTW originate for many reasons, and have several manifestations.
They may precede, follow, or occur simultaneously with war. They may occur in
conjunction with conventional operations to complement the attainment of
strategic objectives. They may occur domestically or abroad, as part of a
combatant commander's forward presence operations or a US Ambassador's
country plan. [Ref. 18:p. 13-1]
One characteristic common to all of these operations is that they are
dynamic and unpredictable, and may potentially experience several shifts of
direction during their course. All of these missions require that participants have
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a thorough situational awareness and understanding, and conduct in-depth
mission analysis to ensure that their efforts are correctly aimed.
Peacekeeping, for example, demands that the peacekeeping force
maintains strict neutrality. One or more of the belligerents may attempt to
provoke a response from peacekeeping forces that could undermine long-
term peacekeeping efforts. Certain military responses to civil disturbance
may solve the immediate crisis but subvert the legitimacy of local
authorities and cause further civil unrest. Humanitarian relief and nation
assistance should not promote dependency on aid from outside sources.
Quick, efficient action by US forces that resolves an immediate issue
without considering the long-term consequences and goals may promote
instability. In operations other than war, victory comes more subtly than in
war. Disciplined forces, measured responses, and patience are essential
to successful outcomes. [Ref. 18:p. 13-1]
Force flexibility is also an imperative, as the potential to rapidly
transition from OOTW to wartime operations (or vice versa) is high. OOTW do
not always occur in peaceful and benign environments. Resolute opponents may
decide that continuation of hostilities (with their original opponent as well as with
the forces introduced to produce order) is in their best interest. While the forces
engaged in OOTW have an inherent right to defend themselves, the use of force
to subdue any party to a conflict may complicate the situation and render
peaceful objectives unattainable. The dividing line between war and other than
war, however, is not always distinct and campaign plans must consider both if
the force is to retain the initiative. [Ref. 18:p. 13-1]
2. Dimensions
US Army doctrine currently under development captures the political
essence of operations other than war and the variance with respect to
conventional operations through a discussion of certain "dimensions" of OOTW,
which determine the nature of a particular operation.
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a) The Nature of the Mandate
Unilateral US conventional operations typically involve clear cut,
straight forward mandates, with very specific goals, that emanate from the
National Command Authority. OOTW, by nature, are much more politically
sensitive, resulting in a much wider array of mandates. The dichotomy present in
this situation, however, is that the more politically oriented the mandate, the
greater the difficulty in transforming the mandate into obtainable objectives. [Ref.
21]
Mandates convey both direct and implied missions. Commanders
must, therefore, carefully analyze the mandate to develop appropriate strategic
and operational concepts and objectives, focusing on what is "do-able" for a
particular force. [Ref. 22] The mandate issuing authority may authorize a very
narrow and specific mandate, or one more broad and ambiguous in nature. The
degree of specificity or ambiguity in the mandate will vary per the situation in
accordance with both the amount of information available about a given situation
at a particular time, and with the level of consensus that exists among
participating nations as to what the mandate should incorporate.
Embarking upon an operation without a clear, concise, and
accomplishable mandate is ill advised, and potentially dangerous. This is
perhaps best illustrated in the infamous 10 October, 1993 US raid in Somalia in
which two US helicopters were shot down, and 18 US servicemen died in the
subsequent battle to rescue US Army Rangers trapped at the raid site. The
transition to UN authority, which marked the onset of UNISOM II, represented
the start of a much more ambitious and broad operation in Somalia. With strong
US backing, the UN Security Council approved an experimental, and virtually
open ended mandate for UNISOM II. In addition to providing humanitarian relief,
UNISOM II was to assist in "rehabilitating political institutions and the economy
and promoting political settlement and national reconciliation." [Ref. 23:p. 66-67]
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The mandate authorized and, according to many, even expected that
force would be required to accomplish the outlined goals. It was understood, that
removing the guns from the hands of the warlords and their respective followers
was key to accomplishing the overarching goals of the coalition. UNISOM II was
mandated to go directly to the causes of the conflict, and seek solutions that
would optimize chances for sustained and real recovery. Not surprisingly, the
operation was also immediately challenged by Aideed, who had adamantly
opposed UN intervention. The operation was further plagued by command and
control problems, organizational confusion, administrative weaknesses, funding
shortfalls, and differences in national policy inherent in multinational operations.
[Ref. 23:p. 66-67]
During OPERATION SEA ANGEL USCINCPAC Admiral Charles R.
Larson issued but one order to his task force commander, then Major General
H.C. Stackpole III.
Go directly to Bangladesh. Report to the US Ambassador and render
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to the government of
Bangladesh. [Ref. 22]
Many experts believe that mission type orders, such as the one
detailed above, are exactly the type of orders most appropriate in situations like
SEA ANGEL, where reaction time figured heavily into the calculus of who would
die and who would live, in the aftermath of the devastating cyclone.
Identifying the mandate is also imperative, as it helps determine an
operation's end state. The end state, driven by the respective "National
Command Authority" of coalition nations (where appropriate), spells out the
conditions that, when accomplished, attain the strategic objectives of the
coalition, or perhaps signal a point of transition and subsequent hand off to other
organizations. End states are subject to change over time with the fluctuating
environmental factors, desired end state is derived from a clear and concise
mandate. From the end state springs the strategic concept, the objectives or
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milestones required to meet those objectives, as well as the queues for effecting
transition of the operation to non-military organizations. [Ref. 19]
Since peace operation are by their nature intended to create or
support conditions conducive to a negotiated conflict resolution, they will always
complement diplomatic, economic, or humanitarian efforts. Success is
characterized more broadly in OOTW than in conventional operations, and is
measured by the extent to which these combined activities progress toward the
mandated end state and not simply by the attainment of military objectives.
Objectives are defined, as in wartime, but they go well beyond (but may include)
the "capture and destruction" goals typically inherent in conventional operations.
Open ended objectives, such as the continued cease fire between belligerents in
peacekeeping operations, or very specific objectives such as re-opening public
schools, utilities, and other services on a target date following natural disaster,
or reducing the death rate in the wake of famine are common examples of how
objectives are structured in OOTW. It is imperative that this measurement of
success be understood because military objectives may shift over time in
response to changed circumstances which may cause frustration within the
force. [Ref. 19 and Ref. 18:p. 13-2]
b) The Source of Involvement and Authority
Individual nations typically sponsor the employment of a nation's
military forces for war. Sponsorship in OOTW is not nearly as clear cut, as
mandates frequently emanate from international or multinational agreement,
informal consensus, or an international organization such as the UN. Ideally, a
single mandate is issued from a single authority to all participants. However, this
is not always possible. Frequently, authority for action is derived from a myriad
of multiparty agreements, resolutions, and bi-lateral accords, of both the formal
and informal variety. Recent history is rich with examples of the variety of
sources of mandate.
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For example, Provide Comfort began as a humanitarian relief
mission acting under UN. mandate. The expanded mission of carving a security
zone in Northern Iraq, however, was not sanctioned by the UN due to the
implications for Iraqi sovereignty, but rather was authorized by respective
governments of coalition participants. [Ref. 4:p. 14]
c) The Operational Environment
The nature of the operational environment is critical in that it is a key
determinant in the types of forces and resources required in a particular situation
at a particular time, as well as allow for prior planning for the potentialities that
may possibly present themselves. Logically, organizations, both military and
non-military, have capabilities and limitations that make them better suited for
some scenarios than they are for others.
There are three principal variables that comprise the operational
environment in OOTW: the level of consent, the level of violence, and the
degree of partiality. These variables do not necessarily contribute equally, but
are interrelated and may shift in magnitude and importance over the course of
the operation. Their intersection, however, determines the nature of the
operation. Control of the operating environment hinges upon the commander's
recognition of these variables, and his ability to influence their pace and
direction of change. [Ref. 19]
The level of consent in the OOTW is an important part of the
operating environment. War is not an activity that requires the consent of the
party against whom action is taken. Peace operations, however, are
fundamentally different, as the degree of consent present in the "target
environment" dictates many aspects of how the operation is approached. The
range of consent is significant. Total consent or total lack of consent may
prevail. One party may consent partially, or in total; or consent may vary
dramatically over time. In traditional (or non-traditional) peacekeeping
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operations, for example, loss of consent may result in uncontrolled escalation of
violence and subsequent resumption of hostilities. Therefore, maintaining the
level of consent is a critical concern for commanders, both as it effects the
security of the force and its ability to accomplish the mission.
Force security and mission accomplishment also hinge upon the fact
that operations other than war encompass a broad continuum of levels of
violence. The environment may range from totally benign to very violent. In these
situations, use of violence potentially begets more violence. This cycle may
quickly escalate in severity, and exceed the capacity of the force to manage it.
Accordingly, commanders must fully understand the relationship between
violence and the desired end state, and employ violent measures judiciously.
Nowhere was restraint more evident than in the situation confronting
the first US forces to enter Iraq during the intermediate phase of OPERATION
PROVIDE COMFORT. Although a demarche had been issued to the Iraqis, that
outlined coalition intentions and demanded a withdrawal of Iraqi military forces
remained. As coalition forces moved into the town, there were several
confrontations between Iraqis and US Marines. However, patience, firmness and
discipline of US forces prevented fighting from erupting, hence preventing the
situation from escalating. [Ref. 24:p. 20]
Finally, impartiality is imperative in OOTW. Peace operations often
involve interposing neutral forces between two belligerent parties. The actions of
the force hinge upon the type of mission it is involved in. Maintaining this
neutrality, and thus, impartiality, are essential elements in designing a forces
actions and concept of operations. Impartial acts and, as important, the
perception of force impartiality by the belligerents is vital in creating a stable,
lasting resolution to many situations.
Forces must take care not to demonize one of the parties in an
internal conflict, as perceptions of partiality have implications for the intervening
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force. Taking sides is seen as a violation of the internal political process of the
country which is to be restored with the resolution of the conflict. The more
inclusive post-Cold War coalitions are likely to include partners who differ in
their sympathies and allegiances for the parties of the conflict. Choosing a side
may mean turn one part of the coalition against another. [Ref. 25:p. 27]
The perception of partiality in a target environment is influenced in
varying degrees by a number of other factors in the operational environment.
The geopolitical situation, social conditions and cultures, scale of a conflict or
presence and durability of a cease fire, number, discipline, and accountability of
contending parties, degree of law and order, efficacy of the local government,
and cooperative nature of the local population all impact upon the choice of
action of the operating force, as well as the perceptions of the indigenous
population as to that forces' partiality.
The lessons of the essence of impartiality are written in blood. In
Lebanon during the early 1980's, American intervention was aimed at providing
a neutral agent to quell the fighting between Christians and Muslims in Beirut as
part of a larger effort to create an Arab-Israeli settlement. The order for US Navy
ships to shell Syria and Lebanese Moslem targets in East Beirut, however,
suddenly made targets of the Marines ashore. The flawed understanding and
management of underlying political conditions turned US participation, in the
eyes of most of the Arab world, partisan. The result was 241 US Marines killed in
retribution and a subsequent US pull out. [Ref. 26:p. 52]
d) The Global Visibility of the Operation
There is little argument that the media is often a catalyst for both US
and international action. Horrific examples of mass human suffering as portrayed
on television and the subsequent internal outrage generated in the American
public have figured significantly in spurring US involvement in situations that
have more moral pull than dire consequence for US national security. The
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rapidly developing nature of technology, and the commensurate effects upon the
speed and volume of global information transfer have significant impact upon
peace operations. Media coverage forms both world and national opinion, hence
support for operations. Support generated by CNN captured images of US and
coalition forces feeding starving Kurds in the snow-capped mountains of
southern Turkey is just as quickly eradicated, as the mutilated body of a dead
US soldier is dragged naked through the streets of Mogadishu.
Commanders must remember the political, strategic, and operational
impact the media may have in peace operations, and further its influence over
planning, defining objectives and gauging success. Whether for or against a
particular operation or objective, media reports have a non-trivial impact that
may influence the participation of all parties involved. [Ref. 19]
C. ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN OOTW
1. General
In conventional operations, the military is typically the sole instrument
involved in creating change within a target environment. Contrastingly, the
ultimate military objective in a peace operation is the creation of a situation that
serves the cause of peace through the development of a lasting negotiated
solution. US military participation in OOTW furthers American interests by
defusing crises and nurturing peaceful resolution of conflicts, hereby minimizing
the need for combat operations. [Ref. 18:p. 13-1] The operation, therefore,
should be viewed as part of a wider, concurrent effort, not as an end in itself.
[Ref. 19]
The capability of US military forces is impressive and unparalleled. The
capacity of US forces to react to the crisis s ations prevalent in many peace
operations is unparalleled. Even in non-cr situations, US military training,
50
resources, equipment, and command and control capability, especially as exists
in a JTF structure, make the military a logical nucleus around which to construct
a larger collaborative effort. The military has the wherewithal and capability to
coordinate those who are not coordinated. [Ref. 22]
The initial response by international relief organizations to both
OPERATION SEA ANGEL and OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT, for
example, was poorly organized, and exceeded the ability of humanitarian
organizations to cope. In Bangladesh, the relief effort was hampered by both a
lack of coordination and information, as well as from sporadic and disorganized
supply deliveries from private organizations. On the Turkey-Iraq border in
PROVIDE COMFORT, the relief agencies were trying to tackle a problem well
beyond their collective capacities. "We're overwhelmed," said Steffan Bodemar,
the chief of mission in Baghdad for the United Nations High Commission on
Refugees (UNHCR). Military involvement in both cases contributed significantly
to increasing the organization and distribution capability in both relief efforts
consequently resulting in significant saving of life. [Ref. 27:p. 15]
Creating a secure environment in which "relief forces" can operate and
establishing a credible threat of force are the pivotal first steps in achieving
these overarching objectives. The primary purpose of the military is to protect
the weak and provide security. Combat units are required to quell the crisis,
establish a secure environment, and provide coordination and logistics support.
Once the crisis is past, combat forces must transition the operation to non-
combat forces and civilian authorities. [Ref. 22]
The historic role of US military forces has involved providing security,
protecting the weak, and responding to crisis. In many situations, the precursor
of distribution of humanitarian assistance is the creation of a secure environment
both for the affected population and for the force doing the aid. This was the
51
case in both Provide Comfort and RESTORE HOPE. Again, when possible, the
intervening force must strive to maintain the appearance of impartiality.
In Somalia, the factions that overthrew the Siad Barre regieme in 1991
were individually incapable of forming a government to supplant the one they
had overthrown. As a result, the structure of government crumbled, and anarchy
ensued. "Armies" of young thugs nominally loyal to one warlord or another took
to the streets, terrorizing the population and stealing or ransoming most of the
food supplies intended for the victims of a long term drought and civil strife.
These interruptions created alarmingly increasing death rates, and the US,
under UN auspices moved to break the pattern by imposing order to create a
secure environment. [Ref. 4:p. 10]
Higher authority must also take every precaution during the
development and assigning of missions not to create impressions or perceptions
that US. military presence is anything other than temporary. Few organizations
in the world are equally adept at responding to crisis as effectively as US. forces
can (if properly directed). Once the crisis is over however, combat units must
withdraw and turn the operation over to either the host nation, or civilian
organizations. Emphasis must be on "basic relief efforts.
No disaster/humanitarian relief mission is intended to rebuild a regional or
national economy/infrastructure. Rather, military efforts should aim towards
enabling a host nation to regain its footing and resume providing for its
population. Once the crisis is past, military forces must effect the transition
to civilian/host nation organizations. [Ref. 28: p 19]
Although increasingly common, employing military forces in OOTW is
not a panacea, and one must ensure that the capabilities and limitations of the
military instrument are clearly understood by those who would order their
employment. There is often a "knee jerk" reaction when crisis develops in an
area of the world with purported or actual strategic importance to the US
However, US leaders should exercise an increasingly great deal of selectivity
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when committing combat forces in OOTW. Certain units are more appropriate for
long term involvement than others. Extended use of US combat forces in civil
functions (as occurred after such operations as POWER PACK, URGENT
FURY, JUST CAUSE, AND PROVIDE COMFORT) conflicts with the he NCA's
desire for rapid re deployment of forces. Additionally, it causes DOD to absorb
unbudgeted expenses not directly related to war fighting. [Ref. 29:p. 30]
Finally, a commander must accurately assess his mission as one either
not involving combat, one potentially involving combat, or one where combat is
likely. This fundamental understanding will facilitate a more appropriately
structured force, as well as enhance the capability to plan for and conduct
operations and develop military objectives to achieve the desired political ends.
Where this determination is not clear, the commander must press the authorizing
body for clarity since misunderstanding or misperception is potentially
disastrous, a factor enhanced through translation of the mandate into multiple
languages and differing cultural perspectives. [Ref. 19]
Currently, in the author's opinion, much debate revolves around the
appropriate role of military forces in peace operations. Questions that include:
Do we need separate forces specifically designed for peace operations?; Do
combat forces require special training and equipment in order to contribute?,
and; Should US forces participate in future Somalias and Bosnias?, are all
recurring disputes. The purpose of this thesis, however, is not to argue these
particular (but very appropriate) questions. Therefore, a baseline assumption
central to the remainder of the thesis is that the US military can and will
participate in future OOTW.
2. Command Relationships
The instruments of national power may be applied in any combination to
achieve national strategic goals in operations other than war. The manner in
which they are employed is determined by the nature of each situation. For
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operations other than war, the military instrument is typically tasked to support
the diplomatic instrument, working with the economic and informational
instruments. US forces may participate in OOTW in three different operational
arrangements. [Ref. 17:pp. V-1,2]
a) US unilateral action
Political considerations or requirements for quick reaction may
require the US to act alone in conducting peace operations. There is often a
tendency for the US to seek consensus for its participation in OOTW, if for no
other reason than to assuage "colonialist" perceptions that could potentially
arise. There are instances when unilateral action better serves US interests. For
example, in 1958, the US unilaterally intervened in Lebanon at the behest of the
Lebanese government. Additionally, the unique capabilities of the US armed
forces may mean that the US is the only nation in a position to conduct a
particular peace operation Participation in coalitions is sometimes necessary.
However, we must ensure that we do not squander lives and resources on those
areas that are not strategically important to the US. [Ref. 1]
b) US as lead nation with support from international
organization
This organization may be the UN, NATO, or another international
organization. Recent trends indicate that the US will avoid purely unilateral
action. US intervention in the Dominican Republic (OPERATION POWER
PACK) conducted under the aegis of the OAS in 1965, and OPERATION
PROVIDE COMFORT under UN sponsorship are examples of this type of
arrangement. Further, OPERATION RESTORE HOPE was planned and
executed by the US under the auspices of the UN. The subsequent UNISOM II
involved a transition of command relationships to the third possible arrangement,
as is discussed below.
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c) Other state or organization lead, US forces supporting
The US force may be tasked to provide support such as transport,
medical, intelligence, or material to a peace operation conducted by another
nation or international organization. OPERATION RESTORE HOPE, a UN
sponsored, US led operation turned responsibility of the operations in Somalia to
a UN command (UNISOM II). This is an example of a non-US led coalition
committed to execute mandates sponsored by various international or regional
organizations. [Ref. 19]
D. NATURE OF THE FORCES
The precedent for collective action is established. Historically, coalitions
were seen primarily as means for preserving regional balances of power. The
frequency of UN involvement in OOTW since the end of the Cold War has
resulted in significant changes in how collective action is viewed and
approached. Between 1947 and 1986, the UN was involved in fourteen
peacekeeping missions all relatively small with the exception of the UN
operations in the Congo during the 1960's. Since 1986, however, the UN has
embarked upon 21 operations. It would appear that the world community has
come to view coalitions, and the legitimacy and burden sharing advantages that
stem from them, as the mechanism with which to respond to problems in the
New World Order (or dis-Order). [Ref. 30:p. 36 and Ref. 31]
Having established the strong likelihood that the US will not embark upon
these operations alone the next logical step, is to look more closely at the
identity and nature of the key partners and players in these endeavors.
Commanders must have appropriate understanding of the variety of potential
partners in the coalition environment. As the role of the military is established,




The Department of State (DOS) is a principal player in operations other
than war outside the continental United States (CONUS). DOS is the primary
source of foreign affairs information for the US government. Much of the national
security and economic information available to the government, and much of the
data on the internal politics of foreign countries originates here. Ultimately, the
State Department strives to take the lead in responding to issues that erupt
using a "here's the problem" here's their position," and "here's what we should
do about it" format. [Ref. 32:p. 43]
Primary policy guidance is provided from DOS in the following areas:
• Matters having an impact on US relations with other countries.
• The extent to which commanders can interfere in the government of a
particular country.
• The level at which the economy of a country is maintained.
• Matters involving informational programs, psychological aspects, and
attitudes for the indigenous population.
• Plans or procedures for the return of civil government. [Ref. 19]
Subordinate elements of the State Department play correspondingly
important roles. The US conducts diplomatic relations with more than 170
countries and maintains about 270 embassies, consulates, and missions
worldwide. Embassies provide detailed analysis of the politics, economic trends,
and social forces at work in foreign countries. This information is shared with
some 60 federal agencies concerned with national security, intelligence,
economic and commercial concerns, and science and technology.
The Embassy is headed by an Ambassador, who is the personal
representative of the President and
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as chief of mission, has overall direction,
coordination, and supervisory responsibilities of US government activities and
personnel in a host country. This authority does not extend to personnel in other
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missions or those assigned to either an international agency or a combatant
commander.
Ambassadors, and other diplomats make significant contributions in
many ways, to include establishing "cordial" relations with host nations, directing
efforts of other US agencies, and co-opting cooperation from agencies that may
not respond as favorably to military requests. These actions potentially relieve
the Joint Force Commander of much of the diplomatic burden. Additionally,
Ambassadors have a better feel for the culture, geography and other
demographic information that can facilitate or expedite action, and may also
assist the JTF commander by running interference with the State Department in
resolving militarily related diplomacy problems with Allies, such as interpretation
and implementation of Rules of Engagement (ROE). [Ref. 32:p. 48]
If a crisis develops in an area where the US has no diplomatic mission,
the President may send a representative with instructions that vary from the
standard authorities and responsibilities of a chief of mission. Such was the case
during OPERATION RESTORE HOPE. US Special Envoy Robert Oakley, in
conjunction with UNITAF task force leadership and backed up by the
overwhelming firepower of the US armed forces who comprised the
preponderance of UNITAF combat units, was able to negotiate a cease fire with
the major parties to the conflict in Somalia. This halted the fighting long enough
to allow the task force to escort disaster relief and food supplies to those areas
in greatest need. [Ref. 20:p. 4]
2. Other US Government Agencies
Many other US Government agencies may also play a role in OOTW.
Among these are the Department of Agriculture; the Department of Commerce;
the Department of Justice and the Department of Transportation.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) serves as the
central point of contact within the federal government for a wide variety of
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emergency response activities including planning, mitigation, response, and
recovery in crisis situations, whether natural or technological. FEMA's
responsibility is to supplement disaster assistance available through state and
local governments, not to supersede it. FEMA is also responsible for
coordinating disaster assistance rendered by all other federal agencies,
including the military. It will also, with appropriate consent, coordinate the
disaster assistance provided by state and local governments and private relief
agencies. [Ref. 32:p. 64]
The US Agency for International Development (USAID) administers US
economic and humanitarian assistance in more than 100 countries. Within AID is
the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), and within OFDA is the
Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART). The US Information Agency
(USIA) is charged with explaining and supporting US foreign policy and national
security interests abroad through a wide range of information programs,
including Voice of America. [Ref. 32:p. 48]
3. International Organizations
Examples of international organizations that may be involved in irregular
operations include the United Nations (UN), the International Committee of the
Red Cross, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. These organizations
may assume the lead to coordinate actions for other non-governmental
agencies. Military planners should therefore establish contact with lead non-
governmental agencies to ensure coordinated efforts.
a) The United Nations
The United Nations is the organization most likely to undertake
peace operations, as previously enumerated. From a US perspective, the UN is
important in that it provides forces, money, and legitimacy (theoretically) to the
operations.
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In the years since the Gulf War, the UN has expanded its role in
world affairs to include participation in much more "muscular" types of
undertakings. Increasingly, UN forces are involved in even more aggressive,
peace enforcement and "nation building" operations that entail disarmament of
hostile factions, delivering humanitarian assistance, training police forces,
conducting elections, and monitoring human rights. This invigorated agenda,
however, poses several areas of concern.
Based upon noted inadequacies, both surmised and experienced,
the US has significant misgivings concerning American participation in UN lead
operations. There exist festering issues concerning organization, doctrine,
command and control, funding, logistics, and rules of engagement that have
plagued UN operations in the past, and have raised serious questions as to the
wisdom of collaborative US military engagement. [Ref. 2]
Equally important is the question concerning the UN's capacity to
manage the increasing number of missions in which it is involved. Many feel that
the UN is already over-extended with respect to its intended purpose and actual
capability. Accustomed to straightforward observation and force separation
missions inherent in peacekeeping operations, the UN currently finds itself
overwhelmed.
UN "capacity" is largely related to its structure. The Military Staff
Committee (MSC) which comprises the lion's share of military operational
expertise is stretched beyond reasonable levels, and lacks both the numbers
and types of individuals to provide adequate levels of support to UN operations.
The MSC was originally envisioned as an international joint staff, which has not
occurred due to various command and control considerations. Although some
changes have been made concerning short term operational capability, and
while other proposals exist to enhance the MSC capability, the operational
acumen of the UN remains sub-par. Reorganizing the UN so that it can conduct
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the scope of missions in which it currently is involved is a formidable task, in that
it requires radical changes in the way the international body plans and conducts
peace operations. The process of change is slow, contentious, and often
unfruitful. [Ref. 2:p. 49]
b) Non-UN Organizations
Organizations such as NATO, the Organization of African Unity, the
Organization of American States (OAS), and the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) have previously performed a variety of functions
related to peace operations, such as election monitoring. These organizations
may also elect to execute military peace operations within their respective areas
of inters. Each organization has different operational concepts and
organizational procedures. In organizations such as NATO, these concepts are
well established and understood by US forces. Other organizations guidelines
may not be as well established, or are non-existent. In operations where
guidelines do not formally exist, a greater degree of "ad hocedness" will likely
prevail.
4. Other Countries
a) Combined Military Forces
Other nations will also send military units to participate in OOTW It
is imperative to understand that each nation has its own political agenda, and
will participate with such resources and in such a manner as it deems
appropriate. In situations where these other military forces are from those
nations with which the US is involved with via treaty, alliance, or standing
agreement, building strong working relationships and concepts of operations will
not pose as vexing a problem. This will not always be the case, however, and
US commanders must plan to operate with unfamiliar partners.
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b) Host Nations
Many operations involve host nation requests for assistance. Some
do not. Circumstances where there either is no legitimate government, (such as
in Somalia), or the actions of the existing government are what resulted in the
need for the relief effort, (such as were the circumstances preceding Provide
Comfort in Iraq) are likely to occur again in the near future, and must figure into
the planning equation.
When a legitimate host nation exists, the perception that the host
nation is in control of any sort of relief operation is important for several reasons.
First, it restores/reinforces host nation legitimacy in eyes of its population.
Secondly, US presence on foreign soil is seldom seen as a "something for
nothing" type of situation. Reinforcing perceptions that the host nation has
control of the situation will diminish perceptions and misconceptions concerning
American colonialist intentions and related animosities. Reactions to American
military forces vary regionally, based upon US historical track record. Hopefully,
by "working for" a host nation, a less domineering impression will prevail. [Ref.
22]
Coincidingly, US forces must make their intentions and capabilities
clear to a host nation. Any assumptions that US military forces are present to
rebuild a country's infrastructure must be immediately laid to rest. Lieutenant
General Stackpole was quick to point out to the Bangladeshi officials that his
force was not there to take over the operation, but to "backbone the
governments efforts" until it had restored the infrastructure to a point where it
could resume independent operations. [Ref. 22] Additionally, US forces must
ensure that whatever capability and resources they intend on introducing into a
disaster or humanitarian relief operation will be assets vice liabilities.
Recognizing the capability of the infrastructure to support the supporting force is
imperative.
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5. NGOs and PVOs
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), private volunteer
organizations (PVOs) have tremendous capacity to respond quickly and
effectively to emergency disaster relief, food distribution efforts, and other
programs aimed at eradicating poverty and vulnerability to disaster. PVOs are
increasingly contributing their valuable resources to long-term development
plans that are pivotal in improving conditions in the developing world.
US relationships with non-military agencies are a critical pillar of
success in OOTW and are based upon the cooperative spirit realized through
mutual appreciation of missions, respect, communication and standardization of
support.
NGO cooperation with the military, however, is not inherent. These
agencies have their own mission and agenda, which occasionally conflict with
the mission of US forces. They are historically suspicious of the military, and
may question any authoritative actions the military may take.
In anticipation and in reaction to an increase in aviation activity in and
around Mogadishu, military representatives (in consultation with others) created
an airspace coordination plan to ensure safe and coordinated flight. The plan,
when briefed to a number of organizations including the International
Commission of the Red Cross, World Food Program, and CARE, encountered
significant resistance based not necessarily on merit, but rather on authority.
The representative from the ICRC, in particular, challenged the right of the
military to organize and impose their will upon civilians. It became apparent that
profit margin was influencing rational (or irrational) argument, as the contractors
were being paid by the ton of food that they could deliver to Somalia. They were
used to operating in a competitively price market and feared that any procedural
requirements that precluded direct line of flight from take-off to landing would
reduce their earnings. They raised the issue of authority constantly and refused
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to acknowledge the right of the military to impose an airspace "order." [Ref.
33:p. 6]
Commanders must consider the presence and capabilities of these
organizations and ensure to co-opt their coordination and cooperation via
whatever means required. Although NGOs, due to their nature, are occasionally
suspicious of military forces. The suspicion will somewhat lessen so long as the
military folds them into the operation and attempts to embrace the significant
capability NGO/PVOs possess.
E. INTERRELATIONSHIPS
This thesis has established that future US military participation in OOTW
will be conducted in coalitions consisting of other nations and organizations. The
mechanics involved in building a successful coalition are contentious at best.
1. Complications of Coalitions
Each operation is unique, and the key considerations involved in
planning and conducting multinational operations varies per the international
situation and perspectives, motives, and values of a specific coalition's
members. [Ref. 17:p.VI-1]
US armed forces must be able to operate within the coalition
environment, both in a leadership and a follower ship role. Coalitions are
typically formed on short notice and can include forces and organizations not
accustomed to working together. Establishing command relationships and
operating procedures within the multinational force is often challenging. It
involves complex issues that require a willingness to compromise in order to
best achieve the common objectives. National pride and prestige can limit
options for organization of the coalition command, as many nations prefer to not
subordinate their forces to those of other nations. The overarching notion critical
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in coalition operations is that as long as the coalition members perceive their
membership and participation as commensurate with their individual national
interests, the coalition has an excellent chance of remaining intact. [Ref.
17:p.VI-2]
The challenge for coalition leadership, whether the US or others, is in
crafting the conditions that create and maintain a shared, common direction for
all coalition participants. Towards this end, several principles of OOTW are
established to help guide the coalition in its decision making. Unity of purpose is
the glue that holds the coalition together, as no two nations share exactly the
same reasons for entering a coalition or alliance.
2. Principles of OOTW
Modern war is conducted in accordance with several agreed upon
principles, appropriately deemed "the principles of war." These principles outline
basic precepts which, when adhered to, substantially increase chances of
success. Although subtle renditions and variations exist amongst the individual
US services, the fundamental thrust and application of these principles remains
relatively consistent. There is a similar but different set of principles outlined in
recent Army doctrine that delineate common tenants of OOTW. Some apply
equally to both conventional operations and OOTW. The remainder, however,
are specifically oriented towards the non-combatant nature of many of the types
of OOTW. Additionally, as in conventional operations, the weight and
appropriateness of a specific principle is situational and will vary between
operations. Discussion of these principles, as taken from Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine




Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and
attainable objective.
This principle of war applies also to operations other than war. A clearly
defined and attainable objective-with a precise understanding of what
constitutes success-is critical when the United States is involved in
operations other than war. Military commanders should also understand
what specific conditions could result in mission termination as well as
those that yield failure. JFCs must understand the strategic aims, set
appropriate objectives, and ensure that these aims and objectives
contribute to unity of effort with other agencies. [Ref. 17:p.V-2]
b) Unity of Effort
Seek unity of effort in every operation.
The principle of unity of command in war also applies to operations other
than war; but, in operations other than war, this principle may be more
difficult to attain. In these operations, other government agencies may
often have the lead. Commanders may answer to a civilian chief, such as
an ambassador, or may themselves employ the resources of a civilian
agency. Command arrangements may often be only loosely defined and
many times will not involve command authority as understood within the
military. This arrangement may cause commanders to seek an atmosphere
of cooperation to achieve objectives by unity of effort. Military commanders
need to consider how their actions contribute to initiatives that are also
diplomatic, economic, and informational in nature. Because operations
other than war will often be conducted at the small unit level, it is important
that all levels understand the military-civilian relationship to avoid
unnecessary and counter-productive friction. [Ref. 17:p.V-2]
c) Security
Never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage.
In joint operations other than war, security deals principally with force
protection against virtually any person, element, or group hostile to our
interests. These could include a terrorist, a group opposed to the
operation, and even looters after a natural disaster. JFCs also should be
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ready constantly to counter activity that could bring significant harm to
units or jeopardize mission accomplishment. JFCs should not be lulled into
believing that the non hostile intent of their mission does not put the force
at risk. Inherent in this responsibility is the need to be capable of rapid
transition from a peaceful to a combat posture should the need arise. The
inherent right of self-defense from the unit to the individual level applies to
all operations. [Ref. 17:p.V-3]
d) Restraint
Apply appropriate military capability prudently.
The actions of military personnel and units are framed by the disciplined
application of force, including specific ROE. In operations other than war,
these ROE will often be more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political
concerns than in war. Moreover, these rules may change frequently during
operations. Restraints on weaponry, tactics, and levels of violence
characterize the environment. The use of excessive force could adversely
affect efforts to gain or maintain legitimacy and impede the attainment of
both short- and long-term goals. This concept does not preclude the
application of overwhelming force, when appropriate, to display US resolve
and commitment. The reasons for the restraint often need to be
understood by the individual Service member because a single act could
cause critical political consequences. [Ref. 17:p.V-3]
e) Perseverance
Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in
support of strategic aims.
Some operations other than war may be short, others protracted.
Peacetime operations may require years to achieve the desired effects.
Underlying causes of confrontation and conflict rarely have a clear
beginning or a decisive resolution. It is important to assess crisis response
options against their contribution to long-term strategic objectives. This
assessment does not preclude decisive military action but does require
careful, informed analysis to choose the right time and place for such
action. Commanders balance their desire to attain objectives quickly with a
sensitivity for the long-term strategic aims and the restraints placed on
operations. Therefore, the patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of
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national goals and objectives, for as long as necessary to achieve them, is
often the requirement for success. [Ref. 1 7:p.V-4]
f) Legitimacy
Sustain the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government
to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions.
This principle focuses on internationally sanctioned standards as well as
the perception that authority of a government to govern is genuine,
effective, and uses proper agencies for reasonable purposes. Joint force
operations need to sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host
government. During operations where a government does not exist,
extreme caution should be used when dealing with individuals and
organizations to avoid inadvertently legitimizing them. PSYOP can
enhance both domestic and international perceptions of the legitimacy of
an operation. [Ref. 17:p.V-4]
3. Other planning considerations
There are a whole host of additional considerations required in OOTW
that play a pivotal role in linking the disparate means of a coalition with the
commonly agreed upon ends. Military commanders must remain sensitive to
these considerations to ensure that military interaction and participation in the
coalition environment is as effective and efficient as possible.
a) National Agenda
No two nations enter a coalition or alliance with exactly the same
reasons. Each member will participate in a manner and with resources as best
suits its interests. The nature of the environment and the nature of the forces
arrayed in the environment of OOTW, however, require that consensus be
reached on the overarching and commonly shared objectives and goals.
b) Unity of Effort
Motivations of coalition participants may vary, but their objectives
can not. Clearly defined and attainable objectives, supported by each member
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nation and coalition partner are critical in charting a consistent and cohesive
concept of operations. Participants should be assigned missions commensurate
with their desires, capabilities and limitations if at all possible.
c) National Communications
Predictably, some forces involved in a coalition will have direct and
instantaneous communications back to their respective national political
leadership. This link may facilitate coordination and deconfliction of often
contentious issues like interpretation of Rules of Engagement (ROE). On the
other hand, this same connection may frustrate previously established command
relationships, as leadership outside of the operational arena can issue guidance
directly to their deployed national forces.
d) Doctrine, Training, and Equipment
Doctrine, force competence as a factor of training and experience,
and types and quality of equipment may vary significantly among the military
alliances of member nations. Non-military partners may also have equipment
and other resources, incompatible with other members. Coalitions which involve
members engaged in alliances, treaties, standing agreements, or any other
formal arrangement will experience somewhat less of the inherent
interoperability problems, but coalition leadership must stand ready to make
appropriate adjustments.
e) Cultural Differences
Each partner in a coalition operation has a unique cultural identity
characterized by language, values, religious systems and socio-economic
outlooks. Seemingly minor issues for one coalition member may have significant
importance for another. Certain accommodations are often required to ensure
continued harmonious relationships between coalition partners.
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f) Management of Resources
The contributions of participants will vary. Some nations may
contribute logistically, some militarily, and some both ways. Occasionally,
nations may send forces to an operation with no mobility, no sustainability, and
little more than their personal weapons and the clothes on their backs. In these
circumstances, such forces are liabilities vice assets, and have questionable
position in OOTW. [Ref. 22] However, forces require support from either national
or coalition resource pools. Identifying requirements well in advance, although
difficult, will pay dividends in ensuring that participants have sufficient resources
to accomplish the mission. [Ref. 17:pp. VI-3-VI-6]
F. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has established that the "other than war" environment varies
from conventional war in many significant ways, each with important
ramifications for US command and control.
The environment is much more political. Coalitions determine the objectives
of an operation in any given situation by consensus and cooperation. A full
understanding of the political dimensions is required to effectively operate in the
OOTW arena. Frequently the lack of political understanding blinds military
leaders and planners to the fundamentals of the peace operation. Military
decision makers then view changes in missions as diversions rather than as an
integral part of peace operations. Without a strategic concept on which to base
peace operations actions, the commander may achieve tactical success but
increases the risk of strategic failure. [Ref. 19]
The role of military force also changes in peace operations. In conventional
operations, military force is often the sole means to an end. OOTW most often
involve military forces as part of a broader effort, complementing other political,
social, and economic activities. Traditional military functions such as providing
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security and protecting the weak remain intact. The C2 challenge, however, is in
crafting a concept of operations that allows for complementary, concurrent, and
appropriate military action in concert with the other activities.
The cultural, doctrinal and resource disparities present in a coalition are
important. Capitalizing on the respective capabilities of each participant requires
a sensitivity to and an understanding of their motivation for participating, as well
as of the inherent capacity of their resource contribution. US military interaction
in the OOTW environment may consist of a unilateral, a leadership, or a
supporting role. The latter two require astute political and organizational skills in
ensuring that the disparate pieces of a coalition are brought together in a
synergistic and complementary fashion. The heightened need for precise linkage
between the political ends and the military ends, ways and means is what makes
peace operation planning and execution different from war planning and
execution. A commonly developed strategic concept provides a sense of unity
and a framework for understanding change in a peace operation. The principles
of OOTW and other planning considerations outlined in current joint doctrine
provide commanders with a thought provoking iteration of the many potential
stumbling blocks and necessary planning considerations for coalition operations.
The overarching objective of this chapter was to illustrate many of the
adjustments required of the US military mind in order to successfully approach
an operating environment for which it is not (typically) specifically trained. US
precepts of command and control are built upon a strict hierarchical
arrangement, with the commander at the apex of the operating force. OOTW are
quite afferent in that there are potentially several "authorities" who will have
certain stipulations as to the manner in which their forces are employed in a
particular operation. From the array of various authority represented in a
coalition, working relationships must be developed and objectives agreed upon.
The commander must fully understand the "authoritative context" within which
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their force is employed, as well as the relationship between that force and the
other sources of authority represented. The following chapter provides a litmus
test, by order of discussion, to assess the degree to which this adjustment has or
has not occurred, and the associated reasons.
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IV. COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) LESSONS LEARNED
A. INTRODUCTION
The previous two chapters of this thesis provided the reader both, a
perspective in to current US military thoughts concerning command and control,
as well insight into the implications of the OOTW environment upon these
perspectives.
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the challenges and impediments a
Joint Force Commander may experience in his attempts at transforming the
necessary adjustments, as derived from the previously mentioned implications,
into physical reality and applying it to coalition command and control. These
issues and challenges represent an aggregate of both historical and potential
considerations, as well as lessons learned from recent US and coalition
experience in operations other than war. From this discussion, the thesis will
then make appropriate conclusions as to what is needed to remedy any noted
deficiencies.
The chapter will break this discussion of challenges and impediments into
three sections: C2, intelligence, and communications. This presentation follows
a similar format established in Chapter II, where the baseline definitions for
command and control were initially presented.
B. DOCTRINE
There is, as of yet, no commonly agreed upon doctrine for coalition building
in the OOTW environment. Some may argue the need for such a foundation.
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The reality, however, is that until a common approach is formulated, coalition
participation will remain largely ad-hoc.
Joint operations, in and of themselves, represent greater challenges than
single service operations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff is still trying to produce the
doctrinal foundation to unite joint forces in warfare. Combined military operations
involve the problems of joint warfare, as well as the added complexities created
when two or more national armed forces bringing their distinctions and
peculiarities to the coalition. [Ref. 34:p. 59]
This path of logic taken one step further captures the essence of OOTW.
Factor into the coalition calculus the problems inherent in combined military
operations (possibly increased by several orders of magnitude), coupled with the
variety of non-military organizations and agencies who may lack familiarity with
the way the military conducts business (and vice versa), plus the use of military
forces in a relatively unrehearsed role such as is presented in many OOTW, and
the implications for complexity and the need for common doctrine are clear. The
need and the feasibility of developing it, however, presents an interesting
dichotomy worth further discussion.
Outlining the difficulties the US is experiencing in bringing all services on
board with joint doctrine illustrates the difficulty in achieving the common
framework desired. For example, command and control is arguably the most
important yet least understood aspect of military operations. US military doctrine,
across the strategic, operational, and tactical strata hinges upon the efficacy of
its command and control doctrine. However, a cohesive perspective of command
and control does not yet exist between all of the US military services. [Ref. 5]
The origins, appearance, and implementation of US command and control,
as discussed in Chapter II, rest atop a historical, and pyramidally structured set
of building blocks. The attempts to synergize and streamline the services, while
increasingly successful, have not been easy. Issues ranging from roles and
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missions to the development and implementation of joint doctrine continue to
fester, and predictably so.
Much of this stems from very different and well known institutional
concepts. Varying service views and perspectives on their respective
contributions to national defense and on service perspectives concerning
command and control are well documented in the existing body of literature.
Many experts have exhaustively dialoged the nuances of each service and their
historical origins and cultures. [Ref. 35] While this thesis will not strive to further
develop the historical reasons for these different views, a brief trace of the roots
of the existing state of jointness is required for further discussion.
The disastrous Iranian Hostage rescue mission and the imperfect invasion
of Grenada spawned the call for military reform, based upon charges that the
failures were largely the result of the services not working together. Critics also
cited many incidence of "counterproductive parochialism" that further contributed
to lack of US military synergism. The services developed weapons without
regard to interoperability with other services, Army and Navy communications
systems could not talk with one another, heavy equipment was acquired that
could not be loaded on certain cargo aircraft, and each service had its own
doctrine for employing air assets. [Ref. 36:p. 71]
The Defense Reorganization Act (Goldwater/Nichols Act) of 1986 was
intended, not to erase service personality, philosophy, or culture, but rather to
mold the unique characteristics and strengths of each service to create a
complementary situation where the capability of the whole was greater than the
sum of the parts. Subsequent lessons learned by US forces in the joint ventures
of Operations' Just Cause and Desert Shield/Storm present a mixed review of
whether or not this goal was achieved. Although improvements have occurred,
much work remains in order to ensure that Armed Forces can operate together.
This is understandable, in that, until recently, the impetus for change has
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remained sub-critical. After all, although less than painlessly and far from
perfect, the "old" command and control structure was adequate to win the Cold
War. [Ref. 36:p. 71]
The era of jointness is new and different. Everything, from the way US
forces are structured for combat to the nature of the threat has changed. The
structure implemented by Goldwater-Nichols is, as of yet, immature. Further, the
process involved in developing joint doctrine requires significant compromise on
the part of all involved. Consequently, the current template that is the product of
joint doctrine development suffers from both the fact that it does not fully
accommodate the cultural differences between the services, and, as a result,
has not yet had adequate time to take root and replace historically solidified
service unique methods and procedures. [Ref. 36:p. 71]
Predictably, many contentious doctrinal issues rooted in historical
precedent and misdeeds continue to thwart acceptance of common joint
doctrine, (USMC/USAF contention over the Joint Force Air Component
Commander (JFACC) concept is but one example.) More frequent joint exercises
and forced interaction will continue to smooth the future road, but it will require
significant patience and compromise from all parties. The current competition
between the services for dollars and missions in these days of rapidly declining
defense budgets further contributes to a sub-optimal cooperative atmosphere. In
sum, a "joint strategic paradigm "has yet to emerge in the years since
Goldwater-Nichols. [Ref. 6:p. 254-258]
US joint capability is increasing through continued participation in joint
exercises and education and by building upon the lessons learned during the
Gulf War (as well as the myriad of joint and combined operations since).
However, the lack of a "joint paradigm" compounded with the prevailing
atmosphere of competition, presents significant implications for command and
control of US forces. The difficulties the United States services have had in
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creating a common doctrine, despite sharing common culture, language, and
political leadership provide the reader with a perspective on the dilemma
inherent in creating an all encompassing approach for coalitions as diverse as
those typically formed in OOTW.
The challenges resulting from the lack of common doctrine, however, are
pervasive. As described by General Robert RisCassi:
Doctrine is more than simply how we intend to fight. It is also the technical
language with which we communicate commander's intent, battlefield
missions, control measures, combined arms and joint procedures, and
command relationships. Doctrine is not contained simply at one level of
war-strategic, operational , or tactical- it embodies all. Campaign execution
demands that these levels of war become inextricably linked... In the
absence of a commonly understood doctrine, it becomes extraordinarily
difficult to plan or execute military operations. [Ref. 34:p. 60]
The remainder of this chapter will discuss those challenges related to the
planning and executing operations other than war.
C. POLITICS
1. Coalition Political Dynamics
When inter-allied factors are superimposed, the effects are frequently
unpredictable. Politics are politics the world over and many times we
encounter difficulties and objections which are illogical from the military
standpoint but which stem from political factors that are very real to the
officeholders, the voter, and taxpayers of the countries concerned. It is to
be expected that we will frequently encounter problems of obscure and
puzzling origin, and an awareness of the probability should help to foster
the patience and flexibility necessary. [Ref. 37: p. 2-44]
The effect of politics upon military operations can not be overstated.
Military action supports political objectives. Strategic aims and operations that
follow are an extension of politics. Further, coalitions are political arrangements
among nations with recognized common interests. [Ref. 30:p. 37]
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Joint task force leadership must have a knowledge and appreciation of
the economic, political, diplomatic and informational components of national
security in a given situation as it applies to the United States, as well as an
understanding of the political dynamics between and within the disparate
nations, forces, and organizations involved in OOTW. [Ref. 38:p. 3] Full
recognition of the dimensions of US policy in a given situation will also both
encourage the commander to use the authority with which he is vested, and will
facilitate a greater degree of "incident free" dealings with the wide array of
coalition participants, by mitigating the chance of perceived slights or
insensitivity's on the part of the US. [Ref. 39]
2. Unity of Purpose
Those who contribute forces and resources to an operation agree that
there is some value in doing so. However, no two organizations enter a coalition
under the exact same pretenses. Every participant has a unique political agenda
and will contribute in a manner most suitable to its interests. This sometimes
parallels the interests of the US, but not always. Compromise and agreement on
an operation's overarching purpose and objectives are the initial steps in
molding coalition efforts.
Unity of purpose is the glue that holds coalitions together, and will
ultimately make or break the success of the operation. Common objectives both
ensure coordinated efforts and restrict action by participants. For example, the
coalition objectives in the Gulf War were used to eject Saddam Hussein from
Kuwait. The common, albeit limited, objectives constrained commanders whom
may have otherwise sought total defeat of Iraq. [Ref. 30:p. 37]
The primary difficulty with US involvement in coalition operations,
however, involves its historical willingness to "talk the coalition talk," but
reluctance to "walk the coalition walk". Often, US actions belie the fact that it
does not fully understand the dynamics of coalition operations.
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LtGen. H.C. Stackpole III captured this notion in his observation that
:
...We really don't think coalition. [We] have a tendency to go into a
situation and say, "We'll run everything... we'll do everything." The coalition
is an afterthought to give us a sense of legitimacy in the international eye.
[Ref. 22]
The reason for this mindset is at least partially embedded in tradition.
US leadership is a historically ingrained proposition in many situations. Although
the trend is towards collective response, much of the burden for major military
endeavors continues to fall upon the United States. Only the US has the where
with all and resources with which to conduct large-scale, unified actions. Hence,
US military commitments are often both prerequisites and catalysts for many
nations. The amount of leverage the US has in determining the coalition's
purpose, however, has irrevocably changed with the end of the Cold War. [Ref.
30:p. 37]
During the Cold War, America was the clear leader and set the agenda
which others followed. Western nations largely shared the US vision and
accepted US lead. Furthermore, as the US provided and controlled the
preponderance of forces, missions could be married to political objectives.
Mission creep was therefore totally within US control. Furthermore, the United
States tackled the big operations, from Korea to Kuwait, which were the real
coalition wars. The United Nations got lesser countries to handle traditional
peacekeeping operations. The UN role in American led coalitions was limited to
a stamp of legitimacy. [Ref. 25:p. 26]
The end of the Cold War and aforementioned precedent for collective
action changes the rules. UN expansion in more "muscular" peacekeeping and
other non-traditional types of operations will further alter the coalition dynamic. It
is unlikely that our coalition partners and the United Nations will allow us to lead
as before, despite the fact that many old friends continue to wait for the
American cue prior to committing forces to an operation. [Ref. 25: p. 27]
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Maintaining unity of purpose also requires an iterative, evaluative
process that will allow the coalition to collectively adjust its objectives to a
situation's certain to change circumstances. The shift in objectives may be
deliberately factored into a coalition's phased campaign plan, or may be altered
if the circumstances require. Recent experience in OOTW has provided
examples of how the mandate may shift in either a planned or ad-hoc fashion.
A Joint Force Commander exists in the realm of the operational level of
conflict. In this role, and in the way of an oversimplified description, he is
charged with translating strategic guidance into tactical objectives for forces
under his purview, it is important for him to recognize and understand the
implications that the strategic interests and agendas of the other participants
have upon the viability of the coalition and hence its chances for success. In the
OOTW environment, as the NCA's "on scene" representative, the JFC may also
play a key role in determining the mandate, based upon a concurrent
assessment both of what is required and what is accomplishable, in concert with
other coalition leaders.
The lessons learned in the transition from UNITAF to UNISOM II clearly
illustrate this. Great care was taken to develop an approved, well-defined
mission with attainable, measurable objectives prior to the commencement of
UNITAF's endeavor in OPERATION RESTORE HOPE. Disarmament was
excluded from the mission because it was perceived as neither achievable nor
prerequisite to the crux of the mission of providing a secure environment for
relief operations. Discretionary "disarming as necessary" became an implied
task which led to the confiscation of heavy weapons and gave UNITAF the
authority to conduct weapon sweeps. The more ambitious "nation building"
agenda of UNISOM II, however, mandated to go to the causes, rather than the
symptoms of the crisis, proved to be seriously weak in the same manner that
RESTORE HOPE was strong: its objectives were vaguely defined, and its results
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are difficult to measure. In both cases, it appears that those close to the
operation had a significant role in voicing what should and should not be
coalition objectives. At least part of the question surrounding the difficulties
experienced in UNISOM II is, "Does the mission meet the "do-ability" criteria?"
Can peace be imposed on a reluctant and notoriously proud population at gun
point and the "social fabric" of their nation be re-woven together at the direction
of outsiders? [Ref. 40:p. 58 and Ref. 23:p. 67]
Once the overall direction and mandate of a coalition is developed, the
specific milestones required to arrive at the end state must be determined. As
witnessed in UNISOM II, this is not always successfully accomplished. The
Italians, for example, who have historic reasons for understanding Somalis
better than most, differed severely with UNISOM, concerning the use of force,
and limited their participation in the operation accordingly. [Ref. 23:p. 68]
Reaching agreement on the operations objectives will facilitate organizing
appropriate forces and resources with which to accomplish the objectives.
What makes peace operation planning and execution different from war
planning and execution is the heightened need for precise linkage between the
political ends and the military ends, ways and means. It is particularly important
that the strategic concept established in the common objectives provide a sense
of development and a framework for understanding change in a peace
operation. Frequently the lack of political understanding blinds military leaders
and planners to the nature of the operation. The result is that mission changes
are viewed as diversions rather than an integral part of the solution process. A
coalition that lacks a strategic concept on which to base its actions may often
achieve tactical success but increase the likelihood of strategic failure.
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D. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
Consistently applied rules of engagement (ROE) are an essential element
of an operation's success. Developing rules of engagement in OOTW is a
complex and often times contentious process. ROEs, unlike the laws of armed
conflict, are promulgated through layers of military and political filters that
regulate the application of force. The rules are self imposed, and situational, and
consequently leave wide latitude in their scope, duration, intent, and
interpretation. [Ref. 41 :p. 21-22]
Rules of engagement, in any sort of operation, have four fundamental
functions:
• ROEs serve as a guideline to help maintain the peace during a transition
to war, i.e. as a guard against inadvertent escalation and a safety
measure for personnel.
• To control combat operations during wartime, ROEs serve a political
purpose by ensuring that the military force follows the directing authority
(i.e. the UN or NATO).
• ROEs serve a military purpose by safeguarding military personnel
through minimizing escalation and increasing the effectiveness of the
operation.
• ROEs serve a legal purpose by ensuring that those participating in the
OOTW follow international law in the execution of their duties. [Ref.
42:p. 28]
Consistent interpretation of ROE by all coalition members is imperative.
There are many obstacles in ensuring this occurs. For example, ROE for
PROVIDE COMFORT were developed by the US European Command, with JCS
approval. Each coalition military force deployed to support the operation had its
own ROE. Usually, these forces adopted US ROE. Some did not, however, and
used an ROE more restrictive than the US ROE. This is dangerous, in that it
creates a situation where coalition members respond to situations in a different
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manner, potentially creating the perception of bias or partiality. It also effects a
coalition force that is integrated to accomplish the assigned mission.
French ROE, for example, allowed a French infantry platoon to fight for an
individual coalition soldier who may be under either Iraqi or Kurd attack.
However, the same infantry platoon could not aid another coalition platoon under
attack.
British employment of artillery had similar problems. The British national
ROE would not allow the deployment of the 105 mm Howitzer battalion,
positioned at the forward operating base in Turkey, into northern Iraq to support
coalition or even their own forces. The British government believed that the
humanitarian nature of the operation precluded the need for such weapons. The
hostile activities of the Iraqi military created an additional need for fire support
assets. The Turkish ROE, however, would not allow the British artillery battalion
to deploy to firing positions inside Turkey to shoot fire missions in support of
coalition forces in northern Iraq. The personal relationship between the CTF and
British commander was essential in securing Britain's approval to deploy the
artillery into northern Iraq.
The example of the Royal Netherlands Marine battalion deployed as part of
the British 3rd Royal Marine Commando Brigade provides an even more
contentious set of circumstances. Combined Task Force PROVIDE COMFORT
was not a NATO command structure, but a coalition of thirteen nations. The
Netherlands commander had to first work through the Dutch government and
then through the British Military to adopt the US rules of engagement. [Ref. 43:p.
20]
In Somalia, the ROE depended upon the perceived threat and proportional
response. Although contingents responded within the ROE, there was a great
deal of variation in interpretation. The Pakistani forces were notorious for their
more brutal responses; the Belgians believed in "smacking the people and then
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feeding them'; and the Italians were frowned upon by the remainder of UN forces
for their soft treatment of the Somali people. [Ref. 44:p. 14]
Consistent interpretation is achievable provided the "lead" force can submit
recommended ROE through diplomatic channels with sufficient lead time to
allow participating nations the opportunity to suggest modifications required to
allow their force's participation in the operation.
E. FORCE INTEGRATION
Establishing unity of purpose and identifying coalition objectives and end-
states are important aspects of OOTW. Sequentially, the next step involves
obtaining and structuring appropriate forces for the mission. This may present
some contentious challenges.
1. Force Structure
Compounding the numbers of complicating issues already discussed, is
the fact that the forces arrayed for any particular operation other than war must
be tailored specifically for the operation. There are several complicating factors
in achieving the appropriate force balance to engage in OOTW.
Where US forces are concerned, a principle complication involves the
absence of a common approach to providing forces for a contingency. There
currently is no precise formula for organizing Joint Task Forces (JTFs), and
specifics will vary per the situation. Varied service attitudes concerning the
employment of combat power continue to impede the development of a standard
approach to operations. Procedures, policies, and practices differ from one
unified (or sub-unified) commander to the other, a pattern that will logically follow
for future JTF commanders, who are taken from any of the Services. Although
each geographic region and each situation for which a JTF is established
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possesses both unique circumstances and requirements, the paradigm for
exercising command and control should be shared.
Joint Pub 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures
supports structuring JTFs around service components such as a numbered fleet,
wing, or expeditionary force, as was the case in RESTORE HOPE and DESERT
SHIELD/DESERT STORM. The unity of effort and efficiency present in an
existing staff with established operating procedures, previous training, and
common doctrine are advantages in both the rapidity in which the staff can
assimilate the responsibilities inherent in coalition operations, as well as in the
amount of resident and known expertise available to the commander to
compensate for any shortcomings in reference to other service capability. Other
structural arrangements may hinge upon geographical arrangements such as
were utilized in PROVIDE comfort when JTF Alpha was created for Special
Operations Forces at Kurdish relief camps in the Turkish mountains, and JTF
Bravo was established to secure and resettle Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq.
Logically, the nature of the task should dictate the identity of the JTF
commander as well as the composition of the force. There are, however, certain
vulnerabilities in ensuring that appropriate forces with requisite capabilities are
included in a force. [Ref. 30:p. 37]
The JTF composition process and command structure is not standard
between unified and specified commands. The manner in which a JTF is
structured is largely a factor of CINC discretion, and although a JTF commander
may have some degree of latitude both in requesting particular forces and in
constructing his staff, the theater force structuring paradigms will effect a JTF
staff composition and potentially, quality. Establishing a JTF involves many
variables and is a complex undertaking. During the crisis or deliberate planning
preceding force deployment, a number of concurrent staff actions and higher
echelon decisions effect JTF force composition. The JTF commander has varied
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latitude in selecting forces for a task force. Through an interactive process
involving the unified and specified commands, the Joint Staff, and component
commands, the JTF is provided with appropriate resources to maximize its
potential to quickly and effectively accomplish its assigned missions. [Ref. 39:p.
10]
The greatest impediment, however, in appropriate structuring and
employment of joint forces lies in the level of understanding that the commander
has as to the range of capabilities of the other services. Joint Force
Commanders are typically extremely well versed in the capabilities of their own
services, and may understandably tend to use those capabilities they
understand best. While JTF commanders usually use the best forces for the job,
this is not always the case. [Ref. 39:p. 16]
Joint operations succeed or fail as a function of the level of
understanding of what is in the "joint toolbag" of a joint task force, and how to
best apply it. Combining the contributions of air, land, sea, space and special
operations forces does not happen in isolation. Each capability is important, and
given appropriate circumstance, any dimension of combat force may dominate.
The JTF commander must tailor and select forces to most efficiently and
effectively accomplish the mission. Failure to do so at worst reduces the force's
chances for success and at best increases the amount of effort required to
accomplish the mission. Fitting the right joint package to a mission and threat
remains the key to success in contingency operations. [Ref. 38:p. 3]
The commander of JTF Proven Force, then Major General Jamerson,
quickly ascertained the need for Army Patriot units to defend Incirlik air base (in
Western Turkey), SOF forces for combat search and rescue (CSAR) missions,
psychological operations (PSYOPS) specialists for operations against the Iraqi
military, and a Joint Information Bureau (JIB) to respond to the media. The
commander included specialists in these areas on his staff from the onset, which
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enabled his force to start quickly and sustain effective combat operations. These
advance efforts enabled the task force to begin flying combat missions against
northern Iraq from an appropriately defended base with CSAR capability, directly
upon receiving permission from the Turkish government. [Ref. 39:p. 16]
Smart JTF headquarters staffing may also counterbalance, to some
degree, a commander's lack of interdisciplinary acumen. A commander who
surrounds himself with subject area experts from the other services will create
his "window" into service unique capabilities and limitations. The manner in
which a particular JTF is structured will dictate, to some degree, the nature of
the staff. Recognizing a recurring need to fill critical gaps in staff expertise, most
CINCs have developed staff augmentation cells of one variety or another. The
CINCPAC Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell is but one example of
how a JTF staff may develop required aptitude to function in a coalition
environment.
The Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) provides
responsive joint staff expertise, crisis action, and normal joint staff planning to a
designated CJTF. DJTFAC members are integrated fully within a JTF staff, and
are not intended to be separate from the JTF staff or a forward echelon of the
USCINCPAC/Service component staffs. DJTFAC normally consists of 26
personnel from HQ USCINCPAC and on island component staffs. It is a multi
service, multi disciplined organization tailored to meet CJTF needs. DJTFAC
members should have specific knowledge of crisis action planning, as well as in-
depth knowledge concerning specialty, service, and staff areas. [Ref. 45]
2. Force Composition
Although one may expect that a large number of participants in the
coalition is desirable, the opposite is often true. Balance and quality of forces is
a much more important factor. There are, in fact, significant disadvantages
unmanaged growth in a coalition.
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As the number of contributing countries increases, there is a
commensurate increase in the amount of policy guidance coming from the top.
The on scene commander, consequently, has less flexibility in executing
appropriate guidance. In other words, as more nations join the coalition, their
contributions bring with them more and more constraints, restrictions, and
special requirements. [Ref. 42:p. 26] This requires a significant adjustment on
the part of a US commander who may be accustomed to operating in the relative
ease of the realm of unilateral action.
Further, the fragility of the target environment may require that coalition
forces maintain a minimal footprint within a host nation. The delicate
environment in many crisis situations, especially disaster assistance and
humanitarian relief operations, requires a minimal "assisting" footprint to abate
the impact on the host nation infrastructure. Excess resources may not only
reduce the positive impact of a force, but also anger a host nation if a coalition's
assistance is perceived as a liability.
The JTF commander for OPERATION SEA ANGEL expended
considerable effort in convincing a wary Bangladeshi government that the forces
and resources he was introducing into country were assets that would not put
unbearable stress in the extremely fragile environment that existed in the
aftermath of the typhoon. In order to ensure that this was the case, the
commander not only limited the "permanent" footprint of his force to no more
than 500 people on land at any one time, but he also had to order some
components to retract some of the unsolicited resources they had provided, as
well as issue a standing order to refrain from sending any further resources to
the area of operations unless he specifically requested it. [Ref. 22]
Other methods of "managing" the nature and size of the coalition were
used in Somalia. The US recognized that the operation would be conducted
under UN auspices and that legitimacy required the involvement of the
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international community, to include participation by Somalia's African neighbors
with similar regional interests, as well as by both middle East and Southwest
Asian countries who shared cultural and religious affinities.
The overwhelming number of nations offering immediate military
support, however, threatened to surpass the coalition staffs capacity to
orchestrate the operation. To handle the vast number of offers, CENTCOM
headquarters screened each offer and retained approval authority in order to
ease the load on the UNITAF staff. The capabilities of contributors-including self
sufficiency, mobility, and willingness to adhere to American operational control
and rules of engagement- were weighted against the operational and political
requirements of the mission. To facilitate the screening, CENTCOM developed a
questionnaire which was disseminated by the State Department via Defense
Attache's. Those nations wishing to participate returned the completed
questionnaires via diplomatic channels. [Ref. 40:p. 61] The difficulties of
command relationships are more fully developed in the following discussion.
We need to identify countries that are willing to sign up at the first sign of
disaster to provide a medical unit, motor transport unit, military police
units, things of that nature where each country can contribute according to
their ability to give and be coordinated with the effort rather than throw all
organizations in there that do not have any kind of interactive capability
whatsoever, so you assign them a sector and hope that they do something.
[Ref. 22]
F. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
Another crucial challenge for a JTF commander lies in merging dissimilar
forces into a synergistic and seamless organization. Given the potential cultural,
political, and doctrinal differences between participants, this is a monumental,
yet critical undertaking. The nature of the coalition will determine the nature of
the working relationships established. Coalitions are linked together in a variety
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of ways, both formal and informal. Coalitions involving allies may very well
involve previously existing formal agreements or treaties that help guide the
coalition command hierarchy. Such existing agreements, although helpful, will
not fully alleviate problems in this area, especially in coalitions that involve the
diverse array of participants experienced in recent OOTW. Whatever the method
of bounding, streamlined and direct command and control relationships are
absolutely vital in orchestrating the efforts of a disparate coalition towards a
commonly defined objective.
As summarized by LtGen. H.C. Stackpole III:
Experience proves that a single headquarters- representing all the military,
diplomatic, private, public, national and international agencies involved-
must provide central control for disaster relief. Otherwise, dispersion of
authority will cause both duplication of effort and tragic omissions Yet, at
the same time, the military must remain sensitive to the particular interests
and contributions of all. [Ref. 28:p. 20]
Due to the consequences inherent in employing military force in an
environment, relinquishing national command and control of forces is an act of
trust and confidence unequaled in relations between nations, and between
nations and organizations, as in applicable in such cases that involve the United
Nations. Chapter II established that US command and control philosophy was
heavily based upon the fundamental principle of unity of command. Many in the
military contend that unity of command is an essential element of a successful
coalition. As written in one prominent journal of military thought, "Unity of effort
in combined operations demands that coalitions accept unity of command." [Ref.
34:p. 67 and Ref. 30:p. 37]
Where "command" relationships apply in a coalition, it is imperative that
authority match responsibility. Compromises must not outweigh mission
requirements. When political complications prohibit proper assignment of
authority, operational design and responsibility must be altered accordingly.
[Ref. 34:p. 67]
Admittedly, unity of command logically simplifies many aspects of
manipulating such a large and complex organization as an OOTW coalition. Yet
has unity of command truly been achieved? Moreover, is it achievable or even
required? The answers to these questions depend upon what degree of
command unity is required for one to consider it accomplished.
Unity of command, in an absolute sense, was not achieved in any of the
three scenarios of primary interest in this thesis. During PROVIDE COMFORT
the Combined Task Force (CTF) commander was successful, despite resistance
from some nations, in persuading contributing nations to place their forces under
his tactical command. US Navy command relationships to the CTF were not the
same as for the other services, or international forces. The Navy command
remained under control of the US European Command, and coordinated with the
CTF to provide required air support. [Ref. 46: p. 18] During OPERATION SEA
ANGEL, most military forces subjected themselves to the operational control of
the JTF commander. The Indians and the Chinese, however, were active
participants, but due to political considerations, coordinated with the coalition,
and contributed in a fashion consistent with their respective national interests.
[Ref. 22] OPERATION CONTINUE HOPE had even less unity present in its
command structure. The relationship of the Special Operations Forces to the
rest of the coalition is but one example of a complex and convoluted chain of
command involving UN, and unified commander tiers of authority. US logistics
and command and control organizations were under UN control through Major
General Thomas Montgomery, who was dual hatted as the deputy UN military
commander and as the UN Force Command deputy. The rangers that arrived in
late August brought their own command system and reported directly to US
Central Command in Tampa. [Ref. 20:p. 12]
The premise that unity of command is essential to achieving unity of effort
also ignores many realities present in the coalition dynamic. Recent experiences
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suggest that the principle of cooperation, consensus, and coordination (CO^)
may more accurately reflect the prerequisite mentality that coalition members
need to achieve unity of effort. Achieving cohesion in a coalition environment
entails consensus, cooperation, coordination on the part of all participants, vice
strict authoritative relationships.
To begin, many participants in OOTW do not subscribe to and are not
subject to a chain of command. Many NGOs and IOs are historically suspicious
of the military, which may result in tenuous initial working relations. This matter
was vividly illustrated during the initial stages of OPERATION RESTORE HOPE.
In preparation for the ensuing onslaught of military forces and additional
relief operations, US military representatives established a plan to de-conflict the
increasingly congested skies above Somalia. The subsequent brief was not well
received by many civilian participants, some who continually questioned the
military's right to "organize and impose their will on civilians." Contributing to this
mindset was that agencies contracted by the relief agencies were being paid by
the ton of food that they could deliver to Somalia. These contractors are often
used to operating in a competitively priced market and were concerned that their
profit margins would suffer if procedural requirements forced them to fly other
than a direct line from take off to landing. Several organizations raised the issue
of authority constantly, and refused to acknowledge the right of the military to
impose an airspace order. [Ref. 33:p. 5]
The individuals who gravitate to the NGO profession are "more likely to be
people more prone to the Peace Corps than the Marine Corps." They are
generally more prone to seek consensus than the average military person, and
will not understand military institutional cultural norms any more readily than
service members will understand theirs. The potential for friction is high, unless
both sides make a determined effort to overcome such prejudice in order to get
the job done. [Ref. 47:p. 42]
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The contributions of non-military organizations and agencies, however, are
critical, and cooperative relationships work well. In SEA ANGEL, the JTF
coordinated its efforts with the Department of State and the Agency for
International Development with which memoranda of agreement existed. Ad hoc
relationships are also effective. An effective division of labor was created among
the International Red Cross, Red Crescent, CARE, Save the Children, and other
relief agencies.
Military forces took advantage of experts from within host countries and US
State Department. USAID disaster relief experts were on the scene in
Bangladesh acting as key advisors, and played a similar role in Northern Iraq.
"We've never done an operation like this with the military before," said Donald
M. Krumm, head of the State Department's Emergency Refugee Program,
alluding to the new, but effective working relationships established with the
military. The contributions of these organizations were critical in mission
success. [Ref. 27:p. 16]
While many relief agencies avoid the appearance of formal relationships
with the military, there is an inextricable dependency between the two. The relief
agencies have the relief to provide, and the military has the ability to provide the
security and logistic support required to provide it. These relationships are
based upon mutual need, trust, and respect, vice any type of authoritative
context, and have proven adequate in most situations. [Ref. 30:p. 38]
Over fifty relief agencies were providing assistance to the Kurds during
PROVIDE COMFORT in Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. There efforts, however, were not
coordinated and the lack of coordination reduced their combined effectiveness.
The military's organizational structure, size, resources and ability to plan and
execute large scale operations makes it particularly well suited to assume the
coordination role. [Ref. 46:p. 28]
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Finally, many nations are reluctant to place their forces under the command
authority of any other nation. The aforementioned "come in and take charge"
attitude that pervades the US military mindset does not do much to ease this
reluctance. There is an overriding concern among many countries that they are
not going to "look good" or are going to be outshone by US forces. These
concerns are often shared by host nations. As adjustments are required in a
situation, the perception is that the US expects to be adjusted to and that
coalition partners must adopt US procedures. Regardless of generally superior
US command and control capability, the jealousy and mistrust this creates
among other coalition partners is significant. [Ref. 22]
The ramifications of other nations' and organizations' perceptions
concerning US attitude are significant, and US commanders must do their utmost
to ensure that negative perceptions are minimized.
The primary reason US forces fall into this pitfall is a general lack of
understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and sensitivities of coalition
partners. In addition to the political agendas, all participants bring unique
capabilities to the coalition that are necessarily considered in the course of
establishing command and control relationships that provide requisite
synergism. The US simply does not know its partners well enough.
A greater level of understanding of these characteristics of coalition
partners would facilitate greater and more rapidly deployed coalition capability,
as partners could plan, train, and, to a limited degree equip themselves with
respect to the capabilities of others. [Ref. 22]
The problems in establishing "working relationships" may be partially
ameliorated by developing a concept of operations that provides coalition
partners with the greatest opportunity to achieve success. In addition to the
distinct political agendas, all participants bring unique capabilities to the "playing
field" that are necessarily considered in the course of constructing operational
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objectives and courses of action, as well as in establishing command and control
relationships that provide for an appropriate level of synergism. Several general
considerations guide tnis process.
To reiterate, the major impediment in accomplishing this arrangement lies
in identifying the capabilities and limitations of coalition partners and
subsequently training towards that end. As in the joint operating environment, it
is imperative that commanders understand the capabilities and limitations of all
coalition forces. Coalition leadership must ensure that participants are assigned
missions that best adhere to their capabilities and political desires, and that
provide them with the best possible chances of success.
Moreover, "tactical" assignment should optimize multinational force
strengths and avoid duplication or degradation of unique capabilities. During
OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT, the British 40 Commando unit, fresh from a
tour in Northern Ireland was assigned the mission of clearing Iraqi secret police
out of the northern city of Zakhu. Explosive Ordinance Disposal teams (EOD),
medical, and a variety of other units also were contributed by several nations,
and assigned missions commensurate with their respective strengths. [Ref. 48]
Likewise, coalition forces must compensate for vulnerabilities among
partners. NGOs, for example, often require different types of support, such as
communications, logistics, etc. to effectively integrate them into a coalition and
capitalize on their substantial capability.
There are various ways to accomplish this objective. For example, an area
of operations may be "sectored", assigning independent sectors of operations to
specific countries. Forces are normally more effective if employed under
commanders from their respective nations. Doctrine, language, and equipment
commonality and interoperability are also advantages to establishing sectors.
[Ref. 49:p. 41]
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When you are able to establish sectors, you are showing confidence in the
organization that is there. You are allowing them a piece of the action that
is commensurate with whatever their input is. [Ref. 22]
In contrast, integration of forces is often required to accommodate
functionally, vice geographically oriented command relationships, to make
necessary political concessions, or to compensate for homogenous force
shortfalls.
French participation during Provide Comfort is illustrative of a "political"
accommodation. France, as a sovereign nation, sent a brigade to operate
independently in Northern Iraq. The French eventually agreed to operate under
TACON under US forces, with the conditions that they not be placed subordinate
to the British, and that other allied forces be assigned under French control. This
operational relationship was highly successful and presents a viable model for
relationships in similar situations. [Ref. 24:p. 17]
Assigning responsibility for specific sectors, however is favored over
integration by many senior US military leaders because integration requires,
"...the process of cross cultural identification and it takes time to do that. In a
crisis situation you don't have time to do that." [Ref. 22]
Sectors also allow nations that are not part of the coalition, due to political
or other reasons, to make contributions to the overall effort. As mentioned, the
Chinese and Indians were not part of the Sea Angel task force because of
political concerns. They provided a significant amount of aviation relief support
in geographic sectors that were far enough away from the rest of the coalition
effort to automatically de conflict from ongoing coalition activities.
G. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter presented a discussion of the pertinent C2 issues that
challenge or impede coalition efficacy in operations other than war. The
difficulty that a joint force experiences in developing a common frame of
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reference, as previously discussed, would lead one to logically conclude that a
multinational, multi-organizational coalition will experience problems of
significantly broader scope and greater magnitude. There are a number of
challenges and issues involving command and control of coalition forces that
face a JTF commander in OOTW, many of which parallel, yet exceed those
found in a joint setting. A full understanding of the dynamics and resulting pitfalls
involved is essential in ensuring optimal employment of US forces. There are
several significant challenges to accomplishing this monumental achievement.
The first, and perhaps most serious challenge is the current lack of a
common doctrine. Doctrine plays a critical role in establishing the procedures
and methodology with which participants will approach a given situation.
Developing such doctrine, however, is certain to be an arduous task. The
problems experienced by the US military in developing joint doctrine for forces
that share a common language and culture, allude to the degree of difficulty in
blending multinational and multicultural perspectives into a cohesive framework.
The lack of framework has important implications for the manner in which
coalitions tend to conduct operations.
Every facet involving the conceptual issues of coalition command and
control is politically and cooperatively driven. The US has relinquished the
monopoly, perceived by some, in setting the mandate, objectives, and command
relationships in the coalitions of the New World Order. Current world perceptions
regarding the link between true collective action and the resulting legitimacy it
lends, do not allow the US the same dominance it enjoyed during the Cold War
as regards coalition decision making.
Further, it appears that the nature of the OOTW environment and the large
and disparate numbers of partners render traditional US perceptions concerning
the nature of command somewhat less valid. Doctrine and training focused
largely upon joint operations as well as previous precedent have developed a
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somewhat myopic US mindset concerning the nature of command and control in
OOTW. The US is accustomed to leading. The manner in which it can lead,
however, is changing.
There is little argument that operations where the principle of unity of
command is achievable will enjoy certain advantages over those operations
where it is not. One commander and one chain of command facilitates direct and
easy two way command, control, and communications. However the notion that
unity of command is essential to successful coalition operations ignores the
evidence, as well as the fundamental characteristics of OOTW.
True unity of command, even of all military forces did not exist in any of the
three operations of focus in this thesis. Furthermore, the non-military
organizations and agencies who played critical roles in these operations were
not subject to "command" authority by the military hierarchy present. These
organizations occasionally lacked organization and focus, but through various
mechanisms and methods of coordination, however, they were blended into
appropriate and productive roles within the coalitions, conducting operations
concurrently and complementary to military operations.
Despite the lack of unity of command, the coalitions arrayed for
OPERATIONS SEA ANGEL, PROVIDE COMFORT, and RESTORE HOPE all
made significant contributions to the relief of human suffering. Yes, there were
problems and inefficiencies. No, the final word as to the stability, durability , and
desirability of the achieved end states in the latter two of operations has not
been said. What is clear, however, is that comprehending the complexities of
coalitions and successfully orchestrating coalition operations, requires a unique
combination of military and political skill. What is not clear, is whether current
perceptions concerning command and control provide the most effective vehicle
by which to orchestrate coalitions in OOTW.
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As previously established, there is no common doctrine for conducting
coalition operations in OOTW. The lack of a common approach has resulted in
an ad-hoc approach, using existing doctrine, due to lack of any other guidance.
The doctrine being used, as it is not specifically tailored for coalition operations
in OOTW, perhaps is unsuitable in many respects, and equates, to borrow a
cliche' to "putting a square peg in a round hole."
Although the failure to focus on the unique nature and distinctions of
coalitions in OOTW, and modify processes according may not prove fatal, it will
perpetuate a trend of sub optimization. Lessons learned must influence
approaches to coalition operations in these circumstances, and a standard
framework developed. This will enhance a coalition's ability to rapidly and
efficiently engage in a specific situation. Instead of trying to frame a situation to
fit old doctrine, the doctrine will be tailored to fit the situation. The solution is
different every time. This will impact a coalitions ability to rapidly and efficiently
engage in a specific situation. Instead of trying to adapt a situation to conform
with doctrine, more effort is required on developing doctrine that fits a situation.
The examples provided in this chapter demonstrate that coalition goals,
objectives, and working relationships are established via the process of CO^-
COordination, Cooperation, and Consensus. The development of a more
appropriate framework with which to approach future coalition operations hinges
upon the recognition of this fundamental premise. Developing an appropriate
framework, however, requires an investigation of not only the conceptual
impediments pertaining to command and control, but the physical challenges as
well. This is the objective of the next chapter.
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V. INTELLIGENCE LESSONS LEARNED
A. INTRODUCTION
1. Purpose of the Chapter
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with an appreciation
of the existing challenges in ensuring that all coalition members have the
necessary intelligence and information with which to execute their respective
tasking and responsibilities.
The degree to which coalition partners share a common picture of the
environment, hence their ability to formulate appropriate operational decisions,
hinges directly upon the amount and applicability of information and intelligence
provided. Assessment of existing C2 processes requires both an understanding
of the conceptual elements pertaining to command and control, as developed in
Chapter IV, and full knowledge of the informational dynamics present in the
OOTW environment.
Many of these issues are outside of the strictly functional or operational
boundaries within which this thesis is focused. However, they are critical to
understanding some of the potential and realized problems inherent in
developing a common process.
2. Intelligence Overview
The contribution of command and control to military effectiveness is
based upon the use made of its basic commodity- information. With accurate
information, uncertainty about the operating environment can be decreased, and
decisions concerning readiness, movement, and applications of a force's
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resources can be made with a more comprehensive understanding of the likely
costs and benefits. [Ref. 50: p. 19]
The ability to conceptualize, plan, and execute operations rests upon
the timeliness and applicability of information and intelligence. The intelligence
cycle as developed in Chapter II, in one form or another, is the manner in which
military forces and other organizations develop awareness on the capabilities,
organization, and intentions of the threat. Additionally, the cycle provides insight
into other environmental considerations that may impact operations.
Without this foundation, employed as a collective and trickle down
process that encompasses the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, it is
unlikely that a coalition will develop uniform perceptions concerning the either
the threat or required action. [Ref. 34:p. 65] This "intelligence preparation of the
battlefield" or IPB process must attempt to cover every necessary facet of the
operating environment of import to the coalition. There are, however, several
complicating factors inherent both in existing intelligence institutions and in
coalitions that inhibit the ability of the intelligence community to meet a force's
information requirements in OOTW.
B. INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
The absence of a common approach to intelligence permeates all levels of
the US intelligence community, and is largely a result of varied points of focus
and emphasis among the services and the community as a whole.
The US intelligence infrastructure is currently struggling to adapt to the post
Cold War environment. For 40 years, the Soviet Union provided a convenient
and constant focus for the US intelligence community. The boundaries that
guided previous practices and collection emphasis, however, are fast eroding.
The new world order has resulted in an understandably more diffused
intelligence effort. Regional conflicts, economic and maritime concerns,
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terrorism, counter-narcotics, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction all
provide the intelligence community with more than enough work to keep gainfully
employed. The perpetual shift in emphasis as dictated by the rapidly changing
pace of world events, combined with limited intelligence assets, both as
concerns personnel and resources, has logical consequences for sustainment
and quality of support to the operational forces. The community is doing the best
it can with what it has, but is significantly taxed.
Like the rest of the Department of Defense, the intelligence community is
effected by cuts and consolidations. The impact of the cuts is already been felt,
with an overall 25 percent reduction mandated by 1997. The reorganization
under way will affect DIA's collection, production and infrastructure functional
arrangement, with a related manpower reduction of 17 percent and a cut in the
number of directorates from eight to four. [Ref. 51 :p. 11]
Furthermore, recent reorganizations of the operational intelligence support
infrastructure have mixed implications for operation forces. Commitments and
tasking for the intelligence community have increased in both quantity and
complexity, but the number of resources available to address the requirements
have not. In the wake of the "peace dividend," separate service autonomous
facilities, personnel, and resources have been consolidated into joint intelligence
organizations under a myriad of aliases, including Joint Intelligence Center, Joint
Analysis Center, and Atlantic Intelligence Center. For several reasons, it is as of
yet unclear whether this structure will adequately provide the level of support
required at the operational level.
The first misgiving concerning the new structure involves the degree to
which the US services have adopted the notion of jointness, as pertains to
providing intelligence for operational forces. Recent discussions with senior
intelligence officers in theater command centers indicate that there is not a
uniform degree of commitment to the new joint concept. Due to reasons that
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include career management and promotion concerns and a perceived need to
reserve a preponderance of a services intelligence resources for autonomous
support, the services, again, lack a consistent approach. 1
These perceptions, in part, stem from fundamentally different approaches
to intelligence. For example, the Navy and Marine Corps historically integrate
intelligence personnel directly into the operating forces. Conversely, the Air
Force has established entirely separate intelligence units to provide required
support to operators. Respective approaches to integration may have
consequences for capacity in certain circumstances. The Navy is relatively
proficient in conducting operational analysis, yet lags in strategic analytical
capability. Air Force intelligence capability is reversed entirely, with proficiency
residing in the strategic arena. Additionally, philosophical differences exist
between services as to the true role of the intelligence professional. For
example, the Navy encourages every intelligence officer to conduct his or her
own independent analysis. This analysis is included in products released from
Navy specific commands. The Air Force intelligence process, however, is more
hierarchically driven, with analysis funneled through increasingly senior levels of
the intelligence organization prior to release. [Ref. 53] The point of this
discussion is that intelligence may be conducted differently from JTF to JTF,
depending upon which service or indiv.. uals are in charge of the effort. This may
effect standardization and support both internally and with other coalition
partners.
An additional element of the debate involves the levels of support available
throughout the various theaters. Not all CINCs have a JIC, or JAC specifically
assigned to address the needs of their respective theater. Potentially, the level
of support to various components may suffer. "Borrowing" resources of any kind
1 These opinions were conveyed to the author by several US Navy intelligence officers who
made these observations during a field trip to the primary US intelligence facilities on the east
coast in April of 1993.
102
has disadvantages, logistics support among the many. The complications
involved with having the "teeth" of a resource, but lacking the indigenous "tail" to
support it are serious. Further, one unit's borrowing of another's resources is
predicated upon the lender not needing the resource. Priority of support would
predictably go to the "owning" unit, or its subordinates. [Ref. 52]
Personnel manning at the operational and tactical levels is also a problem.
Personnel shortages and the overtaxing of these scant resources further
precludes appropriate analysis. For example, a majority of a military intelligence
officer's time is spent managing resources, and ensuring that the flow of
information up and down the chain of command is adequate. Considerable time
is required to lay on tasking, and other facets of collection management, as well
as managing the diverse and constantly changing array of ADP systems.
Analysis of collected information is conducted in whatever time is left in a day. 2
[Ref. 52]
A final institutional lamentation concerns the orientation of the intelligence
community. US strategy was clear during the Cold War: contain the Soviets and
deter nuclear conflict. The strategy was clear, hence the role of intelligence was
also clear: find out how Soviet forces operated and provide adequate warning of
any Soviet attack. The numerology of potential conflict with the Soviet Union
caused the intelligence community to focus on the "how many are there" type of
analysis. Qualitative assessment was essentially an afterthought, as in the mind
set of US forces, "Ivan's" intentions were perfectly clear. [Ref. 53:p. 60]
Now, US strategy depends upon the region, and there is a tendency to use
intelligence organizations trained in threat assessment and warning to estimate
events in a rapidly changing and uncertain political and social arena as exists in
OOTW. This is a role for which the intelligence community is not prepared.
2Also, author's discussions with Naval Intelligence Officers in numerous intelligence seminars
conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School during 1994.
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Training methods have historically contributed to deficient analytical support.
The historical focus on technological gadgetry and the resulting intelligence
collection system has further inadvertently handicapped qualitative analytical
capability. The current system is designed to count and detect, not assess. [Ref.
53:p. 60]
Understanding an asset's capabilities and limitations is an essential
prerequisite to employing it to its maximum potential. This is a noted
shortcoming in the historical use of intelligence. Commanders who understand
what military intelligence can and can not do will likely gain more from its
employment.
There is a need to prepare US military officers to anticipate enemy
perceptions. During the Gulf War, General Schwarzkopf and his air component
commander, Lieutenant General Horner, were sensitive to the cultures and
political views of their Arab allies. This sensitivity was gained by spending time
in the region. They used their appreciation of the situation to establish and
maintain a very diverse coalition. [Ref. 53:p. 60] This example, although
extracted from a conventional operation, provides the reader with a prelude of
the intelligence challenges facing a coalition in an environment as complex as
that encountered in most OOTW.
C. OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES
Many of the intelligence challenges in operations other than war stem from
the unfamiliar and unusual environment in which the military intelligence
infrastructure is used. The operational constraints, considerations, and
complications are very different than those in conventional operations.
A recurring theme in this thesis involves the lack of a standard approach to
command and control and its associated components. This is also true of
intelligence in OOTW. There is doctrine for joint intelligence operations, and
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there is doctrine for multinational intelligence operations. However, there is no
doctrine for combination multinational and multiorganizational operations in the
irregular environment. There are several ways in which this impacts the
intelligence community.
1. Role of Intelligence
The first impact may be labeled as confusion. If there is no doctrine for a
particular type of operation, does this imply that intelligence does not have a role
to play? Of course not. However, using conventional intelligence doctrine for
OOTW creates a variety of opinions as to the appropriate role of intelligence.
Combat operations involve well defined mechanisms for conducting
ongoing assessment. Intelligence tracks a forces impact on the enemy and
submits this information to the operators to factor in to subsequent operations.
The intelligence cycle, as developed in Chapter II, provides the traditional
vehicle by which to achieve this. In many OOTW, however, especially those
involving humanitarian assistance and disaster relief actions, there is not a clear
cut doctrinal approach at conducting such assessment. [Ref. 47:p. 51]
In an oversimplified description, the intelligence community traditionally
has its charter in identifying the location, resources, capabilities, and intentions
of an enemy. The "enemy" in OOTW, however, is potentially more abstract than
the intelligence community is accustomed to dealing with. Does the intelligence
community consider the environment in the aftermath of a typhoon, or starvation
in the wake of anarchy as an enemy? A "purist" would argue that environmental
considerations are friendly situation information, thus belong in the realm of
operations. If this is true, how can intelligence contribute to an operation where
these sorts of adversaries are the primary targets of the deployed force?
The JTF that deployed to OPERATION SEA ANGEL wrestled with these
very issues. Operators maintained that the process "looked, walked, and talked
like the intelligence cycle." The process of assessment of the effectiveness of
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the relief effort was evolutionary, transferring from the J-3 section to the J-2
section. The J-3. who recommended the move, still wondered if there was a
more appropriate approach, however. [Ref. 47:p. 51]
Another contention concerning the role of intelligence is its relationship
to operations. There are many operators who consider the intelligence
community as nothing more than "librarians," who have fallen out of touch with
what the operational community requires. A central notion in successful
implementation of IPB is that it requires a tighter, closer, and more proactive
relationship between intelligence and operations personnel. Although historical
precedence and lessons learned espouse the requirement to keep intelligence
and operations separate (purportedly to ensure a detached and unbiased
assessment, and to preclude intelligence telling the commander what he wants
to hear), perhaps there are reasons this may require re-evaluation. Many argue
that the deviation between the intelligence community and operations has grown
too large, and that the gap has resulted in an intelligence community that is
unable to fully understand and anticipate what its customer, the war fighter,
needs. Many also feel that military intelligence officers need more exposure to
operational doctrine and procedures. Intelligence personnel need to be able to
think operationally at all levels. Only then can they understand the perspectives
of and the options available to potential foes. Military leaders and planners also
need more exposure to areas where regional conflict is likely. There is a need to
see and feel what these nations are like, as well as to develop an understanding
of the history of the region. [Ref. 53:p. 60]
Intelligence can, has, and will continue to play a substantial role in
OOTW. The relationship between the commander and intelligence, however, will
largely dictate the contribution intelligence will make to a specific operation. The
manner in which intelligence is structured to conduct its mission must
encompass the strategic, operational, and tactical realm. This is due to the
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"trickle down" interdependent relationship that exists between the three levels of
operations. The mandate in an operation, for example, ultimately will impact the
mission assigned to an infantry battalion or requested of a relief organization.
Establishing this overarching methodology, however, depends upon the
intelligence community's recognition of several of the other difficulties inherent in
OOTW.
2. Identify Requirements
The nature of OOTW and the characteristics of the key participants
have been developed throughout this thesis. The need to improve the
understanding of these characteristics and peculiarities is also established.
Consequently, the degree to which the environment is understood or
misunderstood is one factor that will drive the appropriateness and sequence of
intelligence and information to coalition partners.
Operations other than war require not only an understanding of the
culture of coalition partners, but a heightened awareness of the socio-economic
parameters of the target environment. Anticipating and prioritizing all intelligence
requirements in OOTW is an ominous task at best. The requirements of coalition
participants in OOTW are extremely diverse. It is also important to realize that
each participant may have different needs which will vary with respect to
assigned mission. NGOs, for example may need to know where the food and
medicine is needed most. Military forces entrusted with coalition or indigenous
population security may need to know where the hostiles are located and the
potential impact upon NGO distribution efforts. Achieving unity of effort requires
that the intelligence and information needs of all coalition participants are met as
fully as possible.
Several recurring themes have developed in recent OOTW that
demonstrate that there is perhaps a requirement to refocus the scope and efforts
of the intelligence community in order to ensure adequate support to operational
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forces. Perhaps these adjustments are best contemplated through analyzing
several of the intelligence shortcomings in our three case studies.
3. Lack of Cultural intelligence
A glaring discrepancy from many past operations is the lack of resident
and easily accessible information on both the country and population into which
operations are conducted, as well on as the wide array of "players" who routinely
participate in irregular operations. A greater understanding of both categories of
information would greatly enhance operational and interoperability planning.
Understanding the demographics of a country (including such items as religion,
terrain, population centers, history r conflicts, etc.) greatly enhances the ability
of planners to develop courses of action (COAs) that accomplish required
objectives, and apply appropriate attention to areas of potential sensitivity (i.e.,
types of rations provided to starving people). Understanding the capabilities,
doctrine, specialization, and equipment of other military and civilian
organizations will facilitate greater operational effectiveness by allowing
commanders to better match operational taskings with capabilities.
The politically sensitive and peacefully oriented objectives of operations
other than war mandate that forces operating within a target environment have a
thorough acclimation in the culture. Understanding the cultural mindset(s) in an
operating environment is critical in all aspects of coalition operations. Failure to
understand the motivations and ideosynchracies of indigenous populations
increases the chances of proceeding down an ill-advised operational path.
These lessons have graphically surfaced during recent events in Somalia.
By the time UNISOM II assumed control from UNITAF on 4 May 1993,
certain elements of the UNISOM leadership made the determination that the
operation's success hinged upon the elimination of Aideed as the leader of the
Habr Gedr sub-clan. Aideed was to be politically isolated, and not allowed to
participate in the future government of Somalia. This decision embroiled the UN,
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in the fabric of Somali politics, eliminating all claims it may have previously had
as to honest brokership in the Somalia situation. To Aideed and his followers,
the UN was now another faction to be dealt with. As war in Somalia is an
extension of politics, conflict was inevitable unless negotiations were conducted,
an impossible occurrence without the Havr Gedr and its allies in the Somali
National Alliance (SNA). The clan structure in Somalia considers an attack on
one member to be an attack on all. They do not have a tradition of personal
responsibility for their actions, as the clan assumes responsibility. A better
understanding of Somali culture may have prevented some of the disastrous
events that occurred later. [Ref. 20: pp. 9-10]
Cultural capability was eventually developed, but should have been
sought and provided earlier in PROVIDE COMFORT. Besides the normal
intelligence requirements, the operation required a strong and instantaneous
provision of "cultural" intelligence. Information such as the tribal and political
structure of the Kurds, lifestyle habits, leaders and military organizations, and
the history of the Kurdish/Iraqi conflict were vital elements of information in the
CTF decision making and implementation process. The themes developed for
psychological operations also depended heavily upon the cultural intelligence
collected. [Ref. 48: p. 12]
A thorough understanding and assessment of regional demographics,
customs and traditions is also required to ensure that anticipated coalition
interactions with indigenous population contribute to a productive atmosphere.
During OPERATION SEA ANGEL, there was a need for additional contracting
personnel to address certain details concerning reconstruction requirements.
Three women volunteered and were sent to conduct negotiations with the
Bangladeshi government. This created an embarrassing situation, in that in a
Muslim culture, men do not negotiate with women. Additional contracting
specialists, males, were subsequently flown in to do the job. [Ref. 22]
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Experiences such as these have resulted in a call for increased
emphasis on compiling information pertaining to the cultural characteristics of
likely areas of operations before a crisis develops . Although no one can predict,
with certainty, where the next crisis will occur, foresight and common sense
should provide adequate clues as to priority regions for this endeavor. Thus, the
intelligence community can begin the task of compiling critical data on the
demographics of "crisis candidate countries," as well as on the capabilities and
limitations of coalition partners. The nature of cultural intelligence largely
precludes its collection via any form of technological gadget. Two intelligence
sources are key in developing the information base of the scope and breadth
desired-- HUMINT and OSCINT.
Human intelligence or HUMINT plays an integral role in the level of
internal cultural acumen a force has at its disposal in a crisis situation. Its
intelligence is extracted directly from the sources either involved in an event or
privy to the information. During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, one of the biggest
intelligence gaps was found to be the lack of in-country sources (within Iraq)
from which to gather intelligence on Saddam Hussein's movement's, mental
state, or intentions. IMINT, SIGINT, and COMINT were available, but there was
no one actually on the ground looking out for US interests. Developing a more
comprehensive "cultural eyes on target" capability is important to future
successes, and is an investment which may pay huge dividends in subsequent
times of crisis.
Unfortunately, the US has a significant shortage of indigenous HUMINT
sources. Developing HUMINT capability requires a considerable investment,
particularly in time. In order to walk, talk, and think like the natives, one must live
among them. Foreign Area Officer programs are a good start, but currently fall
short of meeting the multi-dimensional demands in OOTW. Because of the time
investment required to develop adequate HUMINT capability, and due to the
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bias many bureaucrats have towards other INTs, many cuts have been made in
the national collection programs. For example, during the 1970s Admiral
Stansfield Turner viewed HUMINT as an archaic form of collection and withdrew
over 200 case agents from the field. [Ref. 54:p. 218]
Open source information or OSCINT is similarly critical in developing
the "database" support desired. Substantial intelligence relating to the political,
military, and economic affairs of other nations is available through means other
than clandestine technical and human source collection. OSCINT is an important
means of collecting information of this type. OSCINT includes the acquisition of
any verbal, written, or electronically transmitted material that is legally acquired.
This includes newspapers, magazines, and unclassified journals as well as the
monitoring of public radio and television. The intelligence community must
determine what joint endeavors, with government and private industry both at
home and abroad, will facilitate the rapid digitization of Third World data useful
to coalition forces in OOTW. [Ref. 15:p. 251]
OSCINT has an advantage over traditional intelligence means in that
intelligence presumes processing and analysis, not simply the dissemination of
raw data. OSCINT can be viewed as coherent analysis reflecting access to
multimedia open sources. Those sources are not classified at their origin, are
not subject to proprietary constraints (other than copyright), are not produced by
sensitive contacts requiring obscuration, and are not acquired through
clandestine or covert means.
Given these distinctions, the obvious utility of OSCINT is perhaps
handicapped, especially as pertains to the OOTW environment. US intelligence
officers are not accustomed to attacking intelligence needs outside of the
historically established channels. This may potentially limit the scope and
effectiveness of intelligence support in an environment that has so many open
sources of information, as the thesis will subsequently discuss. [Ref. 55:p. 65]
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At a minimum, an archived data base concerning potential target
regions should include operational elevations and temperature, cross country
mobility and inter visibility, hydrography, weather, culture, and the presence of
US citizens. Investments, generalizations about bridge loading, tunnel clearance
and river fording limitations are also critical. Logistics factors may include the
availability of maps and charts, the distance of the capital cities from the five-
fathom line, the number of airfields and ports that will support the introduction of
forces, and the time in days it would take the nearest forward deployed force to
reach the country of interest. Further, communications data, such as the angle
and availability of satellites, local switching facilities, and engineering
information such as refrigeration, warehouse and lumber facilities may be
extremely pertinent. [Ref. 56:p. 120]
Developing this sort of a data base, however, is easier said than done.
Simply stated, the resources (manpower and collection resources) required to
develop and maintain a capability of this sort simply exceed current available
resource levels. One suggestion towards alleviating this shortage involves
dividing the work load between trusted allies (i.e., the British would take a chunk
of the world, the Japanese another, the Koreans another, and so on). After allies
finish compiling the data on their respective reasons, everyone could then trade
"chunks." The magnitude of the undertaking obviously requires prioritization of
effort, and identification of which regions of the world are most important to US
forces. Although efforts towards development are on going, it will be sometime
before a capability of the type envisioned comes to fruition. [Ref. 57]
4. Prioritization and Anticipation
The priority of the information required is equally important, in that it
determines the sequential focus of the intelligence community, assuming that
resources will be limited. Priority will shift as the mandate, objectives, and
tactical situation shifts. It is imperative that the intelligence community be able to
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prioritize and provide the user with the critical items first. Many examples of
improper prioritization, or inability to deliver critical elements or products were
encountered in recent experience.
Inevitably, a crisis develops in an area and under circumstances that a
force has prepared for and anticipated the least. Due to a combination of factors,
that includes limited embarkation space, the forces often find themselves short
of (or completely lacking) requisite maps. Implications of this shortcoming are
obvious. Insufficient mapping and geodesy plagued both Operation's Provide
Comfort and Sea Angel. Throughout both operations, but especially during their
initial stages, maps were in chronically short supply and often arrived late in the
planning process. Despite the speed with which forces were introduced into the
area of operations, higher headquarters should have anticipated the volume of
maps necessary for such a large operation and taken a more proactive role in
supplying JTF forces.
In PROVIDE COMFORT, the initial "handful" of maps were distributed to
commanders only 36 hours before the initial units flew across the border. During
SEA ANGEL the cyclone wrought horrendous change on the coastline of the
operating area. As a result, the maps that were available bore little resemblance
to the terrain features present upon arrival of the JTF. This posed significant
problems for aerial navigation, and pilots had to manually update pilotage
charts. 3 [Ref. 58]
Indeed, this problem is endemic. According to a 1989 study of 67
countries and two island groups of interest to the Marine Corps, 22 have no
maps and would require rapid exploitation of multispectral imagery with grid
overlays. Mexico, Surinam, Bangladesh, Greece, and Turkey fall into this
category. Another 37 have only a few 1:50,000 tactical maps which generally
Author's personal observations in PROVIDE COMFORT, and Col. Keith Maxfield, G2
MARFORPAC, Personal Interview, 9 December, 1993.
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cover only the major ports and cities, showing no manmade features (roads,
airfields, etc.) established within the last ten years or so. Columbia, most of
Central America, Peru, and most countries in Southwest Asia, Asia, and Africa
also fall in this category. Only 10 of 69 areas of interest have complete 1:50,000-
scale map coverage, and those are out of date by an average of ten years. [Ref.
58:p. 38]
A more rapid and responsive, real-time mapping capability is required at
the operational level. Several initiatives are currently under way towards
achieving this, such as a deployable compact disc (CD) map library, which
contains a complete set of Defense Mapping Agency digital terrain products and
topography initiatives using mutispectral imagery. These are not a total solution,
however, because adequate reproduction capability is still logistically
cumbersome. [Ref. 57]
Medical intelligence is another frequently overlooked or understated
aspect that may figure heavily into a force's concept of operations. Accurate and
timely medical intelligence is vital in most circumstances surrounding disaster or
humanitarian relief. Prerequisite to alleviating suffering is a knowledge of the
ailments currently affecting the population, or a clear understanding of what
afflictions are likely based on existing environmental conditions. This knowledge
is equally important in protecting coalition forces and reducing the incidence of
sickness and debilitation, hence degradation of operational effectiveness.
Current medical intelligence was lacking for many of the Major
Subordinate Commands during Provide Comfort. Prior to debarkation medical
intelligence assets consisted of packets published in 1988 and several AFMIC
reports. No intelligence was available from Desert Storm. Information (in areas
of climate, hazardous plant and animal life, and incidence of intestinal and upper
respiratory disorders) was inadequate and replete with inaccuracies. [Ref. 48]
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Weather and its potential impact upon operations also requires
consideration. Weather reports, trends, and forecasts are vital elements of
information in relief situations. This information is especially critical when the
weather is the threat, or when the weather has significant operational
implications. The angry sea-states encountered by sea-based forces during
OPERATION SEA ANGEL are illustrative of this point. Ships required meticulous
and constant maneuver to avoid running aground in the unstable waters that
followed the onslaught of the typhoon. The implications of weather for air assets
are similarly obvious. [Ref. 22]
In some instances, lack of this information is a factor of JTF
composition. During Operation Provide Comfort, weather reports were not
consistently received from higher headquarters. Aggravating this shortcoming,
the JTF lacked an adequately equipped, dedicated meteorological support
detachment. Outside sources were either not tasked with, or incapable of
providing the required levels of information. Although conditions ranged from
cold temperatures and snow when the CTF began operations in April, to a
searing 120 degrees by the time the hand-off to the UN was complete in June,
the weather remained relatively constant. However, in this situation (as well as in
any other environment), weather could have presented significant challenges/
obstacles to operations, and certainly poses ramifications for the types of
equipment (both personal and operational) that a force will bring to the field.
[Ref. 59]
5. Identifying Resources
The number of available intelligence sources is also typically increased
in operations short of war. The "multinational flavor" and international (non-
military) presence normally associated with operations of these sort results in a
plethora of potential resources that can make substantial contributions to
intelligence and information collection efforts.
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Few would argue that US intelligence assets developed for more
conventional tasks have significant benefit in OOTW. US forces are accustomed
to using those sources, frequently with great success. A clearly defined enemy
allows a focused intelligence effort. Intelligence contributed in a multitude of
ways to the CTF tasking that developed during PROVIDE COMFORT. Tactical
reconnaissance capabilities were indispensable to the CTF. Through these
assets, immediate updates on the refugee and Iraqi military situations were
provided. The need for responsive reconnaissance capability was highest when
the coalition and Iraqi forces faced off after US Marines made the initial entry
into what was to become the expanded Security Zone. The movement and
disposition of Iraqi military units were critical essential elements of information
(EEls) to the relatively lightly armed CTF security forces. All tactical intelligence
collection assets were employed to their fullest extent, and every available
opportunity to gather intelligence on the Iraqis and Kurds exploited. Aggressive
ground and air reconnaissance plans resulted in constant surveillance on Iraqi
positions and provided timely and accurate information on the location and
dispositions of all Iraqi units within the Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR).
[Ref. 60]
Daily contacts at the small unit level within the Security Zone and
refugee camps also became excellent sources of information. This information
had to quickly flow to the CTF for analysis and dissemination to maximize its
utility. Once synthesized with appropriate tactical reconnaissance, this type of
HUMINT provided key intelligence needed for operations and security.
The activities and threats posed by the plethora of terrorist groups
throughout the area of operations was also cause for concern. Updates and
security assessments from multiple sources, including Turkish contacts, allowed
for threat condition adjustments and implementation of appropriate security
measures. [Ref. 48]
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Additionally, USN Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance Pod System
(TARPS) aircraft provided outstanding information. Interrogator translator team
support was superb and crucial to mission accomplishment. HUMINT operations
and collection provided excellent information concerning Pesh Merge activity
and Iraqi secret police activity. Signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection was
superlative and well integrated with coalition electronic warfare (EW) forces,
despite the difficult SIGINT collection environment.. [Ref. 61]
Non-traditional sources are also plentiful in OOTW. Non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and private volunteer organizations (PVOs) also figure
heavily into intelligence collection efforts. These organizations are often resident
in a country for considerable periods of time prior to a crisis situation, and may
constitute the most valuable initial information available to the coalition. For
example, CARE was the first organization able to provide the JTF commander
with any situational information during SEA ANGEL. This organization knew a
great deal about the circumstances in the surrounding communities, and played
a pivotal role in determining priority of effort. [Ref. 22]
However, in order to maximize the utility of these organizations, the JTF
must remain sensitive to host nation, and NGOs perception of military
intelligence and overall suspicion of the military. The arrival of American forces
during OPERATION SEA ANGEL was greeted initially with great concern by
NGOs present in the affected area. However, the JTF commander quickly
assuaged NGO fears that the US was going to take over all aspects of the
operation by embracing the relief agencies and their commensurate capabilities,
and stressing the cooperative effort required to stop the dying and eradicate the
suffering of the Bangladeshi people. By fully integrating NGOs into the coalition,
a cooperative and efficient working relationship was established, which had
significant ramifications for operational success. [Ref. 22]
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Local authorities and civilians represent a substantial, albeit obvious,
intelligence source. During Provide Comfort, daily contacts at the small unit level
within the Security Zone and refugee camps became excellent sources of
information. This information had to quickly flow to the CTF for analysis and
dissemination to maximize its utility. Once synthesized with appropriate tactical
reconnaissance, this type of HUMINT provided key intelligence needed for
operations and security. Similar circumstances were encountered during Sea
Angel.
6. Managing Collection
OOTW present a mixed blessing to the intelligence community. On one
hand, there is an uncharacteristically large number and variety of sources from
which to develop a cohesive picture of the operational environment. Conversely,
managing collection from the abundant source pool and fusing it into a usable
product is a monumental undertaking. The sheer number of potential sources
and users of intelligence presents coalition intelligence planners with an
ominous task at best. The guiding principles for managing collection should be
to focus first on what is needed, identify when it is needed, and then manage
collection to provide the appropriate intelligence support in a timely manner.
The sharing of intelligence and sensitive technical means depends upon
providing the interpreted product of intelligence to those members of the
coalition who require it. The US has significant capability, and where possible, it
should be made available to a coalition to provide support to the operation.
Other countries have alternative means and systems which must also be
incorporated into a workable intelligence collection plan that provides accessible
products to others. [Ref. 34:p. 78]
Despite the increased number of sources, and the relatively "open
source" type of environment present in many of these operations, if the
collection and dissemination effort is not managed correctly, serious intelligence
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and information deficiencies are likely to result. Whether acknowledged or not,
history has shown that managing the assets and efforts of a coalition force is
challenging and sometimes ignored altogether.
During Operation Provide Comfort, despite the overwhelmingly
successful tactical intelligence operations, information flow from higher
headquarters was virtually non-existent and collection management was
disjointed. The focus on reporting, was up the chain , and not down. Little to no
information was received from higher headquarters on developments within Iraq
that could have affected CTF security force operations until D+35. Had Iraqi
forces attacked during the early stages of the operation, the CTF would not have
known about it until the Iraqi forces were within the TAOR. The problem was
exacerbated as the security zone expanded, and higher headquarters
coordination and planning of collection operations collapsed. The lack of
guidance from higher headquarters resulted in direct coordination between
Major Subordinate Commands (MSC's) for coordination and deconfliction of
reconnaissance missions, as well as other "work-arounds" outside the official
chain of command to ascertain current levels of Iraqi activity. [Ref. 61]
Intelligence providers must also ensure that they recognize the need of
the individual coalition partners, and ensure that only required information is
funneled to them. The problems involving overload that occur at the central
management facility can also happen at the tactical level, with similar
ramifications.
7. Information Management
Perhaps one of the most formidable challenges in a coalition
environment involves managing the diverse yet voluminous types and amounts
of information flowing through the organization. Information management is as
integral and important a part of C2 of military forces at all levels as conducting
operations. C2 systems supporting forces in OOTW (and any other mission)
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must have the capability to provide the appropriate information to the right
person at the right time, which allows forces to maximize opportunity and
accomplish their mission.
The increased availability of sources is not necessarily a benefit if the
intelligence staff is not appropriately manned or organized to deal with the
eievated flow of information. Again, collection managers must take care not to
bring in overwhelming quantities of intelligence and information, so as to exceed
their capacity to expeditiously process and disseminate critical information to
supported units.
8. Disseminating intelligence
Once the sources are identified, and their capacity tapped, a product of
some sort or another is produced for dissemination. Many nations, the US
among them, are guarded in their approach to sharing and disseminating
intelligence with varied levels of classification and sensitivity with the diverse
array of coalition participants.
Few nations wish to share their sensitive sources of intelligence
gathering or make known their technical strengths and weakness of various
collection means. Coalitions potentially include partners whose cooperation will
only last as long as the threat, and will dissipate once the contingency is
resolved. Further, past US history with coalition warfare has included nations
with whom the US was already engaged in an alliance, NATO for example,
where protocols and limits concerning intelligence sharing already exist.
Regardless of the complications, intelligence must be shared, at least at the
operational and tactical levels. [Ref. 34:p. 70]
Certainly, arrangements and sanitation work arounds exist that allow
critical materials to get to those who need them most. In some circumstances,
depending upon the composition of the coalition, standard agreements and
treaties may guide intelligence sharing between nations. However, the editing
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and other sanitation methods used take up precious time from an intelligence
shop that is likely overburdened and undermanned.
The threat to coalition forces is a significant factor in determining the
level of sensitivity appropriate for a particular operation. This will govern which
sorts of intelligence are releasable to which participants and under what
conditions. Considerations include not only what types of information are shared,
but also the potential for disclosing the manner in which the intelligence was
obtained. Initial assessments must include the permisivity of the environment.
Appropriate decisions as to the overall classification levels of the intelligence
effort are then possible.
It is imperative that the desired level of security be declared as soon as
feasible to prevent any additional conflicts or delays in providing coalition
members with required intelligence support. PROVIDE COMFORT involved a
number of allied nations. The classification environment that existed in this
situation was considerably more open than existed previously in Desert Storm.
This posed a problem for US military personnel who are constantly ingrained
with the importance of safeguarding operational and intelligence information.
Many individuals had difficulty releasing information in an unclassified or
"releasable to foreign nationals" environment. Consequently, information flow
was frequently less than optimal. [Ref. 62]
A final challenge in the dissemination of required intelligence and
information involves the methods by which the information is conveyed.
Considerations involving the command and control system architecture impact
upon the manner, type, and timeliness of information transfer from source to
user, and are the subject of the subsequent chapter.
121
D. CONCLUSIONS
The contribution of intelligence is critical in OOTW, but the path to
maximizing its potential is laden with difficulty. There is currently no common
approach that adequately addresses the peculiarities of intelligence in OOTW.
Existing guidance, while better than nothing, leaves it to the intelligence
community to proceed in ad-hoc fashion in an environment for which it, in many
respects, is unaccustomed and ill-prepared. Shortcomings in provided support
are a result. A large portion of the deficiency, in the author's opinion, is again in
using guidance developed with a relatively narrow focus, as is the case with
current US doctrine, and trying to apply it to a problem that is much more
complex and broad. In short, current doctrine does nc< iaKe a sufficiently holistic
and broad view of the circumstances present in OOTW.
To summarize the unique characteristics of the OOTW environment: the
nature of the objectives in OOTW require an emphasis on intelligence of a
different type than the intelligence community is used to providing; the
requirements of the coalition partners are broad and complex;, potential
intelligence sources are plentiful, but are different than what the intelligence
community is accustomed to using, and require a much greater level of
sensitivity in order to exploit; collection management is complicated by the
variety of need and the number of sources; dissemination hinges upon security
and sharing arrangements which are established either be- or during an
operation.
A coalition must have a robust collection and analysis section, capable of
directing and coordinating the intelligence collection efforts of all partners, taking
full advantage of organic capabilities. Tactical information must be analyzed,
tailored and fused with available theater and national information to provide the
clearest picture to the tactical consumer. For any contingency operation,
coalition collection capabilities must be identified, and an analytical section
organized to fulfill coalition requirements. [Ref. 61]
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The Atlantic Intelligence Command has published an SOP that details
required intelligence functions for joint forces and, the author feels, represents a
reasonable goal for a coalition intelligence effort. These functions include
indications and warning, current intelligence, military capabilities assessment,
enemy courses of action estimate, military related intelligence assessment,
target intelligence support, collection management, and operational intelligence.
A unified, centralized, all-source intelligence system, at the coalition level, is
vital to success in the OOTW environment. This intelligence system should:
• Operate throughout the area of operations (at a minimum).
• Maintain a centralized system of source control
• Coordinate all intelligence and counter intelligence programs.
• Provide direction and guidance for the overall intelligence effort.
In accomplishing these objectives, however, the intelligence community
needs to fill the void of an appropriate framework to methodically think through
the issues effecting intelligence support in OOTW, before the next crisis occurs.
The propose of such a strategic outlook is to allow forces to anticipate those
factors that are key to successful campaigning and intelligence support in
OOTW.
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Purpose of the Chapter
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with an appreciation
for the difficulties involved in establishing a comprehensive and coherent
communications plan that fulfills the needs of a coalition in operations other than
war.
2. The Problem
The ability to apply the tenants of any sort of common doctrine that may
eventually evolve relies upon developing an architecture that is capable of
integrating all coalition participants in a seamless fashion that allows for
appropriate levels of mutually reinforcing support. A situation is not discernible,
a plan executable, or an evaluation of effect possible without a sufficient
communications architecture with which to receive and send appropriate
information/intelligence.
Unless the architecture permits the ability to share with and receive
information from fellow coalition partners, risks and shortcomings will result.
Command and control in coalition operations is difficult for a number of reasons.
After all appropriate command relationships have been established, however,
the problem remains with execution, and implementing the C2 structure that has
been agreed upon. Where hardware and protocols are concerned, US forces
still have difficulty operating with one another. Combine this factor with forces
from other countries and international organizations, each with its own standard
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equipment and operating procedures, and the problem is exacerbated
immeasurably.
Given the dissimilar nature of the doctrine, equipment, and procedures
that the myriad of coalition partners bring to the playing field, creating such a
"seamless" architecture are extremely difficult. A key rests with ensuring that
command and control system planning be given adequate priority and stature
with other sorts of operational preparation. Too often, communications does not
receive an appropriate amount of consideration at appropriate times. In many
instances, the correct time for rigorous assessment occurs during the
programming and acquisition cycle. Other factors involve doctrine,
interoperability, and finally, planning. Some of these issues are institutional, and
others involve lessons learned from previous operations. They all warrant
discussion.
B. DOCTRINE
The command and control (C2) of military forces at all levels is as much a
problem of information management as it is of carrying out difficult and
complex war fighting tasks. Command, control, communications, and
computer (C4) systems supporting US military forces must have the
capability to filter the information that is important, determine who or what
needs it, and ensure that it gets there in time to be used. Therefore, the
fundamental objective of a C4 system is to get the critical and relevant
information to the right place in time to allow forces to seize the opportunity
and meet the objectives of the operational continuum. [Ref. 16]
A common, workable doctrine is required to ensure that a coalition's
communications architecture is as optimally developed as possible. Disparate
parts, disparate procedures, and disparate players must all be blended into as
cohesive and seamless a structure as possible. This requires an intensive
amount of cooperation and coordination among all participants.
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As with command and control and intelligence considerations, already
presented in the thesis, a common approach must encompass all appropriate
aspects of the operation and its requirements, and will require participants to
look beyond the scope of the relative ease involved in unilateral planning. An
initial analysis of current US doctrine may provide clues as to what a challenge
developing cohesive doctrine for coalitions may entail. Two potential difficulties
are present in current US communications doctrine, and, again, the difficulty
springs from the historic lack of a "joint strategic paradigm."
Current US communications doctrine and operational practice entails
establishing a "network of networks" in joint and combined operations. Each sub-
network has within it two or more switchboards, or more abstractly, "nodes."
The nu jer of nodes will vary per the size of the operation. The joint doctrine
identifies a "generic C* joint system that links the supported CINC to the JTF,
the JSOTF, the deployed service components, and the DCS. [Ref. 63:p. 11-1] All
the services communications systems are substantially different, and each
service maintains and controls its network via its own management cell. CINC
and JTF level administrators have an even more ominous task in integrating the
service networks into a cohesive theater network which supports the operational
commander.
Operations other than war often involve significant numbers of nodes, both
US and allied, spread out across vast geograpr z regions. For US forces, the
nodes are connected by multichannel transmission links, normal over some sort
of multiplexed radio path. The links between sub-network are known as
gateways. The JTF commander is provided only generic guidance relevant to
deciding how to employ communications systems between units and commands.
Doctrine states that "..communications and C4 systems can be employed as
follows: senior to subordinate, supporting to supported, reinforcing to reinforced,
left to right, between adjacent units as directed." [Ref. 64:p. 13] However, little
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guidance exists concerning the functional aspects of integrating
communications networks of the Services, let alone other nations. Although the
JTF commander has the authority, with regard to US forces, to arrange
communications assets however he chooses, the details on how this is done are
scant. [Ref. 64:p. 13]
As delineated in Joint Pub 6-05.1:
When two or more component commanders are collocated within a
geographical area, their C4 requirements are to be coordinated and
consolidated to the maximum extent possible. The responsible joint HQ J-6
is informed of any cross-Service agreements. [Ref. 63:p. II—4]
This, for all intents and purposes, does not provide the JTF commander
with the directive type authority needed to ensure optimal architecture
configuration. The commander appears to have only arbitrator type guidance in
controlling how two or more components may choose to set up their networks.
Although benefit of the doubt ought be given to appropriate decision makers as
to the best set up, this decentralized decision making in a network presents
some risks as to sub optimization, assuming that Air Force (or any other service)
network managers will have ingrained biases favoring their respective services,
regardless of the consequences to others. [Ref. 64:p. 14]
The lack of directive doctrine also effected communications planning for
OPERATION RESTORE HOPE.. A single point of contact with tasking authority
from Commander Joint Task Force did not exist in the case of both the Army and
the Air Force components (both whom were major communications contributors
and planners). Plans were established on a "what are you bringing" basis vice a
more direct, "you are bringing this," tasking mechanism. [Ref. 65:p. 6]
The point of this discussion is that if current US doctrine is insufficient in
detail to guide US services in establishing a viable C2 architecture, it may also
be inadequate to deal with the increased complexity and problems experienced
in a coalition environment. Complicating the authoritative aspect of current
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doctrine is the problem in physical implementation. Joint Pub 6.0, Doctrine for
Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4) Systems Support to
Joint Operations, classifies military communications systems as either strategic
or tactical. The categories of communications, however, are not directly
paralleled by the levels of operations- strategic, operational, and tactical- that
are used elsewhere in joint doctrine. Some complications may result, as
discussed below. [Ref. 64:p. 7]
As developed in Chapter II, the Defense Communications System provides
the connectivity from the National Command Authority (NCA) down to the CINCs
and to all of the various DOD organizations that could potentially support a JTF.
If a CINC or JTF headquarters must deploy, it requires a level of
communications support that will accommodate the volume, security, and
responsiveness of the information required for the situation.
Current doctrine envisions an "extension of the DCS" by combatant
commanders, with tactical assets provided by components. [Ref.16:p. III-7]
However, there is a significant gap between the strategic and tactical levels of
com: „nications doctrine and equipment which effect communications support at
the operational level, and makes the "extension" difficult to accomplish. For
example, during Operation Provide Comfort, precedence calls were not reliably
processed from the tactical network, through the gateway, and into the DCS
network. The Combined Task Force (CTF) Commander even occasionally had
his personal phone calls blocked Although the problem was solved in a matter
of days, it illustrates the potential u.rficulties in "extending the DCS" and linking
dissimilar communications networks in a time sensitive manner. [Ref. 64:p. 8]
JTF asset availability may also preclude or confound extension of the DCS,
as seen in OPERATION RESTORE HOPE. Ground Mobile Forces (GMF)
equipment is required to provide digital backbone to geographically dispersed
elements of a force outside the range of terrestrial systems. In the case of the
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First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), having only a single suite of GMF
SATCOM precluded displacement and restricted the ability of planners to
provide for DCS robustness. [Ref. 65:p. 9]
As shown, although the concept of extending the DCS is conceptual viable
and desirable, realization of the concept is subject to several technical and
doctrinal realities that will preclude satisfactorily effecting the extension in a time
sensitive situation. The previous discussion also illustrates that connectivity and
architecture considerations require additional attention within the services and
DOD, in general. Historical focus has clearly centered on the prosecution of
tactics, not on resolving communications problems. [Ref. 66]
Today's doctrine is geared towards gluing the service distinct systems
together, and although there is an increased emphasis on developing
interoperable systems, the US will have to live with systems currently in
inventory. Given budget constraints, it is not reasonable to expect that current
systems will be scrapped in favor of a new baseline, fully interoperable suite of
equipment for all the services. Systems will arrive incrementally to create
desired levels of interoperability among US forces, and hopefully, standards will
be adopted by allies and other potential coalition partners to decrease
equipment interoperability problems in future crises. Sustained pressure is
required, however, to ensure that future acquisitions are interoperable, and more
desirably, interchangeable.
C. INTEROPERABILITY
Interoperability, as alluded to in the previous section, is a primary
impediment in achieving the desired architecture. Interoperability entails,
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The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept
services from other systems units or forces and to use the services so
exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. [Ref. 8]
The causes and impacts of the lack of interoperability are wide ranging,
and involve both US specific and coalition issues.
1. US Specific Issues
a) Equipment
Equipment standardization is a recurring problem that continues to
hinder joint and coalition operations. Legacy systems, doctrine, and procedures
developed in the days of the Cold War are still in use. During the days prior to
jointness, and to a more limited degree today, each service developed its
equipment, from weapons systems, to C2 systems, independent of the needs of
the other services. These systems were developed as part of service specific
(and exclusive) networks.
The Tri-Service Tactical Communications System (TRI-TAC),
developed and fielded over the past twenty years, was supposed to be the "cure-
all" for interoperability at the operational level. The equipment was built
according to specifications requiring technical interoperability with most tactical
and DCS systems that exist yet today. However, there are currently several
different versions of the TRI-TAC system in use that require additional
engineering effort to develop a usable network.
The Army has converted its switchboards to a flood search routing
scheme, the Air Force retained the deterministic form of routing, the Marine
Corps uses a third version of TRI-TAC switchboard, and the Navy does not have
any large tactical switchboards. The Joint Communications Support Element has
another version of the switchboard, and the Special Operations Forces (SOF)
deploy with still another. Additionally, several modes of transmission are used to
interconnect the various types of switchboards in this "network of networks."
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Satellite, tropospheric scatter, cable, and line of site radios using Very High
Frequency (VHF), Ultra High Frequency (UHF), and Super High Frequency
(SHF) bands are employed. The services have fielded a a unique combination of
the transmission equipment in whatever quantities and variations the respective
service has decided it requires. This dissimilarity between services contributes
to the complexity of the network management function. [Ref. 64:pp. 14-16]
During OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT, the use of UHF
TACSAT assets minimized interoperability problems at the CTF HQ level.
However, at the task force level, the vast number of communications systems
used in the operation hampered interoperability. [Ref. 48:p. 13]
From this discussion, it is apparent that the US services have not yet
completely conquered joint interoperability problems. Many initiatives are
ongoing to rectify these problems. Technological disparity is addressed in such
initiatives as C4I For the Warrior, and others. Despite all the effort and money
funneled towards a solution, the doctrinal and procedural issues will take
significant time to resolve.
b) Network Management and Logistics
Historical emphasis on service specific needs and subsequent
system development also resulted in separate network management procedures.
Resolving disagreements, especially between gateways, is complicated when
the technicians at opposite ends of a problem approach the "troubleshooting"
process in a different way.
Supply and maintenance procedures also vary among the services.
The Army and Marine Corps, for example, push logistics support capability
forward, to allow for more immediate support. The Air Force, however, maintains
most spare parts at a sustaining base, often located back in CONUS, and calls
forward critically needed parts when necessary. A JTF commander may,
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consequently, have to take spare parts from Army or Marine stockpiles to repair
a vital Air Force system while in theater. [Ref. 64:p. 16]
2. Coalition
Interoperability problems follow a similar pattern among coalition
members. Often, in coalitions that involve alliance partners or where standing
agreements or memorandum of understanding exist between participants,
interoperability problems are somewhat abated. However, there are several
recurring themes regarding the difficulties in achieving coalition interoperability.
a) Equipment
Several variations on equipment interoperability appear in coalition
operations. The thesis has discussed the need to connect all participants in an
appropriate fashion. Interoperability, however, is hindered largely as a factor of
the equipment coalition partners bring or do not bring to an operation.
Many countries bring equipment into an operation that is not
sufficiently interoperable with other forces. Standardization among allies and the
US is achieved through international forums in accordance with policy and
procedures in JCS MOP 147, "International Military Rationalization,
Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI) Between the United States and Its
Allies and Other Friendly Nations." This document covers all aspects of
interoperability. With respect to C2 systems, the policy focuses on enhancing
combined combat capabilities for US military forces to communicate and share
data. Areas of particular concern for compatibility and commonality include C4
and automated information systems, battlefield surveillance systems, target
designation systems, and target acquisition systems. [Ref. 16:p. V-1]
Further, as many nations now use computers in their force
management schemes. It is important that we share common standards which
will permit a rapid merging of information management systems. [Ref. 34:p. 69]
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Organizations with whom such formal arrangements and consultation is not
conducted must be approached via other channels, to ensure as great as
possible a degree of interoperability is achieved.
Additionally, countries who provide forces for OOTW often lack the
communications resources required for effectiveness in the demanding OOTW
environment. Coalition organizational structure may or may not allow for timely
procurement of gear prior to the commencement of operations. As a result, the
US and its better equipped allies will likely shoulder an increasing burden to
provide equipment for large contingents from other nations. [Ref. 44:p. 7]
The US professes its ability and "wherewithal" to tie such huge
undertakings as coalitions together, and it is anticipated that US communications
equipment will form the backbone of most operations that involve US forces. For
example, 9th Communications Battalion, assigned to I Marine Expeditionary
Force (I MEF), the Marine Forces Component and JTF nucleus for OPERATION
RESTORE HOPE, provided cable and telephones to support the JTF J-1
(administrative section), Joint Visitors Bureau, Canadian Forces, ARFOR (Army
Component), and MARFOR (Marine Component) in the early stages of the
operation (prior to the arrival of ARFOR and MARFOR assets in country). 9th
Communications Battalion also provided all message center switching support
for the JTF, Joint Support Command, and ARFOR prior to transition to ARFOR
support for the communications and message center. [Ref. 65:p. 7]
Regardless of what the circumstance involving equipment
interoperability, the "fix" usually comes from US personnel and equipment pools,
the exact nature of which will depend upon the nature of the security
environment. NGOs pose the greatest difficulties in this arena, and have the
most significant communications shortcomings. These organizations bring many
unique capabilities into a OSOW environment, but are heavily reliant on local
133
telecommunications, which are threatened in many types of OOTW. To function
effectively, communication augmentation is usually required. [Ref. 47:p. 43]
Unfortunately, lending equipment to others is often a double edged
sword. Depending upon the threat environment (and hence whether or not
secure communications is used) the patching problem is complicated. During
non-encrypted operations, with partners that share a common language, a
simple equipment loan may solve the problem. Non-common language is likely
to require liaison personnel and equipment. During operations that require
secure communications, if equipment is loaned, additional personnel are
required to provide security. Regardless of the combination, US forces will likely
suffer a reduction in personnel, expertise, equipment, and, consequently,
indigenous capability. [Ref. 67]
b) Language and Procedures
Language is another significant interoperability problem. Translation
of information into the multiple languages included in the coalition steals
precious time from the command and control cycle, and will likely involve many
errors. While it is common for coalition headquarters to maintain translation
cells, the speed of translation will vary with the size and complexity of
information to be processed, and the accuracy will vary from translator to
translator.
The procedural realm of interface is an additional challenge, and
many procedural elements of coalition participation may pose problems. A
diverse array of concerns ranging from local area networks and appropriate
baud settings to requesting fire support all require consideration in the planning
stages of an operation. For example, it is not necessarily true that services share
the same format for requesting and controlling air strikes or are familiar with
procedures for controlling naval gunfire missions, if required.
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There are efforts currently underway aimed at alleviating certain
portions of the procedural difficulties potentially or actually encountered in past
coalition operations. US forces, however, are still subject to the problems
inherent with procedural incongruities. As discussed, the services have
developed network management procedures for their new equipment
independently. [Ref. 64:p. 16]
Further, lacking a common doctrine, basic military terms and
symbology vary from nation to nation. As a result, limited information flows
between coalition partners who do not share a common language. Many
recommendations aimed at overcoming this difficulty exist. Some suggest a
multilingual software that ties back to a common operating system is desired.
Such software must be user friendly and easy to learn. A move to an icon based
interface is also a possibility, as it is easier to standardize a picture than a word
or phrase to describe an intended function. [Ref. 34:p. 69 and Ref. 66]
Additionally, coalition headquarters should have pre-prepared
dictionaries of common military terms and symbols, both to facilitate translation
for information management systems and to reduce the latitude translators have
in portraying a term or symbols' meaning. Coalition capabilities and assets must
also be archived in a C4I data base to enable both present and future coalition
staffs to incorporate forces in battle management and other coalition planning.
[Ref. 34:p. 69]
Even when procedures are established, however, getting all
participants to adopt them is difficult, as was experienced during RESTORE
HOPE. The Naval fleet ignored the established Inter-theater Communications
Security Package (ICP) and used procedures that were intended for another
area of operations. This left the Joint Force Air Component Commander
(JFACC) on one key, and the Fleet on another. The ICP selected to re-
standardize the communications security procedures caused a problem because
135
the Multi-National Forces (MNF) did not have the same key. Constant changes
in the composition of the MNF further complicated matters. [Ref. 65:p. 26]
3. Liaison
Regardless of the cause of a lack of interoperability, liaison is a
widely used method of ensuring interoperability in coalition operations.
Liaison is the contact or communication maintained between elements of
military forces that ensures mutual understanding and unity of purpose and
action. In terms of mission accomplishment, liaison is one of the most
effective principles of all and can be enhanced by placing competent C4
systems personnel with the forces employed. [Ref. 16:p. II-3]
Liaisons were heavily used during OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT.
As countries indicated a desire to join the coalition, USEUCOM authorized and
encouraged direct liaison between the CTF and the nations' military
representatives. Advance liaison teams contacted the host country and the CTF
to iron out the details off their respective nations' participation. This was a highly
successful way of developing the desired force composition and shape national
contributions. It reduced duplication of effort and provided the liaison teams a
good feel for the operation and allowed the CTF to fill certain priority
requirements through allied sources.
Liaison was also critical in procedural standardization. A concern early
on in the operation was establishing a common system for calling for and
conducting air support operations. The US Marine Corps Air Naval Gunfire
Liaison Company (ANGLICO) teams provided all coalition forces with a
standardize capability that proved highly successful and was well received. [Ref.
48:p. 9]
D. PLANNING
We were not able to establish communications other than air command
and control, in terms of an ATC type mode, with the other countries that
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worked with us because it was an ad-hoc relationship and they were never
programmed in to be part of us. So our communications were essentially
verbal, done by meeting... [Ref. 22]
Lieutenant General Stackpole's comments concerning communications
during OPERATION SEA ANGEL capture a central notion required in achieving
optimal command and control architecture's in operations other than war.
Achieving interoperability requires planning.
This section of the thesis is not an indictment of any of the communications
planners of any particular operation. Rather, the author's intent is to reinforce
the notion that interoperability is not achieved accidentally, and that the further
in advance and more all-encompassing the planning process, the greater and
sooner the ability of a force to impact a target environment. Additionally, this
section highlights several useful considerations that guide effective C2 system
planning.
1. Centralized, Collective, and Cooperative Planning
The process of integrating many smaller networks into the previously
mentioned network of networks is inherently tedious, management intensive, and
slow. It is also an iterative process that produces necessary adjustments as the
operation's objectives, tempo, and participants change.
Moreover, planning must include as many of a coalition's participants, in
a coordinated fashion, as early and as often as required. Through engineering,
currently fielded equipment is technically interoperable, however, the manner in
which the network is established, operated, and maintained may hinder
interoperability. Often, key personnel and or units are not identified sufficiently
far enough ahead of time to ensure that all participants communications
concerns are addressed, which causes the potential need for adjustments at a
later time. However, such a comprehensive and inclusive planning process will
ensure, to the degree possible, that the collective needs of the coalition are met,
and will identify shortfalls at a relatively early stage.
137
Centralized planning of communications is imperative to ensure that the
needs of the entire coalition are met. Operations which are in transition, or
involve multiple levels of command, such as recent operations in Somalia,
however, often make centralized planning difficult to achieve. During RESTORE
HOPE, a team was detailed by USCENTCOM/CCJG to visit Somalia to gather
data and write a statement of work (SOW) for a UNISOM II communications
system. The team briefed its findings and recommendations to the then UNISOM
I commander, Brigadier General Shaheen. The General supported the
recommended approach, but informed the team that multiple communications
proposals were being developed. Concerned that the fragmented initiatives
would not provide common and consistent service across the required "customer
base," he contacted the UN and effected the halt to all ongoing communications
development efforts until the team could brief UN Headquarters in New York
City, and a decision was reached. [Ref. 65:p. 20]
2. Situation Awareness
To make a painfully obvious statement, the amount of information
known about a situation will largely determine how effective communications
planners are in the first iteration of the process. This is important, especially
because the initial response in OOTW like disaster and humanitarian relief
often weighs heavily in the final toll in human suffering.
Situation awareness influences all aspects of communications planning,
and is largely contingent upon accurate and timely intelligence and information
flow. Issues such as potential mission, state of the target environment,
identification of participants, and required communications links are important in
being able to provide the commander with adequate system capacity and
connectivity.
OOTW, however, do not always allow for a clear and complete array of
information, especially as pertains to the nations and organizations expected to
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participate in the coalition. Alliances, such as NATO, involve well established
and practiced, albeit imperfect, procedures and relationships between known
partners. This is a luxury absent in many OOTW.
Although the location of the crisis is not predictable, general estimations
as to coalition participation are possible, and a certain degree of
communications planning can happen in advance of a crisis. Knowing possible
coalition partners will also allow appropriate agencies and sections to effect
adequate planning from the onset of a situation.
As with many other aspects of coalition operations, the US does not
adequately understand the communications limitations and capabilities of all
participants. To the author's knowledge, no efforts are underway to
systematically develop a repository of information that would alleviate certain
aspects of the mystery from coalition planning. As an intermediate objective, US
forces should begin compiling a data base that outlines
hardware/software/protocol specifications/standards of all potential coalition
participants, as well as NGOs.
In a perfect world, once the participants and concept of operations is
established, C2 systems developers can assess critical information paths, as
well as identify the required medium of communication (i.e., voice, data, imagery,
etc.). Subsequently, planners can match resource requirements with resource
availability (including host nation infrastructure assets, if appropriate), and
identify anticipated shortfalls.
The holistic and collective nature of this process cannot be
overemphasized. Planners have to consider not only what they intend on
introducing into the environment, but also what capability is already present in
the environment.
The potential for conflict between those communications systems
resident in an operational environment and those yet to arrive is an important
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consideration. Other organizations may be on the scene well in advance of the
arrival of the military. A significant communications related difficulty in
RESTORE HOPE was the frequency deconfliction with the NGO communication
systems. In a humanitarian relief operation, especially where little indigenous
communications systems exist, deconfliction with support agencies is critical to
avoid degradation of NGO services for relief, as well as safety. As US and
coalition forces built up in Somalia, frequency interference increased. [Ref. 65:p.
19]
3. Sequencing
Understanding the approved campaign plan will facilitate appropriate
sequencing of equipment. Commanders often face difficult choices between
combat power and communications capability as regards the mechanisms for
introducing the two into the operating area. Planners must ensure that
communications resources are available in concert with the sequential
requirements of a force.
Thorough comprehension of the expected chronology of a force's
communications requirements will prevent planners from force feeding
unnecessary communications resources into a theater. This is important
because unnecessary equipment may create perceptions that the US "intends
on taking over," and also because of the potential to tax a fragile infrastructure.
Further, it reduces the logistics difficulties in moving additional equipment,
should conditions warrant. [Ref. 67]
4. Flexibility
The lack of information in a crisis situation is a serious impediment; it is
also a reality that planners must deal with. Additionally, it is logical to assume
that as operations progress and information becomes available, details
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concerning communications requirements will change. As a result, an iterative
process, is required to adapt to the situation as it develops.
Initially, forces must plan to provide all aspects of their own support
unless circumstances dictate otherwise. Planners may have insufficient detail to
assess the capability of a host nation infrastructure to provide any level of
support in a given scenario. In many circumstances, such as existed in
Bangladesh and Somalia, the infrastructure of the respectively ravaged
countries was unable to provide any sort of foundation to assisting forces and
organizations.
There was no government, power supply, telephones, water, sanitation,
ATC facilities, navaids or radars. Each military element was totally
dependent upon its own assets; Somalia could provide nothing. [Ref. 33:p.
2]
Planners must also take care to build in for growth. Many countries and
organizations may be reluctant to participate initially, until the operations
chances for success become more clear. They don't want to become involved in
a situation that is unpopular at home. Consequently, anticipate that the coalition
will shrink and expand. To the degree possible, a modular approach is required
to facilitate easy plug in and disengagement from the communications backbone.
Furthermore, OOTW often involve a change in mission. The supporting
architecture must be sufficiently robust to adjust to the dynamic environment
prevalent in OOTW. Resource limitations, however, often limit the degree of
flexibility inherent in any architecture. These effects are magnified in the early
stages of an operation when follow on or augment equipment is yet to arrive.
Under I MEF equipment allocations at the time, a failure in the single AN/TSC-
85B would have posed catastrophic consequences for force C2. Had elements
of I MEF rear been tasked with additional missions, they would have had no
means to effect long haul communications connectivity. [Ref. 65:p. 9]
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5. Transition
Eventually, once the crisis is contained, US forces will turn the operation
over to appropriate agencies, and retrograde. Significant consideration as to
transitionability of a system is required from its inception. Forces must redeploy,
leaving sufficient communications capability (backbone) intact to allow those
assuming responsibility for the operation to conduct their mission. As the US
military often provides the backbone communications for these operations,
planners must allow for this eventuality and plan accordingly.
For example, communications planners for OPERATION RESTORE
HOPE developed a detailed plan for transition to the UN that left the required
connectivity intact. UNITAF transition to UNISOM II was carefully choreographed
and incrementally achieved, giving the relieving organization (the UN led
coalition) adequate time to bring their system up on line. [Ref. 68]
E. PLANNING EQUIPMENT DEFICIENCIES
A discussion of the difficulties involved in command and control
architecture would not be complete without a brief overview of some of the
dilemmas present in the World Wide Military Command and Control System
(WWMCCS). WWMCCS provides the means for strategic and operational
direction and technical administrative support for the command and control of
US military forces. WWMCCS ensures effective connectivity among the NCA,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other components of the NMCS
down to the Service component commanders. WWMCCS also provides
communications functions that assist in the coordination and exchange of
essential command and control information. [Ref. 16:p. VI-2]
The heart of WWMCCS is the Joint Operation Planning and Execution
System (JOPES), an automated tool that the CINCs and services use to access
and manipulate time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD). The TPFDD
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is a key product produced through JOPES, and consists of the computer
database that supports an operation plan (OPLAN). The TPFDD defines the
forces for the OPLAN and when those forces are scheduled to flow into the
theater of operations. The TPFDD also includes movement, personnel, and
cargo data associated with deploying units, in-place units, and associated
sustainment resources. The database provides routing information and supports
estimates of transportation requirements. To simplify the identification of forces
in the TPFDD, combat, combat support, and combat service support forces,
personnel, and supplies are linked together in groupings known as force
modules. [Ref. 69]
There are many problems forces have experienced in using these
command and control planning tools, however. The biggest weaknesses are the
limitations posed by not having sufficiently trained personnel who can operate
WWMCCS and JOPES. These systems are not "user friendly," and skills are
extremely perishable. The lack of expertise with these tools precludes optimized
planning and deployment of US forces, a situation noted in both PROVIDE
COMFORT and RESTORE HOPE. [Ref. 70]
These difficulties posed planning and deployment problems for US forces in
both PROVIDE COMFORT and RESTORE HOPE. In PROVIDE COMFORT
problems included misunderstanding the capabilities and limitations of the
system, failure to comply with requirements of the system, and attempting to
work around the system. It was evident throughout the operation that a number
of commanders and commands did not understand the systems function. During
RESTORE HOPE, I MEF had no WWMCCS or JOPES trained personnel.
Consequently, planners were initially putting a TPFDD together with "stubby
pencil." [Ref. 48:p. 20 and Ref. 70]
Lack of training and familiarity with WWMCCS also effected forces during
other phases of the Somalia deployment, as equipment and personnel to install,
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operate, and maintain a WWMCCS connection did not arrive in country until
almost a month after the flow began. Hence, WWMCCS could not be used to
affect the flow from in theater. CJTF had to work issues concerning the flow of
personnel and equipment from Somalia to Camp Pendleton and then into
WWMCCS. [Ref. 65:p. 6]
F. CONCLUSIONS
Establishing an adequate command and control architecture in operations
other than war is fraught with complications. Problems ranging from equipment
interoperability rooted in acquisition history, to the inability of various coalition
partners to agree upon and follow standard procedures, provide more than
adequate challenge for communications planners. Some of these challenges
have been, and will continue to be met should current trends in ad-hoc coalition
relationships continue.
However, the most significant impediments in communications planning for
OOTW involve the same issues that this thesis has identified as key for both
command and control and intelligence considerations- doctrine and planning.
Logically, forces plan and execute best in a familiar environment. Doctrine
and procedures are developed to support that environment. As discussed,
OOTW introduce many unfamiliar complexities that planners must adjust to if
sufficient communications support is to be provided.
In the author's opinion, current doctrine and associated planning
procedures are not robust enough to handle the diversity of OOTW. Many
doctrinal considerations, such as extension of the DCS, require the time it takes
to replace "un-interoperable" systems to resolve. However, a common approach
is required to ensure centralized and holistic communications planning, in order
to plan for interoperability in advance of crisis or, at least, to reduce the degree
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of "ad-hoc" and resulting communications crisis management experienced in
recent coalition participation in OOTW.
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VII. THE NEW FRAMEWORK
A. INTRODUCTION
1. Purpose of the Chapter
The purpose of this chapter is to present a useful framework for
approaching command and control and its associated components in operations
other than war (OOTW). As discussed, OOTW have many unique and complex
aspects that, in certain respects, require an approach fundamentally different
than that outlined in current doctrine.
The framework presented here is called the "coordination, cooperation,
and consensus (CO3 ) loop," for reasons that will become evident later in this
chapter. It is a concept oriented, decision and capability based approach that
allows planners a holistic view of the conceptual, environmental, and
architectural aspects of command and control in OOTW. It is intended as an
augment to current crisis and deliberate planning processes, and, potentially, as
a baseline for developing future common doctrine for OOTW.
2. Summary of Lessons Learned
This thesis has presented the challenges and shortcomings of the
current US and coalition approach to command and control and its inextricable
elements, intelligence and communications, in operations other than war. The
author discussed several of the issues that "sub-optimize" command and control
in this environment. In all three areas of discussion, a common theme surfaced-
existing doctrine does not adequately addresses the numerous dimensions,
complexities, and peculiarities that exist in OOTW. In short, forces and
organizations are not accustomed to having to include so many other
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participants and unfamiliar operational considerations into their strategic,
operational, and tactical plans. A summary of the lessons learned follows.
"Coordination, cooperation, and consensus," or CO^, more
appropriately captures the central concept regarding how coalition participants
are able to organize and conduct operations in the irregular environment.
Traditional military perceptions of command and control, as developed in
existing doctrine, have several inadequacies.
Joint doctrine has not yet taken root and replaced the atmosphere of
inter-service competition that permeates any operational environment. The lack
of a joint strategic paradigm causes problems of varying degree for US forces in
almost any operating environment, both from a command and control
perspective, and in the intelligence and communications arenas.
Unity of command is a central tenant in current conventional doctrine,
but has limited applicability in OOTW, where politics often supersede
operational logic and sensitivity to coalition participant perceptions is potentially
more important than engaging in the most direct road to success.
Further, unity of command was really never achieved in any of the
operations discussed in this thesis. Even though some relationships and
interoperability within a coalition are prearranged through treaties and standard
agreements, large portions of coalition interaction are developed ad-hoc. Many
nations are reluctant to place their forces under the control of other nations.
Additionally, many organizations that participate in OOTW have no legal
obligation, and in fact posses a historical aversion to working with military
organizations.
The problems experienced with communications and intelligence follow
a similar but slightly different path. Structure and doctrine both impact the ability
of the communications and intelligence community to provide support to the
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coalition. Of course resource incompatibilities and security concerns also
determine certain measures of support available.
A more serious impediment, however, has surfaced with the ability of
these communities to approach these operations with a holistic view. The noted
deficiencies in US understanding of cultural and allied characteristics stem, at
least partially, from the fact that conventional and or unilateral action, upon
which the preponderance of US (and most other nations military) doctrine is
established, do not involve the variety, breadth, and depth of circumstances and
players present in OOTW. The result is planning that is too narrow in focus.
A force's ability to exercise command and control depends upon
intelligence, which depends upon a C^ system, which depends upon command
and control. The intelligence community is not accustomed to having to consider
weather, starvation, or other obscure threats as the enemy. Conventional
operations also do not require the same degree of political sensitivity and
cultural understanding. Civilian population centers and composition are
historically low priority issues in the conventional arena. The enemy's ability to
wage war is the combatant force's target. In OOTW, however, the civilian
population is the target. Cultural norms, customs, traditions, and religion are all
essential elements of information in formulating appropriate plans.
There is also inadequate foresight into planning to work with the various
participants. Identifying capabilities, limitations, doctrine, equipment, and areas
of specialization of the myriad of players happens after the fact, and after the
attempts to create a viable architecture are already well under way. This is
important, as each participant brings a unique perspective concerning its
objectives, required resources, and methodology to a given situation.
Accordingly, creating a suitable architecture is a complex undertaking.
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3. The Need for a New Framework
In the OOTW arena, there are three key lessons taken from the
operations discussed in this thesis. First, the formulation of a clear and precise
mission statement which defines measurable and obtainable objectives is
paramount. Second, the objectives will drive the number and types of forces
required for a particular set of circumstances. Finally, developing a
comprehensive strategy that coordinates all instruments of national power- not
just the military- greatly enhances the probability of achieving the stated
objectives. [Ref. 40:p. 63] This closely parallels the prerequisite questions posed
to a command and control problem solving process, as develop in Chapter II.
The thesis has shown that the working relationships developed in the
three primary case studies, although problematic in many respects, were
sufficient to allow the coalitions to make significant impact in the target
environment. Cooperation, coordination, and consensus were critical elements
in the qualified successes achieved. To varying degrees, the forces in these
operations were able to develop consensus, coordinate interoperability, share
equipment, and resolve any other political, procedural, or doctrinal issues.
These accomplishments, however, were not gained easily. Only through
a tremendous amount of ingenuity, creativity, hard work, and compromise were
adequate conditions established to permit the outcomes achieved. There
remains a distinct lack of a common methodology for approaching C^
considerations in an environment that involves the diverse array of participants
historically represented in OOTW.
The potential number of combinations of "who will operate with who" in
future coalitions is unknown. If put in perspective of the Cold War, recent
coalitions have produced some very unlikely bed fellows, both in and out of the
realm of OOTW. For example, who ever thought that the US and Syria would be
allies, as occurred in Desert Shield and Storm. Further, it is probably too much
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to expect that every country, organization, and military force in the world will
agree upon a single best way to perform a particular function, or upon the single
best piece of communications equipment for a certain requirement. Political,
doctrinal, and resource distinctions are a fact of life that, while flexible to a
degree, will likely continue to present challenges to interoperability and other
aspects of working together.
There are some elements of OOTW, that are known, however. Forces
must still sense, compare, decide, and act in order to create the desired changes
in the target environment. The cybernetic C2 cycle still pertains to any
participant in any operation. Although individual participants may not agree on a
standardized mode of operations for all situations, perhaps establishing a
shared view of the problem solving system and the position and composition of
their respective command and control cycle, within the coalition, is possible.
The crux of the command and control problem in operations short of war
involve paradigm, absence of a holistic view, and planning. A shared view of
how the problem solving system is developed will provide a greater degree of
interoperability and a decreased amount of ad hoc planning. If participants can
agree upon the issues and concerns that must be addressed prior to embarking
upon an operation, perhaps a greater and more rapidly achieved level of impact
is obtainable.
In the author's opinion, much of a coalition's strength is derived from its
diversity. No one organization can act as a panacea for all of the worlds woes,
both as is related to waging war and waging peace. In order to capitalize upon
this diversity, however, a common approach that reflects the cooperative,
coordinative, and consentual nature of future coalitions, and that allows coalition




The ultimate goal of the framework presented is the development of a
seamless, efficient, and effective coalition command and control process
oriented towards a collectively determined objective. The process should blend
the resources, capabilities, limitations, and political desires of individual coalition
participants into a synergistic and complementary whole. An optimal command
and control process should consider the interrelationship and interdependencies
between coalition components and position physical entities and functionality
accordingly.
5. Methodology
In presenting this framework, a brief discussion of the heuristic after
which it is patterned is provided first. Then, an overview of the structure, purpose
and assumptions relevant to the CO** loop is presented- Finally, a detailed
discussion of each module in the step by step process is submitted. Although
this framework is oriented and developed specifically with respect to operations




COORDINATION, COOPERATION, AND CONSENSUS
(C03) LOOP
1. Origins
The CO** Loop is largely patterned after the Modular Command and
Control Evaluation Structure (MCES). The MCES is a general approach to
evaluating command and control systems which has been successfully applied
to a number of issues concerning C^ system planning, acquisition, testing and
operation. It augments traditional analysis by providing a series of seven steps
or modules to evaluate alternative C^ systems and architecture's. These
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modules guide analysts who may otherwise focus prematurely on the
quantitative model rather than the problem definition and the specific measures
needed to discriminate between alternatives. MCES was developed by a team of
experts from industry, government, and academia and was endorsed by the
Military Operations Research Society. It presents difficult concepts in a
standardized way that is easily absorbed by both new practitioners and
managers. [Ref. 71:pp. 1-2]
2. Purpose
The C03 loop is a problem solving process that provides a holistic and
standardized methodology that coalition participants can use to frame the
command and control problem in OOTW. It is called the CO^ loop because one
or more of the "CO's" is required at each step to reach an amenable and
adequate arrangement for all members of the coalition. It does not replace the
generic command and control process, but rather establishes a method by which
to ensure that the C^ process, for both each coalition participant and the
coalition as a whole, is positioned in a manner appropriate for prevailing
conditions. This framework is, in the author's opinion, a reasonable
representation of the logical and chronological progression of decisions and
discovery a coalition must follow to optimally establish and execute command
and control in the OOTW environment.
Circumstances and mission parameters will change during the course of
an operation. Hence, the iterative nature of the cycle allows the coalition to
adjust its command and control problem solving process as the situation
requires. It may be employed during, before, or after an operation, and has
applicability to a wide range of military operations. Many of the key functions and
objectives within the modules already exist as a portion of traditional staff
planning. The new framework, however, is intended to provide for a more holistic
and all-encompassing assessment that forces participants to consider the
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capabilities and resources of other potential coalition partners, as well as the
effect of the OOTW environment on their respective operational bias.
3. Overview
The C()3 loop is depicted in Figure 4, and shows a "roundtable" of





































Figure 4. The Coordination, Cooperation, and Consensus (C03) Loop
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six steps that make up the loop. From the round table is an output that shows an
information feed to the respective "higher headquarters", as appropriate.
Obviously, in most situations, more than one branch of output is required.
Additionally, an input arrow feeds from the "higher headquarters". A simplistic
description of the modules is provided below.
The loop itself is comprised of six functional steps that will be described
in modules. The CO3 loop begins by identifying the overarching problem that the
coalition wishes to resolve. There are several sub-problems involved, that will be
discussed in the detailed description of the modules. The second step identifies
the composition and boundaries of the C^ system. The third module develops
measures of force effectiveness (MOFE) for each of the objectives, that allow the
coalition to determine whether the objectives are being met. Fourth, a dynamic
framework that identifies the relevant C^ process functions (as most often
represented by the generic C^ loop) is established. Fifth, steps two and four are
integrated, allowing the coalition to identify the interrelationships and
interdependences between the physical entities and structures, and the C^
processes or functions. In the sixth, and final module, the respective coalition
participants execute their respective command and control cycle, the impact on
the target environment is assessed and fed back to the "round table," and the
process iterates until the appropriate end state is reached.
4. Description of Modules
The CO3 loop modules are presented from the perspective of a JTF
commander.
a) Module 1: Formulate the Problem
Module 1, as depicted in Figure 5, may more appropriately be called
"political preparation of the battlefield" (PPB). Problem formulation in OOTW is,
by far, the most political and difficult of the functions in the CO3 loop. It is also
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the most important. The output of this module is a clear and concise articulation
of the mandate, the intermediate objectives, and the desired end state.
In this module, US forces receive overall policy guidance from the
strategic level, and will analyze this mandate for both explicit and implicit
missions and tasking. The full range of potential coalition partners and their
respective political agendas are then identified, and a "core" of decision makers
EXECUTE
FORMULATE THE PROBLEM
POLITICAL PREPARATION OF THE
BATTLEFIELD
IDENTIFY PARTICIPANTS AND AGENDAS
DETERMINE MECHANISM FOR DECISION MAKING
ANALYZE MANDATE/DETERMINE END STATE
IDENTIFY POTENTIAL SCENARIOS
IDENTIFY OBJECTIVES
PREVIEW REMAINING C03 MODULES
Figure 5. Module 1: Formulate the Problem
is formed. The mechanism for decision making is also identified, whether via
single headquarters, coordinated meetings on a twice weekly basis, or
communication via liaison. Consensus is then reached with fellow coalition
partners as to a common interpretation of the mandate, as well as the desired
end state. Sequential objectives are then charted to reach the determined end
state.
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The objectives the coalition problem solving system will address
must be developed in accordance with the "do-ability" criteria previously
discussed in this thesis. Wanting to do something, and having the resources
with which to do it are two very important, but separate, matters. Coalition forces
must ensure that they both want to do something, and have the resources with
which to accomplish a particular objective in order to prevent the "mission creep"
syndrome that some previous coalitions have experienced. The timing, scope
and cnticality of the required coalition action will also drive the determination of
the objectives, to a degree.
This step should also include an initial iteration through ail of the
CC)3 modules to provide planners with an initial perspective on potential
problems and solutions as early as possible. In the implementation of this step,
the answers to several questions may help formulate the problem. In
implementing this step, the answers to several questions may help achieve a
clearer picture of the problem:
• Who are the decision makers, and how and when are decisions made?
• What is the nature of the mission and the operating environment, and
what types of forces are likely to be required?
• What is the current state of the target environment?
• What is the desired state of the target environment?
• What viewpoints must be addressed to achieve an amenable solution?
• What are the basic assumptions of the problem? What is the history?
How has the problem, historically, been solved?
• What are the existing and potential threats?
• What are the existing and potential scenarios?
• What is the time frame in which this mission must be accomplished?
In summary, three major steps take place in Module 1: (1) the
coalition participants and the general manner in which coalition decisions are
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made is identified; (2) consensus concerning the nature of the mandate is
reached, and objectives are defined to achieve the agreed upon end state; (3)
the remaining modules are previewed for potential problems to provide planners
with as much lead time as possible to find solutions.
b) Module 2: Bound the C2 System
Module 2, as described by Figure 6, outlines the relevant system
elements that bound the problem of interest. The first goal is to differentiate
between the system and its environment. The JCS definition for a command and
control system, as provided in Chapter II of this thesis, is useful in conducting








BOUND THE C2 SYSTEM
ASSESS ENVIRONMENT
. IDENTIFY PHYSICAL AND STRUCTURAL
C2 ENTITIES
. DEVELOP CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
Rest of World
Figure 6. Module 2: Bound the C2 System
physical entities- equipment, software, and people, and associated facilities; (2)
structure- organization, concepts of operation, standard operating procedures,
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and patterns of information flow; and (3) process- the actual functions, actions,
and impact of the system. [Ref. 71 :p. 5]
This module identifies the C^ system by its physical entities and
structures and associates it to the forces it controls and the environmental
stimuli to which it responds, including the threat. Once the aggregate system
elements are identified, the physical and structural entities may be further bound
by placing them in the appropriate level of the diagram represented in Figure 7.
This series of levels, or "onion skin" graphic, has five rings in its most inclusive
depiction, and represents an all-encompassing perspective of the factors
bearing on a particular operational problem.
Figure 7. C2 System Bounding and Levels of Analysis
Beyond the outer ring is "the rest of the world." Elements and
structure that exist, and may have importance with respect to similar problems,
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but which are outside the scope of the immediate problem facing a particular
coalition are contained in this layer. An example of the potential contents in this
region may include such events as the development of another crisis in a
different region, which may divert resources to the specific problem in focus.
The outermost ring of the "onion" represents the environmental
factors that impact the problem This ring encompasses the major scenario
components in an operation, initially with regard to the current situation within a
target environment. For example, "the Kurdish rebellion spawned an Iraqi
retaliation, which forced a mass Kurdish exodus to the mountains on the Turkish
and Iranian borders. The refugees have no food, water or shelter, and hundreds
are dying every day," encapsulates the many key elements of the crisis.
Identifying causes and effect linkages in an environment is a critical function in
this layer. In line with the example provided, the history of the region, culture of
the people, and likely scenarios must all be assessed. Intelligence obviously has
a substantial role to play in this ring. The coalition must collectively identify what
it knows and what it does not (but must) know, as well as make assumptions
concerning possible scenarios. The "macro"-essential elements of information
(EEls) are identified in this layer.
Moving towards the center, the next ring deals with the forces and
organizations which comprise the coalition. The pie wedge sectors which divide
this and all subsequent rings of the onion skin diagram convey the notion that
the coalition is comprised of a system of interrelated systems, and that each
participant has its unique physical and structural entities which it brings to an
operation. The C2 systems of the individual participants is the focus of the next
ring, and the sub components of these systems make up the inner most ring.
The identification of the physical entities that comprise a coalition's
respective "firepower" provides coalition leadership with a general
understanding of whether or not it has the required resources with which to
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accomplish the mandate, and subsequent objectives. Requests are made to
higher authority to fill critical shortages. If resource constraints cause previously
identified mandate and objectives to fail the "do-ability" analysis, the mandate
and objectives may require revaluation.
Once coalition decision makers are comfortable that sufficient
resources exist within the coalition, a concept of operations is developed that
establishes appropriate command or cooperative relationships, and missions are
doled out to respective participants. This entails hierarchical, dependent, or
complementary organization of participants and subsequent mission assignment
in manner commensurate with both political desire and capability.
In summary, within the second module of the CO^ loop, a broad
based assessment of the operational environment, and those elements with
which the coalition must interact is presented; a static representation of the
physical and structural command and control entities inherent in individual
coalition partners, and the coalition as a whole, is assembled; and, a concept of
operations that establishes appropriate command and coordinative relationships
and missions for each coalition participant is created.
c) Module 3: Specify Measures of Force Effectiveness
Figure 8 shows Module 3, where coalition decision makers must
specify the criteria that gauges the impact both of the coalition as a whole, as
well as the individual coalition participants. Module 1 identified the coalition's
overarching objectives. Module 2 resulted in assignment of missions, in
response to the objectives determined in Module 1 . In Module 3, a measurement
for assessing the collective and individual contributions of coalition participants
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Figure 8. Module 3: Specify Measures
Traditional command and control systems analysis involves three
primary measures: Measures of Force Effectiveness (MOFE), Measures of
Effectiveness (MOE), and Measures of Performance (MOP). The three levels of
the C2 system in the onion skin diagram are associated with one of these
measures, depending upon the layer. Determining the boundary of interest helps
to determine what level of measure is required. For the purposes of this
discussion, the boundary between the force and the environment, and between
the forces and their respective C^ systems are the boundaries of interest.
MOFEs and MOEs
,
respectively, are the measures required.The preliminary
iteration of the CO** loop, as recommended in Module 1, may provide an initial
set of relevant measures. This initial set may be put through further scrutiny
through comparison with the set of criteria established in Table 1, which may
produce a more manageable set of measures. [Ref. 71 :p. 13]
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TABLE 1. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION MEASURES
Characteristics Definition
Mission-oriented Relates to force/system missions
Discriminatory Identified real differences between alternatives
Measurable Can be computed or estimated
Quantitative Can be assigned numbers or ranked
Realistic Relates realistically to the C2 system and associated
uncertainties.
Objective Can be defined or derived, independent of subjective
opinion
Appropriate Relates to acceptable standards and objectives
Sensitive Reflects changes in system variables
Inclusive Reflects those standards required by the analysis
objectives
Independent Is mutually exclusive with respect to other measures
Simple Is easily understood by the user
The remaining measures are then classified with regard to their level
of measurement, and MOFEs are related to MOEs. MOEs are further mapped
into MOPs in the MCES, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. Measures at
the higher level, MOFEs and MOEs, are desirable because they are more
closely related to the ultimate purpose of the coalition, and because they capture
many of the implied lower level measures in a meaningful way. For example, an
aggregate MOFE may involve something such as reducing the death toll in a
specific crisis. An individual MOFE could include delivering a specific amount of
food or medicine to a region. A AOE could consist of something like the number
of requests for food and medicine a force's C^ system can process per hour.
This MOE is a critical component in achieving aforementioned MOFE.
To summarize, Module 3 results in the specification of a set of
measures that allow coalition decision makers to gauge the effects of the force
on the environment, and the contributions of the respective forces' C^ systems
to the forces' effects.
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d) Module 4: Define the 02 Process
Module 4, as shown in Figure 9 focuses attention on the individual
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Figure 9. Module 4: Define C2 Process
Generally, the implementation of the CO^ loop modules to this stage
have resulted in an identification of: the mandate and objectives, system
boundaries and elements, a concept of operations and command relationships,
and criterion to measure force and C^ system contribution.
Each participant, however, has a potentially different set of
parameters within which to embed its C^ system. Obviously, the missions given
to a relief agency and a military force will vary, as will their respective command
163
and control processes. Implementation of this model is oriented towards
ensuring that the respective systems are properly aligned.
Specifically, attention is directed at identifying three elements of
concern: 1) the environmental "initiator" of the C2 process, which results from a
divergence in the desired state of a target environment; 2) the internal
cybernetic C^ process (Lawson's Loop) as developed in Chapter II, and; 3) the
input to and output from the internal C^ process and the environment. As
discussed, the C2 process functions are generic, and may be adapted to
comprehensively map to almost any C^ process. They are also applied
iteratively. The key element in implementing this module is understanding that it
is geared towards identifying the "action-reaction" link of respective C^
processes, and their intended impact on a target environment.
e) Module 5: Integrate System Elements and Functions
In Module 5, illustrated in Figure 10, the interrelationships and
interdependences between the physical entities and structures (defined in
Module 2) and the C^ processes or functions (described in Module 4) are
identified and described. This is necessary to provide an overall perspective on
"who does what, and when do they do it," among the coalition forces. In way of
an oversimplified example, the output of a reconnaissance unit's directed action
on the target environment-identifying the location and composition of hostile
forces provides at least a portion of the impetus to an infantry battalion's C2
cycle, which will cause it to act on the environment- close with and destroy the
enemy.
The second portion of the challenge, is identifying the manner in
which the required information is transmitted from one participant to another.
Information flow, as demonstrated, supports and spurs decisions and links the
separate C^ processes within the aggregate coalition architecture. As discussed
in Chapter VI, critical links must be identified, and modes of communication
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determined. Base upon this assessment, planners can determine the actions
required to achieve interoperability and connectivity. Resource surpluses and
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BUILD AN ARCHITECTURE
Figure 10. Module 5: Integrate System Elements and Functions
The final form of the architecture should at least consist of the
process description of the system elements and their associated processes
arranged in the structural framework depicted in Figure 6 and Figure 7.
In sum, this module maps steps two and four together to provide a
cohesively linked C^ architecture for the entire coalition. Both the static and
dynamic characteristics of the architecture will change in concert with the
operational circumstances and subsequent iterations of the CO^ loop.
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f) Module 6: Execute Coalition Command and Control
Once the architecture is established, having considered all
participants and their respective capabilities, limitations, and political agendas,
implementation of Module 6 is where the coalition members execute their
respective command and control problem solving processes. As discussed, the
individual missions assigned to participants are sub problems of the larger
problem that is assigned to the coalition. The output of these respective
processes, has some measurable effect upon the target environment. The
"round table" of coalition decision makers determines if the coalition's end state
is achieved. If it is not, the CO^ cycle goes through another iteration.
C. CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, the author developed a framework that provides coalition
participants with a common methodology for approaching command and control
considerations in operations other than war. The framework attempts to fill the
gaps in existing doctrine, through ensuring that , to the degree possible,
planners maintain a holistic approach to achieving command and control in the
OOTW environment. As discussed throughout the thesis, there are a number of
peculiar problems that OOTW present for US military forces. Entitled the
Coordination, Cooperation, and Consensus Loop (CO^) loop, this new
framework is intended to augment present crisis and deliberate planning
processes. Through a series of steps or modules, the CO^ loop provides
planners a tool with which to establish, in logical and chronological fashion, an
all encompassing perspective of command and control considerations in a
particular operation. The framework is generic, iterative, and may be applied to a
myriad of operations. Only broad based concepts are discussed in the approach
developed, and further assessment of specific functionality within each module
is required. Also, the author recognized that a sample application may enhance
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the reader's level of comprehension of this process. Unfortunately, due to time
constraints, this is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
1. Command and Control Overview
Chapter II provided a broad discussion of the origins, nature, objectives,
and principles that pertain to both command and control, and its inseparable
components, intelligence and communications. Historical origins of command
and control, as well as key elements of current military perceptions were
discussed. Moreover, the critical notion of C2 as a problem solving process, that
depends upon intelligence and communications is presented.
2. Operations Other Than War
Chapter III illustrated the unique environment of operations other than
war and its relationship to traditional US command and control precepts. The
chapter illustrated that several adjustments are required of the US military mind
in order to more appropriately approach the "irregular" operating environment. In
the author's opinion, US perceptions concerning command and control do not
accommodate the political, environmental, and operational realities present in
OOTW.
3. Command and Control Lessons Learned
Chapter IV provided a detailed discussion of the impediments and
challenges to effective coalition command and control in OOTW. The absence of
a common doctrine and its resulting effects on creating an appropriate
operational mindset were discussed. Military commanders must recognize that
coalition objectives in OOTW are achieved through coordination, cooperation,
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and consensus, or CO^, rather than through more hierarchically arranged,
authoritative relationships. The need for more holistic approach is also
discussed, as pertains to the need to address the political considerations of all
coalition members when establishing coalition objectives, command and
cooperative relationships, mission assignments, and rules of engagement.
Decisions on these matters are developed collectively.
4. Intelligence Lessons Learned
Chapter V established that intelligence is critical to C^ in OOTW, and
the path to maximizing the potential of intelligence in OOTW is laden with
obstacles. Again, current approaches, procedures, and methods follow
historically ingrained patterns aimed at winning the Cold War. The intelligence
community continues to adjust to the diverse requirements thrust upon it, and is
still developing the framework necessary to provide appropriate levels of support
in the complex and diverse OOTW environment.
5. Communications Lessons Learned
Chapter VI presented the challenges coalitions face in ensuring that
critical and adequate communications are achieved between required entities.
As with command and control, and intelligence, current doctrine falls short of
what is required in the OOTW environment. Interoperability problems exist
between US services, and are largely rooted in an acquisition history that follows
the same divergent path as individual service perspectives on command and
control. Continuation of current trends in the ad-hoc nature of coalitions will
perpetuate the degree of interoperability experienced. Interoperability, as with
other necessary ingredients in an adequate C^ architecture require planning.
Current doctrine and procedures do not appear robust enough to handle the
diversity of OOTW. The need for a common, centralized, and holistic approach
is established.
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6. A New Framework
Chapter VII presented a new framework, the Coordination,
Cooperation, and consensus (CO3 ) Loop, which may prove useful as an initial
foundation upon which to develop a common doctrine. It presents a standardized
methodology that structures a coalition's approach to command and control in a
holistic manner that more fully considers the peculiarities of OOTW, as well as
the diverse nature of the forces within the operating environment.
The CO3 loop provides a first step in eliminating the current ad-hoc
manner in which coalition command and control is established. It provides a
conceptual framework that is useful in mapping the interrelationships and
interdependencies between the functions and physical entities, in order to
ensure that the coalition's maximum potential is realized in as efficient manner
as possible. Abstractly, it attempts to create a situation where, for a change, the
value of the whole is equal to or greater than the sum of the parts. The CO3 loop
strives to instill this synergistic and complementary effect between coalition
partners, and between the coalition and the environment within which it
operates.
B. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has discussed that the end of the Cold War has created a
complex and varied environment within which US forces will operate. Both
manmade and natural disasters are likely to continue, as the world adjusts to the
disappearance of previously established boundaries. Consequently, US
participation in operations other than war is likely to continue, and will likely
occur in the context of a coalition environment. Currently, coalitions are
developed on a largely ad-hoc basis. There is no common doctrine, at present,
which provides a common approach or adequately addresses the uniqueness
and diversity represented by coalition operations in the irregular environment..
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The exact leadership role that US forces may play in a coalition will vary.
However, US forces, especially as comprised in a Joint Task Force (JTF), are
often a logical nucleus around which to form a coalition. Current US doctrine and
perceptions concerning command and control, intelligence, and
communications, however are based largely towards the employment of US
forces in more conventional circumstances.
Through a combination of ingenuity and, often, enormous individual efforts,
existing doctrine, procedures and approaches have, to a degree, sufficiently
served to accomplish the tasks at hand. However, many problems and lessons
are unnecessarily releamed with each new operation, potentially detracting from
the speed and degree of impact the coalition can have on a target environment..
A common and standardized approach is required to blend the political
agendas, capabilities, and limitations of a diverse coalition into an efficient and
effective entity. Only through a methodical iteration of a process that logically,
chronologically, and holistically frames and links the problem at hand, the
resources arrayed to address the problem, and the functions that comprise the
problem solving process, is this possible. This is the objective of the
Coordination, cooperation, and Consensus (CO^) Loop presented in this
thesis.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
The study of operations other than war is relatively new, as indicated by the
comparatively recent efforts at developing doctrine to specifically addresses this
environment. This thesis continues endeavors at identifying the impact of the
irregular environment upon military operations, and recommending appropriate
adjustments. The framework presented represents an initial effort at improving
coalition approach to command and control in OOTW. General concepts and
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functions were introduced. However, there are several areas that could benefit
greatly by further research. These include:
• A more detailed and higher resolution functional decomposition of each
module of the CO3 loop.
• A more detailed assessment of current operational and tactical
interoperability problems between US services, and the US and potential
coalition partners.
• A comprehensive look at the UN command and control mechanisms, and
associated problems.
• A more thorough enumeration of the political dynamics present in a
coalition environment.
• A comparative analysis of various methods of establish the force
composition and organization of a Joint Task Force.
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APPENDIX A: CASE STUDIES
A. OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT
As the Gulf War's fighting ended on February 28, 1 991 , a Kurdish rebellion
erupted in northern Iraq. Iraqi forces attacked the Kurds. People fled from cities
and towns. Worldwide television showed cold, wet Kurds suffering from hunger
and disease and dying in the hills of northern Iraq and southern Turkey.
On April 6, 1991, USCINCEUR established JTF Provide Comfort. Initial
objectives were to provide humanitarian relief by air dropping food and other
necessities, establishing relief centers, supervising distribution of food and
water, and improving sanitation and medical care. JTF Provide Comfort included
USAF airlift, a special operations command, and an amphibious ready group
(with an embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit). When it became apparent that
operations would significantly increase in complexity and duration, USCINCEUR
expanded the organization of the JTF, changed commanders to reflect the
changed nature and increasing complexity of the operation, and established the
JTF headquarters at Incirlik, Turkey.
The new JTF commander established two subordinate JTFs: JTF Alfa, a
special operations task force, at Silopi, Turkey; and JTF Bravo at Zakhu, Iraq.
JTF Bravo's mission was to provide security in its operational area inside Iraq,
build refugee camps, and move displaced persons into these camps. JTF Bravo
forces included the Marine Expeditionary Unit, a British Commando Brigade, a
French Parachute Regiment, a Spanish Parachute Regiment, and US Army
airborne infantry and attack helicopter battalions as well as PSYOP and civil
affairs units. Ultimately, JTF Bravo included combat and combat support units
from US and coalition member nations, including an Italian Composite Special
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Forces Airborne Brigade, a Dutch Marine Combat Battalion, and an Infantry Rifle
Platoon from Luxembourg.
Air Force forces (AFFOR) operated from Incirlik, and established and
maintained an air exclusion zone over the protected area and coordinated air
delivery. Army and non-US cargo helicopters were OPCON to COMAFFOR.
Army forces (ARFOR) (less those in JTF Bravo) were also based at Incirlik.
COMARFOR was also designated commander of a multinational support
command, with OPCON of Army, Air Force, and Marine logistic units to support
its multinational force.
PROVIDE COMFORT was a coalition effort. The United Kingdom, Spain,
France, the Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, Australia, Luxembourg, Canada,
Germany, and the United States contributed forces. The operation also
encompassed United Nations relief assistance. The JTF became Combined
Task Force (CTF) Provide Comfort.
Especially in its early weeks, PROVIDE COMFORT demonstrated the
remarkable agility and flexibility of a team-oriented effort. The CJTF and
subordinate commanders used Service capabilities where they were needed.
They assigned clear (although not easy) missions; gave direct, simple guidance;
and established command relationships that facilitated mission accomplishment.
It was an outstanding example of the complexity of the end state and post
hostilities operations. [Ref. 17:pp. V-7,8]
B. OPERATION SEA ANGEL
On April 28, 1991, a tropical storm began brewing in the Bay of Bengal.
This storm, named Cyclone 02B picked up speed and power quickly, and on
April 28th, slammed in to the Chittagong-Cox's Bazaar coast of Bangladesh. In
the areas directly in the storm's trajectory, a wall of water 20 feet high swept
inland three miles and completely inundated numerous offshore islands. This
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event caused the majority of the mortality. By best government estimates, up to
138,000 lives were lost and 2.7 million people were rendered homeless and
hungry. Most of these were squatters who farm the mud flats in the Bay of
Bengal that stretch out from the Bangladesh coast.
The port of Chittagong, and much of the Bangladeshi Navy were destroyed.
Hundreds of square miles of farmland and fish hatcheries were inundated, and
over 100,000 head of livestock were killed. Further, may miles of earthen
seawall were breached, making the coast even more susceptible to the normal
sea swells from the Bay of Bengal.
By 1 1 May, a request for assistance had been received in Washington from
the newly elected civilian government of Bangladesh. Upon approval of this
request by the NCA, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff tasked
USCINCPAC with executing OPERATION PRODUCTIVE EFFORT ( the name
was later changed to OPERATION SEA ANGEL). The relief arrived in the form
of a joint task force, commanded by Marine Corps Major General H.C.
Stackpole, III.
By the next day, General Stackpole and key members of his staff were in
Dhatka, Bangladesh, assessing the magnitude of the damage and determining
the forces required to render appropriate assistance. The staff of the JTF was
comprised of Marines and sailors of the III Marine Expeditionary Force, based on
Okinawa, Japan, joined shortly thereafter by "jointness" experts from Hawaii.
The rescue force also included Special Operations Forces personnel, who were
skilled in dealing with emergency situations in emerging nations, as well as by
five US Army Blackhawk helicopters.
The typhoon had cut off conventional voice radio and telephone contact
with the American Embassy. Once the staff arrived in Bangladesh, a quick
briefing with US Ambassador William Milam's country team, the government of
Bangladesh, and non governmental relief organizations, such as CARE and the
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Red Cross-Red Crescent, provided the JTF with an initial assessment of what
assistance was required.
Relief supplies were in adequate supply. The difficulty was that the supplies
were in Dhaka, and the hardest hit area was around Chittagong, 120 miles to the
south. Distributing relief supplies would be a central challenge. General
Stackpole and Ambassador Milam emphasized that the government of
Bangladesh was in charge of relief efforts, and would set priorities during the
operation. The JTF and supporting forces from other nations (including the
British, Japanese, Indians, and Chinese) would provide transportation and
medical services as required.
The Bangladesh government formed two coordinating committees. The one
at the national level in Dhaka primarily set priorities for US C-130 flights to a
forward staging base at the seaport of Chittagong; the second, at Chittagong,
scheduled helicopter missions to the outlying islands and coastal regions where
the aid was most desperately needed. The committees were composed of
representatives of the Bangladesh civil government, Bangladesh military, NGOs,
the JTF, and officials of the US Agency for International Development.
Bangladesh officials chaired both committees and were responsible for
designating priorities in the relief operations.
Further, a US Navy amphibious task group with the 5th Marine
Expeditionary Brigade aboard was enroute back to the US, after participation in
the Persian Gulf War, and was in the area shortly after the storm hit. This force
remained offshore and contributed helicopters, medical teams and engineers as
needed, but kept the US presence ashore to a minimum. The small force
footprint was important in minimizing the culture shock between Western service
personnel and local Bangladesh civilians who were unaccustomed to US
technology, culture and customs. The ability to "sea base" the relief operations
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kept the number of US personnel ashore at any one time to fewer than 500 of
the 7000 US military members present. [Ref. 47 and Ref. 72]
C. OPERATIONS PROVIDE RELIEF, RESTORE HOPE, AND
CONTINUE HOPE
Operations PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE demonstrated the
complexity of integrating peace support operations with other types of operations
and provided a glimpse of a new style of post-Cold
War military operations. By the middle of 1992, after years of civil war,
drought, and famine, the situation in the southern half of Somalia had reached
such a tragic state that humanitarian organizations launched a worldwide appeal
for help. In response to this outcry, the President of the United States directed,
in mid-August 1992, an airlift of food and supplies for starving Somali (Operation
PROVIDE RELIEF).
US forces immediately initiated the airlift of relief supplies from Mombassa,
Kenya, but continued instability in Somalia prevented safe passage of the flights.
Relief workers in Somalia operated in this unsafe environment under constant
threat. Distribution of relief supplies was haphazard and subject to banditry and
obstruction by local warlords. The people of Somalia continued to suffer.
Based on the continued suffering and the realization that the United States
was the only nation capable of decisive action, the President directed
USCINCCENT to plan a larger scale humanitarian relief operation. On
December 3d, the President directed USCINCCENT to execute Operation
RESTORE HOPE. In broad terms, it was an effort to raise Somalia from the
depths of famine, anarchy, and desperation in order to restore its national
institutions and its hope for the future. Conducted under the auspices of the
United Nations, Operation RESTORE HOPE was a multinational humanitarian
assistance operation that ultimately involved more than 38,000 troops from 21
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coalition nations, with an additional 9 nations providing funding, support, and
facilities vital to the operation.
Unified Task Force (UNITAF) Somalia was formed with forces from France,
Italy, Canada, Belgium, Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, as
well as other nations. On December 9, 1992, under UN auspices, US SOF and
amphibious forces assaulted and secured the airport at Mogadishu and the
seaport soon thereafter. Arriving supplies could now be off-loaded safely.
The task force methodically expanded throughout the capital city of
Mogadishu and into the countryside. As land forces were added to the task
force, control was pushed inland. The airlift of supplies increased significantly as
air bases were secured. Over the next three months, the coalition expanded into
the southern half of Somalia, establishing and securing relief centers and
escorting supply convoys.
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The operation was made more complex by continued uncertainty and
instability in the Somali political situation. The task force, working closely with
the US Department of State and eventually more than 50 humanitarian relief
organizations, assisted in establishing an environment in which relief operations
could proceed. Because of the proliferation of weapons throughout the country
during the many years of civil war, relief efforts included the identification of
individuals and groups that posed immediate threats and the removal of visible
weapons from circulation. A radio station and newspaper were established to
inform the public regarding the UN force objectives as well as public service
information to enhance security.
As the situation was brought under control by military forces, priority shifted
to diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain a lasting truce between competing
factions. UNITAF Somalia was amended to include relief-in-place by forces
assigned to the United Nations Operation in Somalia, now designated UNOSOM
II. The distribution of relief supplies continued while great care was taken to
ensure a seamless transition between UNITAF and UNOSOM II forces.
UNOSOM II involves a much broader, "nation bulding" mandate, and is still
active today. [Ref. 17:pp. V-14-V-16]
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APPENDIX B: TYPES OF OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR
Operations other than war include, but are not limited to, the following types
of operations.
A. ARMS CONTROL
The main purpose of arms control is to enhance national security. Although
it may be viewed as a diplomatic mission, the military can play a vital role. For
example, US military personnel may be involved in verifying an arms control
treaty; may seize WMD (NBC or conventional); may escort authorized deliveries
of weapons and other materials (such as enriched uranium) to preclude loss or
unauthorized use of these assets; or may dismantle or destroy weapons with or
without the consent of the host nation. All of these actions help reduce threats to
regional stability.
B. COMBATING TERRORISM
These measures are both offensive (counter terrorism) and defensive (anti-
terrorism) in nature. The former typically occurs outside the territory of the
United States, while the latter may occur anywhere in the world. The Department
of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Federal Aviation
Administration are actively involved in anti-terrorism operations. See Joint Pub
3-07.2 for more information.
C. DOD SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS
The national drug control strategy (NDCS) is issued by the President
pursuant to the Antidrug Abuse Act of 1988. The antidrug plans and programs of
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the Department of Defense are an integral part of the NDCS and include
detection and monitoring; support to cooperative foreign governments; support
for interdiction; support to drug law enforcement agencies; internal drug
prevention and treatment programs; research and development; and command,
control, communications, and intelligence support. See Joint Pub 3-07.4 for
more information.
The National Defense Authorization Act of 1989 assigned three major
counterdrug responsibilities to the Department of Defense: acting as the single
lead agency for detecting and monitoring aerial and maritime transit of illegal
drugs into the United States; integrating the command, control, communications,
and technical intelligence assets of the United States that are dedicated to
interdicting the movement of illegal drugs into the United States; approving and
funding State governors' plans for expanded use of the National Guard to
support drug interdiction and enforcement operations of law enforcement
agencies.
D. NATION ASSISTANCE
The main objective of nation assistance is to assist a host nation with
internal programs to promote stability, develop sustainability, and establish
institutions responsive to the needs of the people. Security assistance and
foreign internal defense are the primary means of providing nation assistance.
1. Security Assistance
Security assistance refers to a group of programs that provide defense
articles and services, including training, to eligible foreign countries and
international organizations that further US national security objectives. Public
law prohibits personnel providing security assistance services (including mobile
training assistance) from performing combatant duties.
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2. Foreign Internal Defense
Foreign internal defense (FID) supports a host nation's fight against
lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency. US military support to foreign internal
defense should focus on assisting host-nation personnel to anticipate, preclude,
and counter these threats. Emphasis on internal defense and development
programs when organizing, planning, and executing military support to FID
programs is essential. Specific tools used in executing the DOD component of
FID programs may include multinational exercises, exchange programs, civil-
military operations, intelligence and communications sharing, logistic support of
security assistance, and combat operations. See Joint Pub 3-07.1 for more
information.
E. NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATION
The purpose of NEOs is to safely and quickly remove civilian
noncombatants from an area outside the United States where they are, or may
be, threatened. Although NEOs are principally conducted for US citizens, US
Armed Forces may also evacuate citizens from host, allied, or friendly nations if
the NCA determine it to be in the best interest of the United States. The
Department of State has the lead in conducting NEOs. US ambassadors or
chiefs of diplomatic missions are responsible for planning for NEOs by preparing
emergency action plans to be implemented when NEOs are required. See Joint
Pub 3-07.51 for more information.
F. PEACE OPERATIONS
This term encompasses three general areas: diplomatic, traditional
peacekeeping, and forceful military actions. Therefore, it may be helpful to view
these types of operations with only three terms: peacemaking (diplomatic
actions), peacekeeping (noncombat military operations), and peace enforcement
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(coercive use of military force). Peace operations are not typically conducted
within the territory of the United States. For more information, see Joint Pub 3-
07.3.
The UN has been the most frequent sponsor of classical peacekeeping
activities; however, regional organizations such as the Organization of American
States, the Organization of African Unity, and the Arab League have also acted
in similar fashion to prevent, halt, or contain conflict in their respective regions.
The objective of peace operations is to achieve a peaceful settlement among
belligerent parties, primarily through diplomatic action. Military operations may
be necessary if diplomatic actions are insufficient or inappropriate.
G. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCIES
Insurgencies attempt to exploit actual or perceived governmental
weaknesses, such as failure to maintain law and order; inability to respond
adequately to disasters; overreaction to civil disturbances; or failure to meet
economic, political, ethnic, or social expectations.
Organizational structures for US support to insurgencies can be overt, low
visibility, clandestine, or covert. Each support program is conducted as a special
activity within the meaning of section 3.4(h) of Executive Order 12333, 4
December 1981, "US Intelligence Activities," and is subject to approval by the
US Congress.
The US military principally trains and advises insurgent forces in
unconventional warfare tactics, techniques, and procedures. These actions
should be integrated with the programs of the other instruments of national
power. [Ref. 17:pp. V-9-V-16]
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